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Preface
When I first began on the series of articles contained in this book, I had no
idea that one day they would constitute a dissertation. Nor, for that matter,
did I realize that I was working on a series of articles. However, while
writing what was ultimately to become Chapter 2, I gradually succumbed
to that fascination with conditional sentences that has held me in thrall for
more than ten years, although if I had not been blissfully unaware at the
outset of the shelves of literature that were lying in wait for me, I would
no doubt have given the minefield a wide berth. Those who feel that ten
years is an awfully long time to devote to anyone subject should realize
that a) in actual practice I rarely spent more than one day a week on
conditionals; and b) ten years is not really all that long, especially if it has
taken one sixteen to graduate in the first place.
There are, of course, a number of people whom I should like to thank.
First of all, there is my promotor Prof. Henk van Riemsdijk, to whom I
feel especially grateful for his sanguine way of encouraging me to carry
on, although he never put me under the slightest pressure (so that it
became a matter of honour for me to finish this thesis on schedule), and
for never losing confidence in me, even when, owing to never-ending
revisions, my own confidence in the whole project was at the lowest
possible ebb.
I also owe a very great debt of gratitude to Carlos Gussenhoven of
Nijmegen University, who will probably have forgotten by now that he
was the first person with whom I discussed conditional sentences, but who
will certainly remember how often I asked him to read and comment on
the rough drafts of some of the chapters in this book. The thoroughness
and acumen he brought to that task have contributed greatly to the clarity
of my own thinking on the subject, and hopefully, also to that of the book
itself.
It is difficult always to bear in mind that what may be fascinating for one
person may be extremely boring for another. Hence my gratitude to my
colleagues at Tilburg University, who time and again found themselves
forced to listen to, and comment on, pairs of conditional sentences 'with a
difference'. I still find it hard to believe how patiently and gallantly
especially Hans Verhulst (my room-mate and fellow Anglicist), Frans
Creemers, Andree Tingloo and Hans van Driel bore up under the continual
inroads I made on their peace of mind. Hans van Oriel is the one person I
mention twice, because the talks I had with him about the notion of 'truth'
helped me solve one of the central questions in this thesis.
I also wish to thank Herman Wekker and Eric Kellerman for the fruitful
discussions we had, years ago, on the subject of English and Dutch
'counterfactuals'; Prof. Harry de Swart and Elias Thijsse for explaining
some of the intricacies of classical logic to me; Adriana Esmeijer for
editing and considerably improving the Dutch summary; and Fons Maes
for helping me to cope with the computer layout of the manuscript.
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A GENERAL INIRODUCTION TO CONDITIONAL SENfENCES
Preliminary remarks
Even a cursory look at the psychological. linguistic and philosophical
literature on conditional sentences will show that they are bones of
contention. There even seems to be disagreement about what they mean.
To quote an extreme example: the logician Goodman (1983: 3) says that
'if we lack the means for interpreting counterfactual conditionals. we can
hardly claim to have any adequate philosophy of science,' with the clear
suggestion that as yet we have no way of interpreting these conditionals.
But there is also the psychologist Johnson-Laird (1986: 63). who says •
•Since we cannot prove that people understand the proper meaning of
conditionals. it is necessary to assume that they do.'
The present book contains a number of studies which have been
published before. and some that have not. This first chapter contains a
general introduction to the subject. and takes a brief look at some of the
problems that are dealt with in more detail later 00. Chapter 2 (first
published in 1984) was originally written in Dutch. and has been translated
into English, with some very slight modiftcations. It discusses the
differences between the four possible Dutch Counterfactuals constructions
(I did not realize at the time that one day I would come to object to the
term 'counterfactual'); Chapter 3 (first published in 1986) deals with the
rare cases where English allows the use of non-volitional will / would in
conditional subclauses; Chapter 4 (first published in 1989) describes the
use of should in the same position; Chapter 5 (first published in 1990) and
Chapter 6 take a critical look at the logic of indicative and subjunctive
conditionals respectively. Finally, Chapter 7 lists some of the pragmatic
differences between the two types of conditional. and ends with what is. in
my view, a fairly straightforward 'theory of conditionals', which leaves no
doubt as to my stance with respect to the views of Goodman and Johnson-
Laird mentioned above.
Inevitably. in a book that partially consists of previously published
material. there is a certain amount of overlap; but even Chapter 7. which
has not been published before. occasionally repeats remarks made in
Chapter 1. There is also an advantage to such repetitiveness, which is that
all the chapters can be read independently. The fact that Chapters 2 to 5
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have been published before also explains why no references are made in
them to any other chapter, whereas such references abound in Chapters 1,
6 and 7.
Although the contents of Chapters 5 and 6 might suggest otherwise, I
make no pretensions to expertise in the field of logic - but as the
arguments adduced by logicians frequently concern fundamental logical
operations as applied to natural language, I felt that a basic schooling in
logic was, at least in a number of cases, enough to take issue with the
logicians. Since, in addition, they frequently have things to say about
natural language without being linguists, I felt justified in making the
occasional remark about logic.
To the articles that have been published before postscripts have been
added in which in some cases links are established between the articles in
question and other chapters; in which certain important points are
elaborated further; and in which I go in for a good deal of speculation
about possible future developments. Frequently the postscripts draw
comparisons between the situations in English and Dutch. Occasionally,
they also provide new insights which arose after the publication of the
articles to which they are appended. In a few cases I have felt it necessary
to come back on (some of the) views I held when the articles were
published; however, these 'recantations' only concern matters of detail.
In one respect I have been quite traditional: although I am well aware
that the main clauses of many conditional sentences consist of questions or
commands, I shall do like the vast majority of writers on the subject, and
concentrate on those conditional sentences whose main clauses are
declarative sentences. Likewise, I have completely ignored markers of
hypotheticality or modality other than would, so that a naive reader might
infer that that is the only auxiliary appearing in a particular type of
conditional main clause, which, of course, it is not.
2 Terminology
Over the years various classifications of conditional sentences (CSs) have
been proposed in the literature; not surprisingly, these categorizations are
accompanied by a plethora of terms.
First of all, there is the generally, but not universally (see below),
accepted categorization into 'real' or 'open' conditionals, often called
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indicative conditionals (ICs) on the one band, and 'unreal' or
'hypothetical' conditionals, often called subjunctive conditionals (CSs), on
the other.
The term 'hypothetical' presents a problem in itself, in that it is
sometimes applied only to SCs, but sometimes also covers ICs. In a sense,
of course, any antecedent presents a hypothetical event or situation, so that
there is nothing wrong in principle with the use of the term with reference
to ICs. In this book. the term 'hypothetical' is to be taken to refer to SCs
when no further specification is given, 'open' being reserved for ICs.
Occasionally, however, the term 'hypothetical' is also used with reference
to ICs. Care has been taken to ensure that no misunderstandings can arise.
Sometimes the term 'hypothetical' is used interchangeably with the term
'theoretical'; this interchangeability may, however, have infelicitous results,
as will be argued in chapter 4.
Some scholars (notably Bennett 1989: 509fO) strongly object to the use
of the term 'subjunctive', their main argument being that except for a
number of petrified phrases, English lacks a subjunctive verb form. Such
criticism, however, cuts no ice, since any term will do as long as it is clear
what it refers to, and nobody will fail to recognize what 'subjunctive
conditional' stands for: it is a conditional which is formally distinguised by
having a past tense or a pluperfect in the subclause and a modal auxiliary,
mostly WOUld, followed by a (perfect) infinitive, in the main clause; in
addition, the states of events or situations referred to in SCs are usually
looked upon as not obtaining in the real world. Since this 'irrealis' aspect
of SCs is a matter of pragmatics only (see Chapter 6 for a discussion), the
term 'unreal conditional' is not to be preferred to 'subjunctive conditional'.
If one bears in mind that bistorically, subjunctive conditionals did indeed
contain a special subjunctive form in the subclause, the objection to the
term SC loses even more of its seriousness. In addition, of course, there
are languages in which a full-fledged subjunctive does exist (e.g. the
Romance languages) whose use mirrors that of the past tense in English if-
clauses.
There are scholars who prefer to call SCs 'Counterfactuals'; others only
use that term for Past SCs, i.e. SCs whose point of reference is a moment
in the past, and whose subclause therefore contains a pluperfect. the main
clause typically having would have + past participle. In this book. the term
'Counterfactual' (CF) is avoided, except in chapter 2, where it is used as
meaning 'subjunctive conditional', the term 'PAST CF' being used for Past
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SCs. The replacement, in Chapter 2, of CF and PAST CF by subjunctive
and past subjunctive respectively would have constituted a falsification of
history.
The reason why the term 'Counterfactual' is avoided in the rest of the
book is that in my view the term is a misnomer, since it suggests that
whatever is contained in the subclause or main clause of a conditional is
not the case in the real world. Semantically, there is nothing to set the
class of counterfactuals apart from that of subjunctive conditionals, so that
the former can simply be subsumed under the latter. One might say that
what a subjunctive conditional (SC) is to a present IC, a so-called Counter-
factual is to a Past IC, so that apart from the Present - Past distinction,
there is no fundamental difference between SCs and CFs. To give one
example: the only real difference between 'If that had happened, I would
have taken immediate action' and 'If that happened, I would take
immediate action' is that the point of reference of the former sentence is a
moment in the past, and that of the latter the moment of speaking. This is
not to deny, of course, that there are a number of practical differences
between SCs and CFs, the main reason being that we know more about the
past than about the present or future.
Above, the component parts of conditional sentences (CSs) have been
called subclause and main clause, but for a long time the terms usually
employed in the philosophical literature were 'protasis' and 'apodosis'
respectively. Lately, however, there has been a tendency to replace the
former term by 'antecedent' and the latter by 'consequent'; and it is
because these terms are more or less self-explanatory that they are used in
the later articles of the present book (Chapters 6 and 7). Again, history
would have been falsified if, for example in chapter 3, the terms 'protasis'
and 'apodosis' bad been replaced by 'antecedent' and 'consequent'
respectively.
The last term that needs to be mentioned here is ' semifactual' , which is a
conditional sentence, either IC or SC, to the antecedent of which is added
the word even, or a comparable word. They are often looked upon as
different from ordinary conditionals in that they imply the truth of
whatever claim is made in the consequent, which is wby they are also




The question how. fine-grained any classification of conditional sentences
should be has received quite a lot of answers.
What virtually all writers on conditional sentences have in common is
that they abide by the distinction, mentioned in section 2 above, between
indicative and subjunctive conditionals. But there is at least one writer who
disagrees on this score: Dudman (1984) (followed by Bennett (1989),
regards the standard dichotomy as fundamentally ill-conceived, and puts
forward the radically different view that the starting point of a
classification of conditional sentences should be the way in which the verb
phrases of the antecedent are generated by the grammar of English. This
leads Dudman to postulate a basic distinction between hypotheticals and
conditionals. The antecedents of the former are generated as full sentences
of English (,If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is human'), and have
consequents which contain a conclusion based on the truth of the
antecedent plus a number of implicit assumptions about the world; the
antecedents of the latter ('If that happens/happened, I will/would be most
upset'), by contrast. are generated under the aegis of the verb phrase of the
main clause, which results in a classification that puts what most people
would call ICs and SCs respectively in one category, Dudman's category
III. His second category (far smaller than either I or III) contains those
conditionals which make reference to present or past habits (,If Granny
misses/missed the last bus, she always walks/walked home').
So whereas the foUowing three sentences would be in two different
categories under the standard categorization, they would all fit into one
category according to Dudman:
(I) If Hitler invades England Germany will win the war
(2) If Hitler invaded England Germany would win the war
(3) If Hitler had invaded England Germany would have won the war
Now, although Dudman groups all these sentences together (whereas most
linguists would put 1) in one category, and 2) and 3) in the other), one
might also argue that the boundary line should be drawn between 2) and
3), since neither 1) nor 2) can now be uttered - only 3) can.
Dudman himself says that his classification of conditionals encounters
problems with respect to the use of the perfect in the antecedent, probably
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because then one can no longer see at a glance whether the if-clause is an
English sentence in its own right. or depends on the verb in the
consequent.
He makes no suggestion as to the solution of this problem, but even
assuming that there is one (i.e. a solution), Dudman's analysis fails in
those cases, discussed in Chapter 3, where the antecedent contains will or
would. 'If he'll be left destitute, I'll change my will' is a conditional
whose antecedent is a full, independent sentence of English, but which
certainly is not a hypothetical in Dudman's sense, although Dudman would
presumably have to class it. incorrectly, with his class I. What Dudman's
system fails to take into account is something that is discussed at some
length in Chapter 3, namely that the question which verbal form is to be
used in the antecedent is not decided by links, of whatever kind, between
antecedent and consequent. but only by the type of condition to be
fulfilled. Also, Dudman assumes that in his 3rd category conditionals, the
present tense in the antecedent. or at any rate in most antecedents, has
future reference. Like others, Dudman appears to take the view that 'If he
comes ...' and 'If he will come .. .' really mean the same thing. See
Chapter 3 for a refutation of that widespread assumption.
But there is more. Not only the perfect or will + infinitive, but even the
simple present in an antecedent might present problems for Dudman's
categorization; for example, an antecedent like 'If Jobo is hungry, .. .'
presumably belongs to Dudman's category I if the consequent is 'he is in
need of food', to category II is the consequent is 'he always has a snack'
and to category III if the consequent is 'he should take something to eat'.
It is less clear, however, into which category we should put the conditional
if the consequent reads: 'he wants something to eat' .
But even if questions like these can be answered by the application of
what will no doubt turn out to be a host of sophisticated interpretative
mechanisms, one may wonder exactly what is to be gained from Dudman's
categorization. It is to be borne in mind that Dudman himself admits that a
subcategorization of his class ill is possible, and even (although less
clearly) that it would be along the lines of the time-honoured standard
dichotomy. Dudman's strictures against this dichotomy are hardly
convincing; it is not really important. for example, that many SCs are
ambiguous in that they can also be interpreted as ICs about past habits. It
is unimportant in the sense that we do not need Dudman's theories to
explain the ambiguity.
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Ellis (1984: 55) also takes a critical look at Dudman's categorization and
doubts whether the distinction between hypotheticals and conditionals is of
much logical significance.
So all in all, although Dudman is undoubtedly right in claiming that
some conditionals have antecedents which are full sentences, as against
others that haven't. the question remains whether that fact constitutes
sufficient reason for jettisoning the old distinction between indicative and
subjunctive conditionals; and it seems that Dudman has failed to convince
the academic community that that distinction, and even the whole idea of
the existence of antecedents and consequents, should be given up. 1
Dudman is not the only scholar to object to the standard distinction
between indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Comrie (1986: 88),
referring to the 'contorted and often empty formulations attempting to
distinguish between real and hypothetical conditionals', argues for a 'scale
of hypotheticality', which will be extensively discussed in the final chapter.
Davies (1979) puts forward a division into telling conditionals, decision
conditionals, performance conditionals, induction conditionals, counter-
factual conditionals and knowledge conditionals.
Pountain (1983) distinguishes 5 types, characterized as consequence,
condition, implication, provision and concession respectively.
Noordman (1977) goes no further than a simple dichotomy: be makes a
distinction between condition-consequence relations and inferences.
Clearly, what is desirable is a categorization which does justice to the
linguistic facts, and to which Occam's razor has been applied: there is no
sense in postulating more categories than is strictly necessary. Seen from
that angle, it is at least necessary to make a distinction according to the
type of link between antecedent and consequent. Such a link may either be
stochastic, in the sense that it is up to the speaker to decide what he will
do in the event of the materialization of the antecedent; logical, in the
sense that the antecedent logically implies the consequent; or causal, in the
sense that there exists a causal relationship between antecedent and
consequent. It stands to reason that as far as 'freedom to decide' is
concerned. logical and causal ties between antecedent and consequent may
be lumped together. The stochastic - logical/causal dichotomy, which, by
the way, corresponds quite closely to Noordman's categorization referred
to above, will be seen to play an important role in matters discussed in
Chapters 4 and 6.
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There is one categorization of conditionals which is hardly or not at all
referred to in the literature, but which should be discussed nonetheless: it
is the classification which depends on the grammatical function that the
antecedent has in relation to the conditional as a whole: the if-clause may
either be an adverbial subclause or a nominal clause, i.e. a clause
functioning as subject or (prepositional) object. Interestingly, but not
surprisingly, whereas the standard clause order in 'adverbial' CSs is
antecedent - consequent, it is the opposite for 'nominal' CSs, a fact that
has not been remarked upon by Comrie (1986: 83), who regards the
preference for the adverbial order as a language universal. I do not know
the figures for English, but in the Eindhoven Corpus, which I consulted
when writing Chapter 2, the figures for Dutch are quite clear: whereas in
the case of adverbial antecedents the proportion of sentences with
antecedent first to those with antecedent second is 2:1, it is 1:2 for nominal
antecedents.
As suggested above, it is not difficult to see why the normal clause order
should be different for adverbial and nominal antecedents. In the case of
the former the event referred to in the antecedent usually leads to, and
therefore takes place earlier than, that referred to in the consequent. Many
nominal conditionals, on the other hand, are evaluative in character (e.g. 'I
would greatly appreciate it if you would open the window'), and we might
say that, in a sense, the event in the antecedent is 'overlapped' by its
evaluation in the consequent. But this may not be the only reason for the
tendency for nominal antecedents to take second position; this may simply
be due to a more general tendency of subject- and object-clauses to follow
the main clause. The issue will not be pursued any further here.
4 Logical approaches to conditionals
Although the approach adopted in this book is descriptive and empirical
rather than formal and mathematical, it is impossible to avoid or ignore
logical issues when dealing with conditional sentences. More generally,
any study of the semantics of natural language will at some point shade off
into a study of logical issues. At the same time, there is no point in
covering ground that has been covered exhaustively by others. Therefore, I
shall not go into the details of Stalnaker and Lewis' possible-world views
of conditional sentences. For a brief account, see, for example, Jackson
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(1987). Other textbooks which contain introductions and comprehensive
studies on the logic of conditionals, are Sanford (1989), which also
presents a historical overview; Harper et al. (1981), which contains a
number of articles written by the protagonists in the debate, i.e. Lewis and
Stalnaker, themselves; Traugott et al. (1986), in which there are also
studies which have not been written from the logician's point of view, but
from those of the linguist (e.g. Comrie) and the psychologist (especially
Johnson-Laird). The most recent work on conditional sentences is probably
Jackson (1991), which, although it might be thought to represent the 'state
of the art', only contains studies that, in one form or another, have all
appeared elsewhere before. In spite of the fact that it was published two
years later than Sanford (1989), it is the latter book which can be said to
be the most up-to-date study of conditional sentences.
As I have suggested above, anyone who takes a linguistic interest in
conditionals, but especially anyone who is interested in the borderline
between the semantics and pragmatics of conditional sentences, will,
sooner or later, be confronted with logical problems. So, although I make
no pretence at being a logician, there was nothing for it but to venture out
into the logicians' territory - but only to the extent that they venture into
that of the linguist.
There is widespread agreement among logicians that at least some (i.e.
subjunctive) conditionals are not truth-functional, which means that
operations which in classical logic preserve truth (for example, 'if p then
q' is truth-functionally the same as 'either not p or q') cannot be applied to
these conditionals. Although Chapters 5 and 6 are entirely devoted to this
issue, a few words may be said here about the similarity between the
if...then construction of natural language and Material Implication in logic,
an instance of which is true whenever the antecedent is false or the
consequent true. In the case of a true p there is no problem, and any naive
language user will agree with the logician: when there is such a true p, a
true q will result in a true conditional (e.g. 'If 4 is smaller than 5, then 2 is
smaller than 3') and a false q in a false one (e.g. 'If 4 is smaller than 5,
then 3 is smaller than 2'). A false p can still result in a comprehensible
conditional when q is also false (e.g. 'If 5 is smaller than 4, then 3 is
smaller than 2'), which leaves the strange case - strange from the point of
view of the language user - where p is false and q true (e.g. 'If 5 is
smaller than 4, then 2 is smaller than 3'). But even in natural language the
last conditional can be looked upon as making at least some sense once it
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is realized that from a false antecedent anything follows - and that
'anything' includes the truth. Still, it is not surprising that in natural
language conditionals of the last type do not occur. Indeed, as will be
argued in Chapters 5 and 6, conditionals with false antecedents must be
accompanied by patently false consequents, since otherwise their
antecedents will be treated as true.
It is important, in view of what follows, to mention the so-called Ramsey
test (Ramsey 1931), a thought experiment which we supposedly carry out
when assessing conditional sentences, and which lies at the basis of most
possible-world accounts of conditionals:
If two people are arguing 'If A will C?' and are both in doubt as
to A, they are adding A hypothetically to their stock of knowledge
and arguing on that basis about c... We can say they are fixing
their degrees of belief in C given A.
With Stalnaker's (1968) modification, the procedure becomes as follows:
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs;
second, make whatever adjustments are required to maintain
consistency (without modifying the hypothetical belief in the
antecedent); finally, consider whether or not the consequent is
then true.
Johnson-Laird (1986: 65) calls this view an idealization, since people 'do
not have ready access to all their beliefs, and it might take hours for them
to review even a relevant sample.' Another criticism levelled at the
Ramsey test has been voiced by Sanford (1989: 154), who argues that
often we need to know the content of the consequent before we can start
our evaluation of the whole conditional: 'We can locate the relatively
simple facts that suffice to back up the conditional, however, only after we
have both clauses of the conditional in mind. There is no first step that we
can take given the if-clause but in ignorance of the main clause.' This is
also why we may sometimes accept a conditional with a fully unacceptable
antecedent, while rejecting another that bas exactly the same antecedent
(see also Chapter 6). As Sanford says: 'It is hard to see (...) how, when
one conditional is true, or false, or acceptable, or rejectable, another
conditional with the same if-clause can be void, indeterminate, or absurd.'
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Sanford is also critical of possible-world treatments of conditionals for a
different reason, which I fmd less convincing. He claims that it is a
problem for possible-world theorists to avoid classifying an SC like 'If you
had thrown the dice just as I did, they would have come up I-I' (said
when I have just thrown 1-1) as acceptable, which in Sanford's view it
plainly is not. But is it really unacceptable, or false? If you use the same
dice cup that I have used, start with the dice in the same position, shake
the cup and throw the dice just, i.e. exactly, as I did, it seems to me that I-
I should be the expected outcome.
Although I emphasize again that I do not want to enter into the
discussion on the merits of the various alternative possible-world views, I
do think that there is something wrong with their starting-point, which, in
Stalnaker's words, is that 'a counterfactual conditional is true in the actual
world if and only if the consequent is true in some possibly different
possible world or worlds.' The view that will be defended in Chapter 6 of
this book is that there is no point in ever calling a counterfactual
conditional true or false in the actual world, since it simply does not
pertain to it.
Apart from this, my disagreement with the logicians has to do mainly
with the alleged failure of conditional sentences to behave truth-
functionall y .
I disagree, first, as regards the claim, held by some logicians, that ICs are
non truth-functional (this is the subject matter of Chapter 5); second, as
regards the more widely held view that SCs are non-truth-functional (this
will be dealt with in Chapter 6), and third, as regards the less widely-held
view that a possible-worlds semantics is also adequate for indicative
conditional sentences. This will be discussed in Chapter 7. For now it is
enough to note the plain linguistic fact that many languages, among which
English and Dutch, make a very clear grammatical distinction between two
types of conditionals (pace Dudman), which in the minds of most
speakers, and indeed, in most grammars, reflects a distinction between real
and hypothetical possibilities (ct. the psycholinguistic view, as expounded
by Johnson-Laird 1986: 65).
It will henceforth be assumed, therefore, that the domain of ICs is the
real world (but see the next paragraph), and that that of SCs is the world
of the imagination, i.e. the world that the speaker creates inside his own
head. To all intents and purposes, such an imaginary world may be looked
upon as a possible world.
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A number of caveats are in order here, however: first, the term 'possible
world' suggests that whatever is referred to in an SC is actually possible,
which, of course, it need not be (,If you travelled at ten times the speed of
light, ...'). Therefore 'imaginary world' is a better term, since it suggests
no such thing; second, although the domain of ICs is the real world. that
does not mean (the point has been made before) that the antecedent of an
IC need be capable of materializing: 'If you travel at ten times the speed
of light, ...' is a perfectly normal antecedent: ordinary speakers of a
language need not be credited with a knowledge of the laws of physics.
But even sophisticated speakers may use the antecedent in question: the
distance from the Earth to the Andromeda Galaxy being 2 million light
years, a traveller who wants to get there within a month - and what
follows is a simple mathematical truth - will have to travel at 24 million
times the speed of light. And that fact also makes the converse true: if you
travel at 24 million times the speed of light, you will get to the
Andromeda Galaxy in a month. This, I would maintain, is a real-world
truth, no matter how complete the impossibility of its antecedent's
realization. Finally, there is Johnson-Laird's (op.cit.: 63) objection to the
concept of 'possible world: 'because the set of possible worlds is infinite
in size, it cannot fit directly into an individual's mind.' This casts at least
some doubt on the psychological validity of the possible-world view of
conditional sentences.
There are cases when also ICs may be said to be about an imaginary
world. namely when a speaker expressly indicates that he is taking the
addressee away from the real one. This is the case in, for example, joke-
telling; whenever an IC occurs in a joke, it belongs to the imaginary world
of the joke in question. Alternatively, a speaker may start a conversation
by saying 'Suppose': 'Suppose that you are walking on Mars. What will
you do if suddenly you run out of water?'. As will again be argued in
Chapter 6, it is only in cases like this that the pragmatic differences
between ICs and SCs disappear.
With regard to the logical differences between ICs and SCs there are two
schools of thought. On the one hand there is the view voiced by Ellis
(1984), who claims that 'there is evidence that indicative and subjunctive
conditionals are variants of one basic kind of conditional'; and that
'logically, they should be the same.' The arguments adduced for this view
are, first, that both types of conditional make use of the same conjunction
if, second. that very often (although not always) a subjunctive conditional
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does exactly the same job as its indicative version did at some earlier point
in time; third, that subjunctive conditionals have the same form as
indicative ones which occur in indirect speech (this point will be taken up
again in Chapter 7).
Against this there is the view, voiced by, among others, Gibbard (1981:
239), who claims that ICs and SCs 'have distinct jobs, and do them in
ways that have little important in common.' TIle usual arguments are, first,
that the change from IC to SC often changes the sense of what is being
said, which means that an IC may be true and the corresponding SC false;
and second, that some logical operations do work for ICs, but not for SCs.
The logic of ICs and SCs will be discussed at length in Chapters 5 and 6,
and the different things we do with ICs and SCs form the natural subject
matter of Chapter 7, on the pragmatics of conditional sentences.
There are, however, a few minor points which deserve being dealt with
here. First, the verb to assume is often used by logicians in a way which
may easily lead to misunderstandings. For, although they do not intend it
to mean 'actually take something to be the case', but no more than 'take as
a starting point of the reasoning', it is the former, not the latter, meaning
which to assume normally has; and conversely, what we do with the
antecedent of a conditional sentence is the latter rather than the former.
Antecedents of conditional sentences are givens, and, as will be
emphasized a number of times throughout this book, givens are not
'assumed'.
Second, there is the widespread view that one cannot assert 'if p then q'
if one knows that p. For example, Gamut (1982: 242) claims that a
sentence like 'If the axolotl is a fish, it has gills' is unlikely to be uttered
by a speaker who is a biological expert (interestingly, Gamut does not go
so far as to claims that the sentence cannot be uttered by such an expert).
A similar point is made by Veltman (1985), who points out that a
conditional can only felicitously assert a conditional if neither the truth of
p nor that of q is definitely established. But this is a half-truth. There is
nothing odd about a conditional like 'If 2 + 2 make 4, then 4 - 2 make
two', or 'If a horse is an animal, that does not mean that an animal is a
horse', for such conditionals are concerned with the correctness of the
reasoning, rather than with the question whether or not 2 + 2 actually
make 4, or whether an animal is actually a horse, and they could welJ be
uttered by a teacher trying to make his pupils familiar with the basics of
addition and subtraction, or, indeed, with those of logic. This, it seems to
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me, constitutes yet another reason for making the distinction (referred to
above) between stochastic reasoning on the one hand, and logical and
causal reasoning on the other.
If one wishes to determine why certain conditionals are possible, whereas
others with the same antecedent are not. one more distinction will tum out
to be relevant. similar to the one given above. It is the distinction between
what in a footnote to Chapter 4 is called generic and specific reasoning. To
give one example: a conditional like 'If I like Mozart, I'll buy the Philips
collection' is impossible - but the reason is not (just) that a speaker knows
whether or not he likes Mozart. All we have to do in order to make the
conditional acceptable while keeping the antecedent is to change the
consequent to, for example, 'surely I do not have to buy the whole Philips
collection?' One might say that here 1, and with it the whole conditional,
has acquired generic meaning. See also Chapter 7.
As pointed out in the footnote referred to above, the categorizations
'causal'/, non-causal' (i.e. stochastic) and 'generic?' specific' are not
hierarchically ordered.
As according to some, 'truth' is such a slippery notion, various theorists
prefer not to use it with reference to conditional sentences. Instead, they
talk of acceptability, assertibility or probability. It will be argued
repeatedly that especially the last notion has no role to play in conditional
sentences at all. As regards the first two notions, it seems to me that if we
regard a conditional as acceptable or assertible, we presumably agree to it.
i.e. we probably think it is true. A similar point is made by Grice (1989:
56), when he says that 'assertibility presumably involves committing
oneself.' And what could the thing that we commit ourselves to be other
than the truth of what we are saying? So to all intents and purposes, to
accept a conditional or to call it assertible is tantamount to considering it
true.
A final point: natural language (or, at any rate, English and Dutch)
makes no formal distinction between implication, which is unidirectional,
and biconditionality, also called conditional perfection or equivalence,
where 'if p then q' and 'if q then p' apply simultaneously. This fact has
been seized upon by some theoreticians trying to prove that the logic of
natural language is something entirely different from that of classical logic.
However, as Chapter 5 will make clear, that view is untenable. Even if
language users show a tendency to interpret conditional sentences as
biconditionals, other, more knowledgeable language users will always be
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ready to intervene when that view is mistaken.
So, although it is a fact that natural language usually does not make a
distinction between implication and equivalence, it is always possible, for
example by using only if, to indicate that the latter is meant.
5 Commitment
If probability is not a suitable basis for a description either of the
difference between ICs and SCs, as was already hinted at above, and as
will be argued extensively in chapters 4 and 7, then what is?
In line with Grice (see the preceding section) and Gamut (1982: 264),
who argues that defending 'if p then q' boils down to being willing to
defend q against any opponent defending p, I shall assume henceforth that
commitment is a useful starting point; that is, when we utter a conditional
sentence, we are committed to the proposition contained in the consequent,
a commitment which becomes 'operative' as soon as the antecedent has
materialized.
This should not be taken to mean that until the antecedent has
materialized there is no commitment - the commitment is there from the
start and can be said to hang over the speaker's head like a sword of
Damocles until it is no longer possible for the antecedent to materialize
(for example, 'If the first car to come round the comer is a VOlkswagen,
I'll pay for your drinks', where the commitment ceases to be operative
when the first car turns out to be a Honda).
It is worth pointing out here that, if p does not materialize, it is at least
misleading to call the whole conditional void. or to say that it is as if it
had never been uttered. By way of illustration of this viewpoint, I quote
the following passage from Quine (1982: 21):
If, after we have made such a confirmation, the antecedent turns
out to be true, then we consider ourselves committed to the
consequent, and are ready to acknowledge error if it proves false.
lf on the other hand the antecedent turns out to have been false,
our conditional affirmation is as if it had never been made.
In order to see that the second statement is mistaken, a simple example
will do: the sentence 'If you exceed the speed limit, you will be fined $
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100.-', contains a consequent the conditional warning in which is precisely
what will prevent me from making the antecedent true; in other words, if it
had not been 'uttered', I would probably have been doing 100 miles per
hour.
It may be emphasized here that there is never any commitment to
whatever proposition is contained in the antecedent To take an example
from the preceding section: a teacher saying 'If 2 + 2 make 4, ...' is not
committed to the truth of '2 + 2 make 4', no matter how firmly he
believes that that is true. No one can take me to task me for believing, or
asserting. that the back of the moon is made of green cheese. if all I have
said is 'If the back of the moon is made of green cheese'. It is wrong,
therefore. to say that when p is known to be true. if means the same as as
or since: no speaker is ever committed to the truth of whatever follows p,
and every speaker is always committed to the truth of what follows as or
since.
It is not difficult to understand that commitment as a starting point will
not work just as easily in the case of SCs, for, as has been argued above,
antecedents of SCs only materialize inside the speaker's head. Still, the
hypothetical commitment can be said to be there as well, albeit that in
many cases (especially, of course. in the case of past SCs the reasoning in
which is of the stochastic type) we can only take the speaker's word for it
that the commitment has been honoured (e.g. 'If I had known about it, I
would have come to your party').
In semifactuals commitment plays a very special role, for. as was
suggested at the end of section 2 above, speakers employing them are
usually looked upon as being committed to the truth of the consequent,
irrespective of the truth of the antecedent. See Chapter 6.
6 The guises of conditionals
Although this book concentrates on 'standard' conditionals, whose
antecedents are introduced by if, it should not be concluded that that is the
only guise in which conditionality appears. 2 The following sentences
might also be called conditionals:
(4) Make one move and you're a dead man
(5) It would be foolish to do a thing like that
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Coordinate structures like (4) are discussed by Konig (1986: 234ff), who
rightly claims that the first conjunct should be looked upon as a 'pseudo-
imperative'. One might say that, like ordinary conditional antecedents,
these conjuncts do nothing but 'mention' the event that brings about the
commitment. Sentences like (5), too, corroborate the view that antecedents
are only 'mentioned', i.e. that they are givens that are not even capable of
being true or false. For further discussion, see Chapter 6.
Less clearly, sentences like (6) - (8) can be said to be conditional in
nature:
(6) People who exceed the speed limit will be fined $ 100.-
(7) Thieves will be prosecuted
(8) In such a mood I usually go to bed
Notice that, for example, the thieves referred to in (7) need not actually
exist; in other words, that (7) does not carry the presupposition that there
are thieves. In that respect conditional-like sentences such as (6) - (8) are
like the antecedents of standard conditionals: the people who exceed the
speed limit in (6), the thieves in (8) and the mood in (8) are no more than
givens.
In a way, any generic statement has conditional overtones, and the
clearest examples of such statements are provided by scientiftc laws:
(9) Water boils at 100° C.
One might argue here that, even though (9) can be rewritten as 'If water is
heated to 1000, it boils I will boil', the meaning of if in such a case is
'whenever' rather than 'on condition that'. However, as the next section
will show, these two meanings are inseparable, and may even be called
necessarily interchangeable.
I am not aware of any special problems posed by 'covert' conditionals
like the ones in sentences (4) to (9) (apart, possibly, from the problem of
defining what it is that makes them conditional look-alikes in the first
place); since they can all be rewritten as 'ordinary' conditionals, I have not
deemed it necessary to devote any special attention to them.
A last example of a type of conditional sentence whose conditionality
may not be immediately obvious will be discussed in Chapter 6 (sentence
(7): 'I'd like a cup of coffee / to go to the theatre'). There is an interesting
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historical parallel to the fact that in such sentences I' d like has more or
less acquired the meaning 'I want' - for many of the modem English and
Dutch modal auxiliaries (e.g. will, can, and their Dutch cognates) originally
were past subjunctives which over the years came to have present meaning
(exactly as would like is doing now); here the parallel stops, for will and
can in addition developed new past tenses, and there seems to be no
danger of that happening to would like.
The change that has taken place in the modal auxiliaries of English and
Dutch makes it clear that it is very difficult, and may even be quite
impossible, to draw an exact boundary line between the pragmatics and
semantics of a language if one considers it from a diachronic perspective.
But even if one only takes a synchronic look at a particular language, it
may tum out in practice to be extremely difficult to draw such a boundary
line, and it may even be impossible in principle as well. Languages are in
a constant state of flux, and one need only read the postscripts to chapters
3 and 4 (on changes presently under way in the use of would and should in
conditional antecedents) in order to realize that in language research there
can never be 'definitive description'.
One of the main aims of the present book, i.e. to define the boundary
line between the semantics and the pragmatics of conditional sentences,
may, therefore, be doomed to failure from the start. However, since there
can be little doubt that functional words are less amenable to semantic
change than 'content words', the situation may not be quite as hopeless as
it looks.
7 Some notes on if, when, and unless
a. if
Although 1 am fully aware of the dangers inherent in arguments based on
etymology, it is useful to realize, as Rigter (1982) points out, that if
derives from Old English gifen = 'given'. Unfortunately, Rigter adds that
the present tense after if suggests factual certainty of the event in question,
thereby suggesting that givens are automatically assumed, which 1 have
made clear they are not.
Although on the whole I tend to agree with Johnson-Laird (1986: 73), his
claim that if is 'a cue to consider a possible or hypothetical state of affairs'
is at least inexact. It should be borne in mind, first, that the state of affairs
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referred to in an antecedent need not be possible at all; second, that the
terms possible and hypothetical, as used by J.L., seem to refer to indicative
and subjunctive conditionals respectively, and that, also in view of the first
point, it would probably be better to speak of 'hypothetical with respect to
the real world' and 'hypothetical with respect to an imaginary world'
respectively; and third, that it is doubtful whether the word if invites us to
consider any state of affairs. AIl we need to do, in my view, is to accept
the state of affairs as a given; a given with respect either to the real or to
an imaginary world. The word if does no more than present a certain state
of affairs as a basis for reasoning, and every listener will necessarily
accept it as such - the language does not even allow him or her to reject it.
No one ever rejects the content of an antecedent How could one, given the
fact that antecedents are never asserted, and that one can only deny
something that has been asserted?
Most dictionaries of English give 'whenever' as a separate meaning of if,
and usually add an example like (10):
(10) If I was sad, I went to the cinema
in which if can be replaced by when. It is doubtful whether it is really
necessary to specify that if can mean 'whenever', since, in my view,
uncertainty with respect to a past event nearly autonatically leads to that
interpretation. Consider, first, the following two present (open)
conditionals:
(11) a. If you heat that ice, it will melt
b. If you heat ice, it melts I will melt
The first sentence can be said to be specific, and the second generic (cf.
footnote 5, Chapter 4). In both sentences the heating of the ice is presented
as something that mayor may not take place, but the second sentence
clearly suggests the existence of a rule. Now, although if can be considered
to mean exactly the same in both sentences, the second if, because of the
implied rule, can also be looked upon as meaning 'whenever', and, indeed,
can be replaced by wheniever). We can conclude that if is unspecified with
respect to specificity or genericity, and that all it means is 'given', without
any claim whatever being made with respect to the actual, occasional or
repeated, occurrence of the event in question. A brief look at the situation
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in other languages confirms that this is not a mere quirk of English
grammar. Dutch als can behave in the same way (in addition to being
capable of meaning 'when'), and even French si allows the translation
,whenever'. It would indeed be a remarkable coincidence if three words
with totally unrelated etymologies just happened to have 'whenever' as a
possible second meaning.
To go back now to sentence (10): although it is not easy to see that this
can actually refer to one single past occasion, there is no doubt that it can:
if the speaker does not remember either in what mood he was, or what he
did, on, say, the day his mother died, he would, admittedly, be far more
likely to say something like 'If I was sad, I willfmust have gone to the
cinema', but it is not entirely impossible - especially if he does remember
that he was in the habit of going to the cinema whenever he was sad - for
him to utter (10) instead. It is precisely because this single-event
interpretation is so far-fetched, however, that we tend to give (10) the
alternative, generic interpretation, with if meaning 'whenever'.
There are two cases in which if can indeed be said to be ambiguous. The
first of these, where if may be a variant of whether (as in ' Please tell me if
you need any help', in which the subclause can be either an adverbial or
an object clause), need not concern us here. The second, however, requires
at least some discussion, since it seems to constitute an argument against
the claim made in section 5 above, i.e. that no speaker is ever committed
to whatever follows if. Consider sentence (12).
(12) The runners were tired, if not exhausted
The subclause can be interpreted as meaning either 'although they were not
exhausted' or 'and they may even have been exhausted' (cf. Fowler 1983:
264). In the latter interpretation if can still be claimed to have its standard
conditional meaning (see below); in the former the meaning is 'even
though' or 'albeit'. For the 'even though' interpretation to apply, it is
enough for the two adjectives or nouns to have more or less contrasting
meanings (e.g. 'the runners were happy, if tired'); for the ambiguity to
arise, however, it seems that not only must the adjective or noun in the
main clause be a hyponym of that in the if-clause (an example with nouns
would be 'we have evidence, if not proof), but the subclause must also
contain the negation not. That the first of these conditions should apply is
easy enough to understand: it just does not make sense for if to be given
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its conditional interpretation if the adjectives or nouns belong to different
semantic classes; hence 'they were happy, if not rich' can only have
concessive meaning. The reason for the second of the two conditions is
less easy to understand: why should the ambiguity in (12) disappear when
not exhausted is replaced by unexhausted (assuming. for the sake of the
argument, that there is such a word)? The answer must be that uneshausted
is no longer a hyperonym of tired, so that the second condition can simply
be dropped.
It is possible to have one's doubts about the conditional status of (12).
even if the subclause is taken to mean 'and they may even have been
exhausted'. However. the close similarity between (12) and 'If they were
not exhausted. they were (at least) tired'. in which the same uncertainty
with respect to the possible exhaustedness obtains. suggests that if (12) is
not a concessive. it is a true conditional sentence.
Two thing are to be noted: first, in the conditional. but not in the
concessive. meaning there is a very strong. indeed an unbreakable. link
between the conjunction and the word not; second. it is only when
sentences like (12) are interpreted as concessives that the speaker is
committed to whatever follows if. Therefore the claim made in section 5
still stands. with the proviso that ifbe conditional.
b. when
The conjunction when can be looked upon as the temporal counterpart of
if, in the sense that only when a specific moment in time is being referred
to is its use obligatory. exactly as if is only obligatory when the condition
to be fulfilled is specific rather than generic. As soon as the meaning of
when becomes general ('at any time than. it can be replaced by if.
Both if and when. therefore. can be said to be unspecified with respect to
specificity and genericity.
Notice that in the case of when the similarity between English on the one
hand and Dutch and French on the other stops. since in the latter two
languages different temporal connectives are used (i.e. Dutch toen and
French quand) when reference is made to a single past occurrence.
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c. unless
In Comrie (1986: 79) there is the following sentence:
(13) Unless you leave immediately, you'll be late
which, according to Comrie, has the interpretation 'If and only if you do
not leave immediately, you will be late'. I would maintain that Comrie,
and with him many other authorities (e.g. Longman's Dictionary of
Contemporary English) is wrong. Unless does not mean 'if not', but its
reverse, i.e. 'not if, or 'except if, and as such it is the exact opposite of
only if. If unless really meant' if not', it would be difficult to explain why
it is perfectly alright for a subclause introduced by it to contain a negation.
If the proponents of the view that unless means 'if not' were right. (14a)
would mean the same thing as (14b):
(14) a. I will make a contribution, unless John doesn't
b. I will make a contribution, if John does.
But. of course, there is an important difference. (14a) contain an escape
clause: the contribution will be made, except in one single case, i.e. if John
does not make one. (l4b) will normally be uttered in different
circumstances, for example when the speaker has just heard that John will
make a contribution (in which case the condition may be called
'sufficient'), or when the speaker wishes to convey that only if John also
makes a contribution, will he make one himself (in which case the
condition may be called 'necessary').
A word about the word-order in 04a) and (l4b): it seems slightly more
natural to start the former with the consequent; if (14a) starts with the
consequent (even if the sentence is rewritten as 'Unless John does not
make a contribution, I will make one), it becomes difficult to comprehend
at a first hearing; no such difficulty arises if in (14b) the consequent is
given initial position. All this, it seems to me, counts as an argument in
favour of 'except if as the only meaning of unless.
One more argument is provided by sentence (12) above, in which it is
quite impossible for unless to take the place of if not.
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8 Looking back and ahead
Sections 2 - 7 above provide a background against which the chapters that
follow are to be read. One of the basic assumptions is that the distinction
between ICs and SCs is, also in a psychological sense, a real one: the
former concern the real world, and the latter althe world of the
imagination. The reasoning that goes on in conditionals is either specific or
generic, and either free (stochastic) or unfree (logical or causal). Although
in general it is not possible felicitously to assert a conditional when the
truth of either p or q is known, that rule does not apply when the
reasoning is both logical/causal and generic. In Chapter 7 it will be made
clear why such generic ICs have no subjunctive versions, which is another
way of saying that (pure) genericity does not occur in SCs. See the end of
Chapter 7 for a schema in which this classification is worked out in more
detail.
Uttering a declarative conditional sentence means incurring a contingent
commitment: whenever one asserts a conditional sentence, one is
committed to the truth of q, a commitment which comes into effect when p
materializes. No speaker, however, is ever committed to the truth of
whatever follows if, even of the truth of p is definitely known.
Chapter 2 examines the four subjunctive constructions that Dutch
possesses, concluding that the interchangeability claimed for them by
Dutch grammarians does not in fact exist, since the Past Tense (in either
antecedent or consequent) suggests that, with respect to the real-world
status of the events referred to, the speaker 'knows that not', whereas by
emloying the construction with zou + infinitive the speaker indicates that
that real-world status does not concern him or her.
Chapter 3 takes a close look at those rare English conditional antecedents
that contain will or would, and concludes, first, that their relative rarity is
not a matter of grammar, but of statistics: since in the vast majority of
cases the condition to be fulfilled in a conditional is the (hypothetical)
occurrence of an event, the vast majority of antecedents contain a Simple
Present or Past; and since very occasionally the condition to be fulfilled is
the truth of the (hypothetical) prediction of an event, will and would will
make their appearance equally occasionally; and second, that will and
would should not really be looked upon as one and the same auxiliary,
since if + will is considerably rarer than if + would.
Chapter 4 addresses the question whether the presence of should in a
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conditional antecedent marks the conditional in which it occurs as a real-
world conditional or as a hypothetical one. On this issue opinions are
divided, what with the greatest authority on the English language coming
down on the side of the latter option, and nearly all other grammarians
opting for the former. The conclusion reached in the chapter is that
allowing should as a marker of hypotheticality rather than as one of
theoreticity has the unfortunate effect of making the English grammatical
system less consistent than it is if should is only looked upon as a real-
world marker of stochastic specificity (or specific stochasticity, if that is
easier to understand).
As indicated above, Chapters 5 and 6 address logical issues, and reach
conclusions which are at variance with the standard logical teaching on the
subject, the most important of which is that both ICs and SCs are truth-
functional, each with respect to their proper domains, i.e. the real world
and an imaginary world respectively. A second important difference is that
although from the point of view of the language user antecedents are never
true or false, from the point of view of the logician they must be treated as
true - the only exception being one particular type of Ie.
Many of the writers on the subject of conditionality content themselves
with presenting only one counterexample allegedly refuting a particular
claim, and do not bother to check whether or not there may be stronger
evidence in favour of the claim in question. This is one of the reasons why
in Chapters 5 and 6 a whole host of arguments is discussed supposedly
proving that there are fundamental differences between the material
implication of classical logic and the reasoning that goes on in natural
language.
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Notes to chapter 1
1. Dudman and, following him, Bennett (note that the latter's
article is entitled 'Farewell to the Phlogiston theory of
conditionals') make it sound as if people who abide by the old
distinction are hopeless stick-in-the-muds. Indeed, the fact that
Dudman's theories are presented in the unbearable language of
the president of a student debating society may have
contributed to some extent to their failure to find general
acceptance.
Dudman also has pretty strong views when it comes to
establishing the 'truth' of conditional sentences; and even more
so when it comes to the question whether or not conditional
sentences are truth-functional. But in the one pair of sentences
that Dudman adduces as incontrovertible evidence that such
truth-functionality does not exist, he makes the typical error
(see chapter 5) of moving the auxiliary verb from one clause to
the other when applying contraposition.
2. In Quirk et al. (1985: section 15.34, notes f, g, h.. i.D the various
forms in which conditionals may appear are discussed as well,
and the same types are mentioned.
Chapter 2
TENSES IN DurCH COUNfERFACIUALS·
1 Introduction
The Englisb sentence If I were rich, I would do it bas four possible Dutcb
translations:
(1) a. Als ik rijk zou zijn, zou ik bet doen
'If I ricb would be, would I it do'
b. Als ik rijk was, zou ik het doen
'If I ricb was/were, would I it do'
c. Als ik rijk zou zijn, deed ik bet
'If I ricb would be, did I it'
d. Als ik rijk was, deed ik bet
'If I ricb was/were, did I it'
whicb sbow that, unlike English, Dutcb freely allows modal zouiden)
('would' sing./pl.) in both the protasis and the apodosis of this type of
conditional sentence, often called counterfactual (CF). Dutch grammars,
insofar as they pay any attention to the four variants at all, generally claim
that no difference in meaning exists between them and that, consequently,
they are completely interchangeable. It is the purpose of this chapter to
show that
a) differences in meaning do, in fact, exist;
b) consequently, there are cases where the forms are not
interchangeable;
c) especially the use of the past tense in apodoses is subject to
severe restrictions.
The elucidation of the differences in meaning will also account for the fact
that in some sentences (such as (1» the four variants do, indeed, appear to
be intercbangeable.
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To start with claim b): to a native Dutch ear, the following sentences will
sound extremely odd (the English translations in the rest of this paper have
a past tense or would + infinitive wherever Dutch has a past tense or
zou(den) + infinitive respectively, and can therefore be turned into
grammatical English by replacing any would + infinitive by a past tense in
the protases, and vice versa in the apodoses; since this paper is only
concerned with the differences in meaning between the two forms, glosses
seem to be unnecessary):
(2) ? Als jullie het huis verkochten wist ik me geen raad
'If you sold the house I didn't know what to do'
(3) ? Als bij dat hoorde werd bij woedend
,If he heard that he got mad'
(4) ? Als bij van Bartok hield ik vond ik dat vreselijk
'If he liked Bartok I considered that something awful'
(5) ? Als de brug kapot zou zijn betekende dat een ramp
'If the bridge would be broken it meant a disaster'
(6) ? Als je dat wilde doen stelde ik dat erg op prijs
'If you did that I greatly appreciated it'
It is also remarkable that some sentences will be unacceptable if given a
conditional, but acceptable if given an interpretation that is temporal and
conditional at the same time:
(7) Als je wat zei kreeg je straf
'If you said something you were punished'
This sentence can only mean: 'in those days they punished you whenever
you said something' (which, incidentally goes for its English translation as
well), and is a far cry from being equivalent to (8):
(8) Als je wat zou zeggen zou je straf krijgen
'If you would say something you would be punished'
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In a sentence like (9), however,
(9) Als je in de gevangenis zat bezocht ik je elke dag
'If you were in prison I visited you every day'
the situation is the other way round: the temporal-conditional inter-
pretation would seem to be an unlikely option here. In (10) things are
different again:
(10) Als je wat eerlijker uitje ogen keek geloofde ik je
'If you looked a bit more honest I believed you'
This sentences will automatically be interpreted as meaning 'I don't
believe you', a negative interpretation which will not readily be given to
(9).
In CFs, the protasis can have two grammatical functions:
a) adverbial adjunct
Als je dat zou doen zou ik bij je weggaan
'If you would do that I would leave you'
b) subject or direct object (also prepositional obect):
Als de brug kapot zou zijn zou dat een ramp betekenen
'If the bridge would be broken that would be a disaster'
Als je dat zou doen zou ik dat zeer op prijs stellen
'If you would do that I would greatly appreciate it'
These types of conditional will henceforth be referred to as adverbial and
nominal CFs (advCF and nomCF) respectively. Although as far as position
in the sentence is concerned the latter do not behave in the same way as
the former', and although, partly for that reason, advCFs do not show the
same frequencies for the four possible constructions as nomCFs, the two
types of conditional do allow both forms in both protasis and apodosis, so
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that the claims made in this paper can be said to apply in equal measure to
both advCFs and nomCFs. This research has made use of a corpus of
Dutch texts, viz. the so-called Eindhoven Corpus (EC), which contains 94
CFs, 35 of which have a protasis with the past tense and an apodosis with
zou(den) + infinitive (abbreviated as '-/+'), and 33 of which have zou(den)
+ infinitive in both clauses (+/+).3 The fact that -/+ and +/+ occur far
more frequently than either of the two other combinations already seems to
indicate that the four forms are not free variants, and that therefore
differences in meaning must exist.
2 The literature
As was suggested above, a survey of the pertinent remarks to be found in
grammars of Dutch can be short. Although Rijpma and Schuringa (1978)
use the terms irrealis and potentialis, they remain silent about a possible
syntactic distinction. In their Stilistische Grammatica van het Moderne
Nederlands ('Stylistic Grammar of Modem Dutch') (1949: 276) Overdiep
and Van Es say the following (my translation):
In a sober style zo in the subclause had better be avoided, since
in most cases the modality will be evident from the connection
with the main clause, other auxiliaries, and the nature of the
conjunction. Therefore sobe is not what we would call the offical
who in the subclause employs the construction with zo in
apparent assimilation with the zo of the main clause: Het lOU ons
verheugen, indien na onze opmerkingen de stijl minder slecht lOU
ziin geworden (Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Couran) ('We should be
pleased if after our remarks the style would have improved') -
Het zou wenseliik zijn indien de regering spoedig zou kunnen
aankondigen, dat en op welk pei/ de waarde van den franc zou
worden vastgesteld. ('lt would be desirable if the government
would soon be able to announce that and at what level the value
of the franc would be fixed')
When zo + in! occurs in a conditional (or: concessive) context,
we call its modality conditional mood:
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Ook al wist ik het, dan lOU ik het je nog niet vertellen (,Even if I
knew it, I wouldn't tell you')
The alternative simple form ... dan vertelde ik 't je nog niet
Ceven then I didn't tell you') is sharper - Als je niet zo stout
geweest was, zou je nu mee mogen ('If you hadn't been so
naughty, we would have taken you along').
One of the questions that suggest themselves here is, of course: if the past
tense does indeed sound sharper, why should this so? Whatever the answer
may be, Overdiep and Van Es' claim that it is a stylistic weakness to have
lOU twice in one sentence has become something of a popular myth, in
spite of the fact that, at least in the EC, +/+ occurs just as frequently as
-/+.
In his paper 'A Semantic analysis of Dutch Tenses' (1962) Ebeling
presents the following pair, which he considers synonymous:
(11) a. Als hij het vroeg, deed ik het
'If he asked, I did it'
b. Als hij het zou vragen, zou ik het doen
'If he would ask, I would do it'
and then writes:
It also happens quite often that the subordinate clause has the
one form (which one doesn't matter) and the principal clause the
other. Theoretically, the difference caused by the addition of
ZULLEN (= the infinitive of zoutden), P.N.) can indeed be only
slight, for it indicates, briefly formulated, that the event reported
is as yet waiting verification. (oo.) The difference between the two
types of "irrealis" appears from the following paraphrases:
ik deed het 'in the known situation (imaginary) I am carrying the
feature of doing it' vs. ik lOU het doen 'in the known situation
(imaginary) circumstances are such that I may be supposed to
carry the feature of doing it',
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It seems possible to reconcile Ebeling's analysis of the meaning shift
brought about by the addition of zullen and Overdiep and Van Es' remark
about the higher degree of 'sharpness' of the past tense: if zou + inf.
indicates that the event in question has not been 'verified', then,
presumably, the past tense indicates that the event in question has been
verified, in other words, has become 'definitive'. Thus the reason why
vertelde ik 'I je nog niet (,I didn't tell you') sounds sharper is that it is
more defmitive, more irrevocable than the zou-form. We shall return to
this later. That Ebeling's parenthetic claim ('which one doesn't matter') is
not tenable is shown by examples (2) to (6). In addition, it seems that most
speakers would prefer (lIb) to (I la), unless the latter is pronounced with
strong emphasis on hij ('he'). This, too, will be discussed later on.
3 A first exploration
The basic idea with regard to a difference in meaning between zou + inf.
and the past tense in CFs was that the latter expresses an irrealis and the
former a potentialis; such a distinction appears quite clearly to exist
between pairs like the following:
(12) a. Als het simpel zou zijn, ...
'If it would be simple, ...'
b. Als het simpel was, ...
'If it were simple, ...'
(13) a. Als hij zou geloven / zou weten, dat ...
'If he would believe / know that ...'
b. Als hij geloofde / wist, dat ...
'If he believed / knew that ...'
A speaker who employs the b-variants thereby denies the truth of the
proposition expressed, whereas in the case of the a-variants the matter is
simply left undecided. Thus (l2b) means: 'It is not simple'; (l2a) means:
'Let us assume, for the sake of the argument. that it is simple.' In a way,
therefore, CFs with the zou-form can be looked upon as more or less
equivalent to simple, 'open', conditionals: (l4a), but not (l4c), can be
looked upon as a variant of (l4b) (this paper is not concerned with the
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difference between (l4a) and (l4b»:
(14) a. Als bet een simpel probleem zou zijn, zouden we bet kunnen
oplossen
'If it would be a simple problem, we would be able to solve it'
b. Als bet een simpel probleem is, kunnen we het oplossen
'If it is a simple problem, we can / will be able to solve it'
c. Als het een simpel probleem was, konden we het oplossen
'If it was a simple problem, we were able to solve it'
Only in a past context can (l4c) be looked upon as the equivalent of (l4b):
We waren niet zo erg slim, maar als her een simpel probleem was, konden
we her oplossen ('We were not that clever, but if (= wbenever) it was a
simple problem, we were able to solve it'). But in that case the sentence is
not a CF, but a normal, 'open' conditional with temporal backshift
(compare also: Hij zei dar als her een simpel probleem was, wij her konden
oplossen (,He said that. if it was a simple problem, we could solve in).
This is an important point: conditional sentences with past tenses in
protasis and apodosis are only CFs when they occur in a present tense
context - sentences like (7) (Als je wat zei, kreeg je straf - 'If you said
something, you were punished'), therefore, are pseudo-CFs, and will not be
considered in the rest of this paper. In English, of course, distinguishing
between 'real' CFs and pseudo-CFs is no problem, since the former always
have a modal auxiliary in the apodosis.
Back to 'real' Dutch CFs. A good illustration of the difference in meaning
between the two available forms is provided by the following pair of
protases:
(15) a. Als dat zou kunnen, ...
'If that would be possible, ...
b. Als dat kon, ...
'If that were possible, ...'
A speaker who employs b) indicates that he is talking about an impos-
sibility; a speaker who utters a) indicates that he does not know whether
wbatever is referred to by the subject is possible, but that he hopes it can
be realized.
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At this point it may already have become clearer why in certain protases
the two forms seem interchangeable: even though Als ik rijk zou zijn (,If I
would be rich') does not directly mean that the speaker is not rich, this
will be its implication in the majority of cases. Not in all, however: it
might be said by a wealthy man who wishes to keep his own wealth out of
consideration; only if he were to say Als ik rijk was (,If I were rich') could
he be looked upon as deliberately trying to mislead the addressee.
So far attention has been paid only to the difference in meaning between
the two forms in protases. There is no doubt that the same difference
obtains when the forms occur in apodoses, although there it is somewhat
blurred as a result of the fact that the apodosis of an ordinary, declarative
conditional always contains an assertion; so, whereas Als ik: rijk ZOU zijn
(,If I would be rich') is not an assertion, dan zou ik rijk zijn ('then I would
be rich') is, albeit a less defmite, less 'assertive' one than dan was ik rijk
(,then I was rich'). By way of illustration of this definiteness the following
three apodoses:
(16) a , had hij het wei gezegd (,he had said it')
b , zei hij het wei (,he said it')
c , zou hij het wei zeggen (,he would say it')
From a semantic point of view, (16b) is closer to (16a) than to (16c): (100)
and (l6b) both imply that the subject has not made the remark in question,
whereas (16c) is only predictive in character.
We are now in a position to understand why a sentence like (17a) has a
more natural ring to it than one like (l7b):
(17) a. A1shij bet zou doen zou ik de politie bellen
'If he would do it I would call the police'
b. ?A1shij het deed zou ik de politie bellen
'If he did it I would call the police'
How could a speaker know whether somebody else is going to do
something? How, then, could he claim to know that this other person is not
going to do something? It has been pointed out earlier that a shift in the
intonation pattern can make an odd-sounding sentence perfectly acceptable;
thus, if (17b) is pronounced with hij ('he') stressed, the oddness disappears
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as a consequence of the implication that somebody else did, in fact. do 'it',
so that the speaker's assertion that it was not the subject of the protasis
who did it. is justified.
Does the observation that the use of the past tense implies the denial of
the proposition expressed solve all our problems? It does not. because in a
sentence like (5) (Als je in de gevangenis zat, bezochi ik je elke dag - 'If
you were in jail, I visited you every day'), it need not be the speaker's
intention at all to claim that his interlocutor is not in jail, let alone that he
does not pay him daily visits. Nevertheless, the past tense in (5) seems just
as appropriate as lOU + infinitive.
An even more daunting problem is posed by those, admittedly rare, cases
where a protasis with lOU + info is followed by an apodosis with the past
tense (i.e. +/-). In the following pairs the a)-sentences sound perfectly all
right. whereas the b)-ones would strike a native ear as very odd indeed:
(18) a. Als je dat zou doen schopte ik je de trap af
'If you would do that I kicked you downstairs'
b.? Als je dat zou doen besloot ik je te onterven
'If you would do that I decided to disinherit you'
(19) a. Als Frank Sinatra zou komen optreden ging ik erheen
'If Frank Sinatra would give a performance I attended it'
b. ?Als je dat kopje zou laten vallen brak het
'If you would drop that cup it broke'
It could, perhaps, be argued that the unacceptability of (l9b) can be
accounted for by reasoning along the following lines: the breaking of a
cup, which is the natural consequence of dropping it. cannot be presented
as taking place 'now' (recall the earlier observation to the effect that a
speaker who employs the past tense thereby reports something which, for
him, is a fact at the moment of speaking), whereas my attendance at
Sinatra's recital results from a decision which is operative as from now. In
other words: the speaker cannot guarantee that. as from now, cups will
break if dropped, but he can guarantee that. as from now, he will go and
see Sinatra, should the latter give a performance. No matter how plausible
this line of reasoning may sound, it will not hold for (18), (20b) and (21)
(see below). The same goes for another explanation, which relates the
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differences in acceptability of the sentences in (19) to the distinction Dutch
makes between omdat ('because') and doordat ('through the fact that.
owing to'): the cup breaks through the fact that (or because) I drop it, but
because (and not through the fact that) Sinatra will give a performance I
shall go to the theatre. Could there be a rule, therefore, which stipulates
that the past tense cannot be used in the apodosis when the logical link
between protasis and apodosis is one of 'logical cause and effect'? Apart
from the fact that this would be a very peculiar type of rule (not that
peculiar, according to some: its reverse is invoked by Comrie (1985:120)
to explain the occurrence of nonvolitional will/would in some protases -
see footnote 2 in Chapter 3), it does not yield a defmite answer in the case
of sentences like (I8b), and it simply fails to account for the clear
difference in acceptability between (20a) and (20b):
(20) a. Als je dat zou doen zei ik het tegen je moeder
'If you would do that I told your mother'
b. ?Als je dat zou doen zei ik tegen je dat je weg moest gaan
'If you would do that I told you to leave'
To make matters even worse, the distinction between doordat and omdat is
frequently ignored in daily speech, and, it might be added, even in formal
language.
One fmal attempt at explaining the differences in acceptability may be
mentioned here, i.e. one which holds that there is no sense in making
'definitive' claims about events which are beyond the speaker's control.
Although that explanation seems to account for the oddity of (l9b), it
wrongly predicts that (21) is ungranunatical:
(21) Als er een atoombom zou vallen waren we allemaal de sigaar
'If a nuclear bomb would fall we were all done for'
Also, it fails to account for the unacceptability of (20b).
4 The semantic distinction
Most problematic cases having now passed in review, an improved version
of the hypothesis expounded in the last section can be given. First. the use
36 CHAPTER 2
of the past tense in CFs (benceforth, for the sake of brevity, 'past tense')
sbould not be looked upon as signalling a claim-to-the-contrary, but rather
as indicating that the speaker knows the opposite to be true (we sball return
to this later). Second, in addition to having the irrealis meaning component
('not now'), the past tense should be looked upon as baving the
complement of 'now', i.e. 'at any other time' as an integral part of its
meaning. It is to be noted that in this way the meaning of the past tense is
the mirror image of that of the zou- form (i.e. the zou-form in CFs) in two
respects, that is, if the latter is cbaracterized, rougbly, as '(hypothetical)
now'. In all CFs, no matter whicb form protasis and apodosis contain, the
events or situations referred to are always imaginary; but a speaker wbo
(in the protasis) employs the zou-form imagines the event in question to be
taking place (or the situation to obtain) at the moment of speaking, i.e.
'now', without knowing, or, at any rate, without paying attention to the
question wbether or not the event or situation is or will become reality. If,
subsequently, be uses the same form in the apodosis, he imagines, again
'now', what kinds of consequences the event or situation referred to in the
protasis bas or will have.
The opposite of all this is the case with the past tense, and since, as we
bave seen above, not only 'not now' but also 'any other time' can be
considered to be the opposite of 'now', a speaker employing the form can
indicate either that be knows the event (or situation) in question not to be
taking place (or to obtain) at the moment of speaking, or that wbat be has
in mind is not any particular moment in time, but that be is abstracting
away from time, and looks on the event in question as divorced from any
particular moment in past, present or future, on the understanding (' any
other time') that the moment of speaking is excluded. In either case,
therefore, he indicates that the event in question is not taking place 'now',
so that be can be said to be making a claim about matters in the real world
- and it is in this respect that the past tense differs crucially from the
zou-fonn.
Whereas the past tense has two meanings, or rather two closely linked
meaning components ('not now' and 'any other time' - benceforth 'any
time' for the sake of brevity), the zou-fonn has only one ('now'), althougb
it could be argued that here, too, there is a second component, viz. 'a
definite time'; but as 'now' is a definite time, the two components
coincide. In contrast, 'not now' and 'any time' may, but certainly need not,
coincide. In the case of the past tense, therefore, the two meaning elements
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remain clearly distinct in most circumstances, and in each individual case
one will be more prominent than the other. Which of the two elements will
be in the foreground is determined by which interpretation makes more
sense, which in turn will be a function of the knowledge that speaker and
hearer share. If the 'not now' -aspect belongs to this shared knowledge, it
will automatically be pushed into the background ('take a back seat'), a
good example being (5) (Als jij in de gevangenis zat bezachi ik je elke dag
- 'If you were in jail I visited you every day'). If the 'not now' -aspect
does not belong to the shared knowledge, it will give the sentence the
force of a claim-to-the-contrary. It should be emphasized, however, that the
choice of one interpretation does not entail the automatic cancellation of
the other: both are always present, one in the fore-, and the other in the
background. This can be clearly demonstrated in a sentence like (6) (Als je
wat eerlijker uit je ogen keek geloofde ik je - If you looked a bit more
honest I believed you'): although it will most readily be interpreted as
meaning 'I don't believe you, for you don't look honest enough', there is
no doubt that at the same time it has the associated meaning 'I believe
people who look more honest than you'.
Let us now have a second look at the problematic cases (18), (19) and
(20). In (18a) (Als je dat lOU doen sehopte ik je de trap af - 'If you would
do that I kicked you downstairs') it is quite easy for the hearer to see for
himself that he is not being kicked downstairs, so that he will
automatically choose the correct interpretation: at no matter what moment
in time, he will be kicked downstairs if he behaves in a certain way. In
(l8b) (Als je dat zou doen besloot ik je te onierven - 'If you would do that
I decided to disinherit you') the hearer is in no position to ascertain what
is going on in the speaker's head, so that he will interpret the sentence as
meaning 'I (the speaker) do not decide to disinherit you', which is just
about the opposite of what the speaker intends to say. Sentence (l9b) (Als
je dat kopje lOU laten vallen brak het - 'If you would drop that cup it
broke') is unacceptable because the 'not now' - interpretation cannot be
excluded and is therefore likely to create serious confusion: how can a
speaker know that the cup does not, or is not going to break? And did he
not really want to say that it is going to break? It could be argued here that
it might be the 'any time' meaning which the speaker wishes to convey;
but it should be stressed that that meaning can only take precedence over
the 'not now' aspect when the latter is evident for both speaker and hearer.
In (20a) (Als je dat lOU doen zei ik het tegen je moeder - 'If you would do
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that I told your mother') the bearer bas no difficulty ascertaining that the
speaker is not telling the bearer's mother, so that the only interesting bit of
information is yielded by the 'any time' interpretation: 'that is the sort of
thing that 1 sball always tell your mother'. In (lOb) (... ze! ik tegen je dat
je weg moest gaan - ' ... I told you to leave') there is again the confusion
caused by the speaker seeming to claim that be is not saying something
'now', wbile be is at the same time saying it.
A similar communication breakdown would occur if in the apodosis of a
nomCF the past tense were to be were used rather than the zou-form; for
most sucb apodoses are of the form Het zou erg prettig zijn (,It would be
very nice'), Het zou geen verbazing wekken ('It would not cause any
surpise'), Ik zou ergeen bezwaar tegen hebben ('I wouldn't mind'), etc.,
and in the case of the past tense the hearer would be in no position to
ascertain that reference is not being made to the moment of speaking, so
that the negative interpretation would result.
It is to be expected that the difference in meaning between the two forms
in the protasis often comes out quite strikingly with such verbs as denken
Cto think'), geloven ('to believe'), vinden Cto think'), voelen ('to feel'),
weten ('to know'), etc.; as speaker and hearer are unlikely to share
knowledge about mental processes or states, protases with these verbs in
the past tense will be interpreted as claims to the contrary. If these verbs
occur in the past tense in apodoses, the 'not now' aspect will be prominent
as well, although the difference in meaning vis-a-vis the zou-form is less
striking there, since, unlike the protasis, the apodosis in declarative
conditionals always contains an assertion. As CFs with +1- are acceptable
only if the past tense unmistakably bas the 'any time' meaning (see
below), verbs like denken, vinden, etc., will not be found in the apodoses
of CFs with +1-. They can, however, occur in the apodoses of CFs with -1-,
as was clear from (6) (... , geloofde ik je - 'I believed you'), and as can be
seen in (22):
(22) Als je dat niet gedaan had vond ik je geen naarling
'If you had not done that I didn't think you were a pain in the
neck'
The addressee has done 'that', and consequently the speaker considers bim
a pain in the neck. That verbs like vinden, voelen etc. in the past tense are
unlikely to be given the 'not now' interpretation is not only due to the fact
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that speaker and hearer will only rarely share knowledge about either's
inner world, but has an additional reason: people may be able to make
categorical statements about what they will always do under certain
circumstances, but hardly what, given certain circumstances, they will
always feel, think etc. From this it follows that sentences like the ones in
(23) are unacceptable for two reasons, whereas a sentence like (20b) (Als
je dat zou doen zei ik tegen je dat je weg moest gaan - 'If you would do
that I told you to leave'), which has an odd ring to it because the 'not
now' interpretation is not excluded, is unacceptable for one reason only,
which seems to correspond with the fact that (23a) and (23b) show a
higher degree of unacceptability than (20b).
(23) a.? Als je me geen uitnodiging zou sturen dacht ik dat je me
wilde beledigen
'If you would not send me an invitation I thought you wanted
to insult me'
b. ?Als je dat zou doen vond ik je een naarling
'If you would do that I thought you were a pain in the neck'
So far it has been suggested that if speaker and hearer share knowledge
about the 'not now' aspect, the 'any time' interpretation will automatically
follow. But that need not always be the case. There is a category of CPs
with -/- in which the 'not now' aspect is quite evident, without it clearly
being the case that the 'any time' interpretation takes over:
(24) a. Als dat zo was zat ik hier niet
'If that were so I did not sit here'
b. Als ik er geen goede reden voor had zei ik zoiets niet
'If I did not have a good reason I did not say a thing like that'
In (24a) it cannot be the speaker's intention either to claim that he is not
sitting here (that much will be obvious), or that, at other any time, he will
not be sitting here; what he wants to do, and does, is present the fact that
he is sitting here as evidence that a certain state of affairs does not obtain.
The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to (24b). Wbat we have in these CFs
are thought experiments of a very simple kind, the consequence of the
imaginary situation referred to in the protasis being the opposite of what
obtains in the real world.
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In view of the above, it will cause no surprise that the word niet (' not')
in CFs usually goes together with the past tense, a past tense, moreover,
which will be given the 'not now' interpretation," This brings us to an
explanation of the fact that CFs with +/- are possible only when there is no
doubt as to the 'any time' status of the past tense. Sentences like (25):
(25) a.? Als bij van Bartok zou bouden zat bij bier niet
'If he would like Bartok he were not sitting here'
b. ?Als ik teveel zou eten woog ik geen vijftig kilo
'If I would eat too much I didn't weigh fifty kilos'
and also (24) with the zou-form in the protasis, at first sight may seem less
obviously odd than other unacceptable sentences mentioned in this paper,
but do leave one with a slightly uncomfortable feeling, which in my view
is caused by a logical break between protasis and apodosis: in the former
the speaker indicates that the possibility of the event/situation in question
taking place or obtaining is open, wbile in the latter conclusive proof is
presented that it is not. Therefore the speaker may be said to be
inconsistent: he sbould bave used the zou-form in the apodosis, or, better
still, the past tense in the protasis. The reason wby this is better is that the
whole point of both sentences is to prove, by means of an apodosis which
is in flat contradiction to the facts, that the possibility mentioned in the
protasis does not exist.
At this point the question may arise whether there are any other
constraints on the interpretation of the form used in the protasis imposed
by the one used the apodosis and vice versa. As can be seen from (26), in
CFs with -/- in which the 'not now' aspect is in the forefront in the
apodosis, the same negative interpretation is also, retroactively, forced on
the protasis. In (26a) the most likely meaning of the past tense in the
protasis is 'any time'; in (26b), on the other hand, it can only be 'not
now':
(26) a. Als hij in de gevangenis zat bezocht ik bern elke dag
'If be were in prison I visited him every day'
b. Als bij in de gevangenis zat wist ik dat
'If he were in prison I knew'
As will also become clear from the enumeration of all the possibilities at
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the end of this paper, no other constraints exist.
Besides niet ('not'), words like ook ('also'), nog ('also') and zelfs
('even') often trigger the use of the past tense, and even seem to upset the
hypothesis presented here. In the sentence cited from Overdiep en Van Es
at the beginning of this chapter (En al wist ik het, dan vertelde ik het je
nog niet - 'Even if I knew I did not tell you') the word nog causes the
meaning of the apodosis to make a U-turn from 'I am telling you' to 'I'm
not telling you, no matter whether I know or not'. What ook, nog, and zelfs
do, is, evidently, to cancel the 'not now' element, so that the meaning of
the past tense becomes 'any time, including now'.
By way of further illustration, consider the following pair:
(27) a. AJsje m' n broer niet was gaf ik je aan
'If you weren't my brother I denounced you'
b. Ook als je mijn broer niet was gaf ik je aan
'Even if you weren't my brother I denounced you'
The meaning, or rather implication, of (27a) is: 'you are my brother, so I
won't denounce you'; and of (27b): 'It doesn't matter whether you are my
brother or not - I (' m going to) denounce you'. For a further discussion of
these CFs, which are sometimes classed in a separate category, viz. that of
so- called 'semifactuals', see Chapter 6.
If both speaker and hearer are aware that the event/situation in question
is not taking place or does not obtain at the moment of speaking, the
difference between the past tense and the zou-form can, with Ebeling
(1962), be said to be only slight the past tense has a more categorical,
more definitive ('sharper') ring to it, which, as we have seen, is caused by
'any time' meaning component, and which, in practice, will see to it that
speakers will show a marked tendency to use the zou-form whenever
reference is being made to a specific event or situation. In the EC there are
two sentences which aptly illustrate this:
(28) Ik zou bet heel erg vinden als we na de verkiezingen weer met
deze combinatie in zee zouden moeten
'I would think it deplorable if after the elections we would have
to throw in our lot with this combination again'
(29) Hoe zou u het vinden wanneer u morgenochtend ontdekte dat het
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huis van uw buren een bordeel was geworden?
'How would you like it if you found out tomorrow that your
neighbours' house bad been turned into a brothel?'
In (28), but not in (29), the speaker is referring to a particular moment in
time: it is clear that morgenochiend ('tomorrow morning') in (29) should
not be understood as 'the day after the moment of speaking' but as
'suddenly'. That the distinction between 'now' and 'any other time' is in
line with that between 'specific' and 'general' can be seen not only from
(28) and (29), but also from the fact that it is easier to replace zou doen
('would do') by deed ('did') in (30a) than in (30b), although it would
definitely make both sentences less acceptable:
(30) a. Als je zoiets zou doen zou ik je nooit meer aankijken
'If you would do a thing like that I would never speak to you
again'
b. Als je dat zou doen zou ik je nooit meer aankijken
'If you would do that I would never speak to you again'
But again it might be added that a shift of the accent to zoiets ('a thing
like that') or dat ('that') will make the sentences sound perfectly all right.
The following diagram lists and orders all the characterizations of the
meanings of the two forms given so far:
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ZOU + infinitive past tense
imaginary imaginary
at the moment of not at the moment of at any other moment
speaking, 'now' speaking, 'not now' 'any (other) time'




not verified, open (?) verified. definitive (l)
the speaker does not the speaker knows
know
For evidence supporting the above views we need not look at conditional
sentences only. There is, for example, a construction in Dutch with lOU +
past participle, the use of which does not commit the speaker to the truth
of the proposition expressed:
(31) Hij zou naar Frankrijk gevlucht zijn
He would to France fled be
'He is said to have fled to France'
Likewise, there is a construction with the past tense which indicates that
the speaker knows the proposition expressed to be untrue:
(32) Was dat maar waar!
Were that but true!
'If only that were true!'
But the most important argument in favour of the theory presented here is
the fact that the vast majority of the protases of CFs whose point of
reference is not the present but the past (pAST CFs) have the pluperfect
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rather than zou + past participle + auxiliary. In other words: (33a) is far
more usual than (33b):
(33) a. A1s ik dat geweten had zou ik wei gegaan zijn
'If I had known that I would have gone'
b. A1s ik dat geweten zou hebben zou ik wei gegaan zijn
'If I would have known that I would have gone'
The EC has the following figures: in the protasis the auxiliary zijn ('to be')
has the form without zou in 18 out of 19 cases, and in the apodosis in 9
out of 19; in the protasis the auxiliary hebben has the form without zou in
12 out of 14 cases, and in the apodosis in 15 out of 19 cases. That in
PAST CFs the variant +1+ has nearly completely disappeared is exactly
what one would expect: generally speaking, people know what has
happened in the past, so that it usually makes no sense to leave the
question whether something did. in fact, happen undecided. A sentence like
(34), however, (taken from the EC) shows that occasionally it does make
sense:
(34) Wei gaf Mr. Hoyer desgevraagd te kennen dat hij bij de ILIF een
verzoek om royement van Zuid-Afrika zou indienen als dit land
een Nederlandse niet-blanke tennisser toegang zou hebben
geweigerd
'Mr Hoyer LLM. did intimate that he would request the ILIF to
expel South Africa if that country would have refused admittance
to a Dutch non-white tennis player'
Here had geweigerd ('had refused') would have implied that South Africa
had in fact done no such thing, a view to which Mr Hoyer evidently did
not want to commit himself.
It will be clear that one would not expect the zou-form to disappear quite
as completely from the apodoses of PAST CFs as from their protases; for
the choice between the two forms in the apodosis is entirely determined by
the degree of certainty of the speaker with respect to the things that would
have happened if the imaginary event/situation had taken place or obtained
(sentence (35) has been taken from the EC):
(35) A1s we niet hadden ingegrepen waren er later veel meer
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gedupeerden geweest
'If we had not intervened far more people had been duped'
(36) Ik denk dat ik hem achtemagelopen zou zijn als bij nog een keer
omgekeken had
'I think I would have gone after him if he had looked back once'
5 An enumeration of the possibilities
If the past tense in CPs has two meaning elements, and the zou-form only
one, then in principle there are nine combinations. We have seen above
that two of these turn out to be impossible; but, as will be shown below,
one combination has two variants, so that we can distinguish eight
different types of CP: one with -t«; two with -/+, four with -l-, and one
with +/-. All (im)possibilities will be listed and characterized below. Of
each type a number of reprentative examples will be given under a), and
under b) a number of sentences in which the replacement of one form by
the other results in a clear difference in meaning. Finally, for every
combination (but not for every type) a number of odd or unacceptable
sentences will be given under x).
I. +/+
Leaving the question what the state of affairs in the real world is
like completely open, the speaker describes a hypothetical event /
situation and predicts what, again hypothetically, will happen as a
result (advCF), or how he or other people will react (nomCF).
a) AIs jij in de gevangenis zou ziUen zou ik je eJke dag bezoeken
'If you would be in jail I would visit you every day'
AIs je dat zou willen doen zou ik dat erg op prijs stellen
'If you would do that I would greatly appreciate it'
(Note that in the last sentence neither protasis nor apodosis
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allows the other form)
b) Als dat zou kunnen zou ik met het vliegtuig gaan
'If that would be possible I would go by plane'
Als hij bereid zou zijn om mee te werken zouden we het redden
'If he would be willing to cooperate we would manage'
x) Als ik jou zou zijn zou ik het wel weten
'If I would be you I would know what to do'
II. -/+
1) 'not now' in the foreground
The speaker describes a hypothetical event / situation, indicating
that he knows it not to be occurring / not to obtain at the moment
of speaking, and predicts what, hypothetically, will happen as a
result (etc.; see under I).
a) Als ik het wist zou ik het zeggen
'If I knew I would say it'
b) Als hij van je hield zou bij vaker met je uitgaan
'If he loved you he would take ou out more often'
(See for other examples, mutatis mutandis, Ib)
2. 'any time' in the foreground
Without having in mind any particular moment in time, the
speaker describes a hypothetical event / situation, indicating that
he knows it not to be occurring / not to obtain at the moment of
speaking, and predicts what, hypothetically, will happen (etc.).
a) Als jij in de gevangenis zat zou ik je dagelijks bezoeken
'If you were in jail I would visit you daily'
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Als we wat meer armslag kregen zou dat heel prettig zijn
'If we were given some more elbow room it would be great'
b) -
x) Als je aan de noodrem trok zou je een boete krijgen
'If you pulled the communication cord you would be fmed'
Als dat kon zou dat mooi zijn
'If that were possible it would be nice'
Als iemand me f 100,- gat zou ik heel dankbaar zijn
'If somebody gave me f 100.- I would be very grateful'
III. -/-
1. 'not now' in the foreground in both clauses
A By means of the protasis the speaker indicates that he knows a
certain event I situation not to be occurring I not to obtain at
the moment of speaking, so that the event I situation referred
to in the apodosis is contrary to fact as well: not x, hence not
y; notice that in the second and third examples the reverse
may apply, in which case they fall under B.
a) Ais je m'n broer niet was gat ik je aan
'If you weren't my brother I denounced you'
Als ik honger had lustte ik wei een appeltje
'If I were hungry I liked an apple'
Als ik bet wist zei ik het
,If I knew it I said it'
b) Of in the last two sentences the zou-form is used in the
protasis, the apodosis can only be given the 'any time'-
interpretation; in that case the sentences fall under IV,l. But
see under B. below!)
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B It is the speaker's aim to prove that the state of affairs referred
to in the protasis must be contrary to fact by making a
hypothetical claim in the apodosis which is patently false: not
y, hence not x.
a) Als ik zo'n rotvent was bielpen ze me niet
'If I were sucb a pain in the neck they did not help me'
Als ik bet wist zei ik het
'If I knew it I said it'
b) (If in these sentences the zou-form is used in the protasis, they
fall under IV,2 and are consequently unacceptable; but see
also under Ab above. In both A. and B. the use of the
zou-form will only result in a weakening of the
'definitiveness' of the claim.)
2. 'any time' in the foreground in both clauses
Without having in mind any particular moment in time, the
speaker describes a hypothetical event I situation, indicating that
he knows it not to be occurring I not to obtain at the moment of
speaking, and feels so confident about its hypothetical
consequences that he makes a categorical statement with regard
to them.
a) Als jij in de gevangenis zat bezocht ik je elke dag
'If you were in prison I visited you every day'
b) -
3. 'not now' in protasis, 'any time' in apodosis
The speaker describes a hypothetical event I situation, indicating
that he knows it not to be occurring I not to obtain at the moment
of speaking, and makes a categorical statement about what, in his
view, will always happen in such a state of affairs.
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a) Als ik rijk was smeet ik eerst m'n vrouw de deur uit
'If I were rich I first chucked out my wife'
(The protasis can also be given the ' any time' -interpretation)
b) Als dat kon ging ik met het vliegtuig
'If that were possible I went by plane'
(This sentence could also fall under III,I,A)
4. 'any time' in the protasis, 'not now' in the apodosis
Impossible: the 'not now' -interpretation of the apodosis
automatically
imposes the same interpretation on the protasis.
a) -
b) -
x) Als jullie het huis verkochten wist ik me geen mad
'If you sold the house I did not know what to do'
Als hij dat hoorde werd hij woedend
'If he heard that he became furious'
Als we naar Engeland gingen waren we duurder uit
'If we went to England we that was more expensive'
Als je viel brak je je been
'If you fell you broke your leg'
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IV. +/-
1) 'any time' in the foreground
Leaving the question what the state of affairs in the real world is
like completely open, the speaker describes a hypothetical event /
situation, and makes a categorical statement about what the
consequences of such events / situations will be; in most cases
these consequences will be actions over which he has a
considerable measure of control.
a) Als je weer zou gaao optreden ging ik er been
'If you would start performing again I went to see you'
Als er een atoombom zou vallen waren we allemaal de sigaar
'If a nuclear bomb would fall we were all done for'
b) -
2) 'not now' in the foreground
Impossible: a protasis which leaves the question what the state of
affairs in the real world is like completely open, cannot be
reconciled with an apodosis which makes the explicit claim that
something is contrary to fact at the moment of speaking.
a) -
b) -
x) Als hij van Bartok zou houden vond ik dat vreselijk
'If he would like Bartok I thought that a terrible thing'
Als dat zo zou zijn verbaasde me dat
'If that would be true it surprised me'
Als hij zou horen wat er is gebeurd verloor hij z'n verstaod
'If he would hear what happened he went out of his mind'
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Als je moeder gewild zou bebben was ik je vader geweest
'If your mother would have wanted I bad been our father'
Als dit niet zo zou zijn zei ik bet niet
'If this would not be true I did not say it'
Als deze theorie niet zou Idoppen verkondigde ik hem niet
'If this theory would not be correct I did not proclaim it'
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Notes to chapter 2
1. Dutch version, entitled Werkwoordstijden in Nederlandse
counterfactuals, published in De Nieuwe Taalgids, 77, 6, 1984,
542-555.
2. Comrie (1985) claims that it is a language universal for the
protasis to precede the apodosis in the majority of cases.
However, nomCFs seem to show the opposite tendency. In the
Eindhoven Corpus (discussed later in the text) two out of every
three advCFs have the protasis in initial position (thereby
confirming Comrie), but for nomCFs it is the other way about.
This should not cause too much surprise: whereas in most
advCFs the event/situation referred to in the protasis leads to,
or results in, and therefore logically precedes, the
event/situation referred to in the apodosis, many nomCFs are
evaluative in character ('I would greatly appreciate it if you
would do this for me'), and evaluations can not only coincide
with the events or situations evaluated, but also precede them.
3. The 94 CFs in the Eindhoven Corpus show the following
distribution:
+1+ 33 -1+ 35
+1- 1 -1- 5
+/zero 3 -!Present Tense 1
+!Pres. Tense 11 -!Pluperfect 3
+!Pluperfect 1 +-1- 1
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4. That negatives and past tenses tend to go together is also quite
clear from the EC figures: there are 9 sentences in which both
protasis and apodosis contain a negative element; in all of these
the protasis has a past tense. There are 5 sentences in which
only the protasis contains a negative element; four of these
have -1+.
POSTSCRIPT Chapter 2
Dutch speakers show a virtually ineradicable tendency to use
ungrammatical would in the antecedents of English SCs; in view of the
semantic distinction that is said to exist in Dutch between zau + infoand a
past tense in an if-clause this tendency is, however, entirely
understandable. The errors of Dutch speakers can be made to be even more
understandable once it is realized that Dutch freely allows the use of the
Present Tense when reference is made to the future. Hence, although (lb)
is fully grammatical, (la) is the more usual form:
(I) a. Ik doe bet morgen
I do it tomorrow
'I'll do it tomorrow'
b. Ik zal het morgen doen
I shall it tomorrow do
'I'll do it tomorrow'
Since, when reference is made to the future, the simple present and a
future form (zol + inf.) are more or less free variants, it is hardly
surprising that even in a temporal subclause tal + infosometimes takes the
place of the simple present, even though there can be little doubt that in
that position the latter from is, again, the standard one. But temporal
subclauses like
(2) Als ik er niet meer zal zijn
When I there no longer shall be
'When I am no longer there'
do occur occasionally and are certainly not regarded as ungrammatical,
although (2) itself may be regarded as a petrified expression. Be that as it
may, it seems highly probable that in the following pairs most native
speakers of Dutch will consider the replacement of the present tense by zal
+ inf. more appropriate in the a)-sentences than in the b)-ones:
(3) a. Als ik op mijn 20ste een miljoen erf, ga ik nu geen baantje
zoeken
If I at my 20th a million inherit, go I now not a job seek
'If I shall / am going to inherit a million at my 20th, I am not
going to look for a job now'
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b. Als ik op mijn 20ste een miljoen erf, koop ik een jacht
If I at my 20th a million inherit, buy I a yacht
'If I inherit a million at my 20th. I'll buy a yacht'
(4) a. Als Jansen morgen komt, hoef ik hem nu niet te bellen
If Jansen tomorrow comes. need I him now not to call
'If Jansen is coming tomorrow. I need not call him now'
b. Als Jansen morgen komt, vraag ik het hem
If Jansen tomorrow comes. ask I it him
'If Jansen comes tomorrow, I'll ask him'
Not surprisingly. Dutch speakers of English are far more likely to translate
the a)-sentences incorrectly into English than the b)-ones, since the
translations in brackets show that in the latter English requires a future
form. Indeed, it is not easy to make it clear to Dutch learners of English
that the conditions in the a)-sentences, in spite of the fact that they look
identical to those in the b)-ones, are really radically different from them, in
that the conditions to be fulfilled in the former concern the truth of a
prediction rather then the materialization of an event - as the translations
into English show.
One more remark may be made in this context, concerning footnote no. 7
of chapter 3. The ambiguity of the antecedent of such conditionals is the
exception rather than the rule in English (as indicated in the footnote.
reference to the future by means of the simple present is restricted to
statements about calendars and timetables); but in Dutch the reverse is the
case, since in that language reference to the future is freely made by means
of the present tense. This, of course, is one more reason why Dutch
learners of English often find it so difficult to 'get their tenses right' when
speaking English.
The problems of Dutch speakers of English are compounded by the fact
that Dutch als can mean either 'if or 'when'. so that a simple subclause
like Als Jan er is has at least three different translations in English: 1) •If
Jan is there'; 2) 'If Jan is going to be there'; 3) 'When Jan is there'.
But that is not all. English when can also be a relative adverb. in which
case it behaves like interrogative when in freely allowing the use of
shall/will after it, for example: Let's discuss this tomorrow, when Jan will
be there. In Dutch. where als can have the same function. the subclause
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following it will again have the simple present. so that the subclause of the
sentence will, again, have 'als Jan er is' as its Dutch translation.
Now, as will be argued in the next chapter, there are 'counterfactuals'
whose condition consists not in the occurrence of a hypothetical event but
in the truth of the hypothetical prediction of one; and in these cases Dutch
learners are, of course. quite likely to use the correct would + infinitive
when translating into English. Consider the following sentences:
(5) a. If he would have them executed on the spot (i.e. if we
surrendered them to him), we should not surrender them to
him
b. If he had them executed them on the spot. I should report it to
the authorities
If these sentences are translated into Dutch, both antedecents are likely to
have zou + infinitive, although a past tense is also possible (albeit less
probable in the case of (Sa». It is, again, no simple matter to explain to
Dutch students that behind the identical translations of the antecedents of
(Sa) and (5b) there are two entirely different conditions.
But these cases are rare, albeit not half as rare as cases where non-
volitonal will + infinitive is required. The majority of SCs happens to have
antecedents the conditions in which concern the hypothetical occurrence of
an event; for these hypothetical occurrences Dutch makes the useful
distinction between 'potentialis' and 'irrealis', and it is when the former
aspect is intended that Dutch learners of English will persist in using
incorrect would + infinitive, since to their ears a past tense, with its
suggestion of 'Irrealis', just sounds wrong.
Kellerman (1987: thesis V) makes an interesting point when be argues that
Dutch speakers should not be blamed for the errors they commit when
uttering English counterfactuals, since these errors, in bis view, actually
constitute an improvement over the English system, which lacks a way of
distinguishing between 'potentialis' and 'irrealis' (although the former can.
strictly speaking, be expressed by the rather formal structure were to +
inf.).
Now. although there is something to be said for Kellerman's position,
there is also definitely a disadvantage to the Dutch system, in that it does
56 CHAPTER 2
not allow making the distinction between a hypothetical event and the
hypothetical prediction of one (see the translations into Dutch of the
sentences in (5», comparable to the failure of Dutch to make a distinction
between a condition which consists in the materialization of an event and
one which consists in the prediction of an event (cf. the sentences in (3)
and (4).
There are, in short, advantages and disadvantages to both the Dutch and
the English systems, but since, strictly speaking, the distinction between
potentialis and irrealis is not an indispensable one, the conclusion that in
terms of rigour and consistency Englisb is the winner seems warranted.
One final point: I have begun to have second thoughts about the type of
CF mentioned in section III,la. I doubt whether the reasoning referred to
('not x, therefore not y') really exists. It may be better simply to class it
under extrapolation about an imaginary situation.
CHAPTER 3
PRESENT AND RJTURE IN CONDITIONAL PROTASES1
Abstract
This paper discusses and rejects proposals by Haegeman and Wekker
(1984) and Declerck (1984) to account for the appearance of nonvolitional
will/would in conditional protases. It is argued (a) that the phenomenon
cannot be properly understood unless the present tense in conditional and
temporal subclauses is looked upon as having nonpast rather than future
reference; (b) that the absence of will/would from temporal subclauses can
be explained in the same terms as tbe presence of will/would in a certain
type of conditional protasis; (c) that the condition to be fulfilled in such a
protasis is not the occurrence of an event, but the truth of a prediction; and
(d) that some, but not all, cases of volitional will/would can be explained
in the same way.
1 Introduction
In recent years there have been several proposals to account for the
appearance, in condition protases, of nonvolitional will and would, as it
occurs in sentences like the following:
(1) I won't say anything, if you won't (WiUiam Boyd, A Good Man
in A/rica).
(2) If he will go to China next year, tben we should publish his book
now (Glendinning-Johnson 1975).
(3) If he won't arrive before nine, there's no point in ordering dinner
for him now (Quirk et al. 1972).
(4) Tomorrow afternoon perhaps - about three o'clock, if that would
suit her (Poutsma 1926).
(5) Now if all the dresses will be finished by about next Monday,
why don't you bring them yourself! (J.B. Priestley, The Good
Companions).
Most of the proposals have started from tbe basic assumption that English
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grammar does not normally allow this nonvolitional will/would in
conditional protases, which therefore are said to behave like temporal
subclauses, in which will/would never, or hardly ever, occurs. The purpose
of this paper is to show
(i) that there are important differences between temporal and conditional
sentences, which go a long way toward explaining the absence in the
subclauses of the former, and the presence in some of the protases of the
latter, of will/would;
(ii) that the presence or absence of will/would in conditional protases
depends solely on the type of condition to be fulfilled and has nothing to
do with the nature of the relationship between apodosis and protasis;
(iii) that the proposals made so far are inadequate in that they fail to
appreciate the distinctions between temporal and conditional clauses, and
between facts and events.
The term 'special conditional' will be used for conditional sentences in
which the protasis contains nonvolitional will/would, and the term 'ordinary
conditional' for those in which the protasis contains any other form.
After a review of some recent articles about the subject, the time
reference in temporal and conditional subclauses will be looked at closely;
the subsequent examination of the differences between the two types of
clauses will develop into a substantiation of the claims made above. The
extent to which volitional will/would in if-clause is taken 'care of by the
view presented here is the subject of the final section.
The recent articles that will be discussed in detail are Haegeman and
Wekker (1984) and Declerck (1984); since these both reject the earlier
proposal made by Close (1980), the latter will come under review again.
For a fuller survey of the literature the reader is referred especially to
Haegeman and Wekker (H & W).
2 Earlier discussions
H & W claim that if-clauses may be either central or peripheral, and that if
they are central they are 'dominated' (' c-commanded', in the terms of
transformational grammar) by the will in the apodosis, so that they do not
need to have explicit reference to the future themselves; if, however, they
are peripheral, reference to the future must be made explicit, that is, by
PRESENT AND FUTURE IN CONDITIONAL PROTASES 59
will.
The difference between the two types of protases is said to correspond to
the difference between what Quirk et al. (1972) call adjuncts and disjuncts.
The following examples are given of the peripheral type:
(6) If you like her so much, you should invite her to tea.
(7) If it will rain tomorrow, we might as well cancel the match now.
A criterion for distinguishing between central and peripheral protases, H &
W argue, is that the former, but not the latter, can serve as responses to
wh-questions, to which they add in a footnone: 'similar observations can
be made with respect to negation' (this obviously reflects Quirk et al.'s
assertion that adjuncts can be the focus of a question or of clause
negation); hence, in H & W's view, the unacceptability of the following
conversation:
(6) a. Q. WhenlUnder what condition should I invite her?
A. *If you like her so much.
Now, although it is clearly suggested that whatever goes for (6) will also
apply to (7), it is doubtful whether that is the case; although in (7a) 'If it is
going to rain tomorrow' would certainly sound more natural, it is not
immediately obvious that the answer as it stands is ungrammatical:
(7) a. Q. WhenlUnder what condition might we (not) as well cancel
the match now?
A. If it will rain tomorrow.
As the issue cannot be decided on the basis of (7a) alone, it might be
helpful here to apply the same test to a standard ifwwill case:
(8) If the lava will come down as far as this, all these houses must
be evacuated at once (Close 1980: 103).
There is no problem in making the protasis the focus of a question (italics
indicate sentence focus):
(8) a. Must all these houses be evacuated at once if the lava will
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come down as far as this?
And the same for clause negation:
(8) b. All these houses needn't be evacuated if the lava will come
down no farther than this, but they must if it will come down
as far as this.
If (8a) and (8b) are grammatical, then, by Quirk et al.'s standards (which
H & W endorse), the protasis in (8) is an adjunct.
Another feature of peripheral protases, H & W point out, is that they
often have 'comma intonation'. The following example, however, can
easily be read without such comma intonation (and even manages to do
without a comma in writing):
(9) ... a thing C..) which (...) the Earl might mention if it would not
be tedious to his host (Evelyn Waugh, Black Mischief)
All this is not meant to prove that there is no such thing as a peripheral if-
clause, and that, consequently, all if+will clauses are necessarily central,
but only that at least some of the if+will clauses under consideration are
adjuncts, so that the distinction central-peripheral cannot be the decisive
factor in the assignment of will/would to these protases. H & W's
hypothesis, therefore, must be rejected.
Declerck (1984), who also tries to explain the appearance of will/would
from the type of relationship obtaining between protasis and apodosis,
discusses nine types of conditionals and examines how will/would
functions in each of them, finally concluding that protases containing
will/would can be of two types: those in which the event in the protasis is
temporally situated with respect to the moment of speaking (let us call
these type A) and those 'which are really head-clauses (either with respect
to an embedded if-clause or because they are used without an overt head-
clause)' (let us call these type B I and B2 respectively). Examples (cited
from Declerck) of these types are
A. If it will make you feel any better, we know now that it wasn't
your fault.
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B I. If John would have succeeded if he had tried. you must have a
try at once. You are much better than him.
B2. Hang it all! If that idiot won't be there as well! Who the hell sent
him an invitation?
Where these types differ from ordinary conditional sentences, says
Declerck, is that in the latter the two (future) events p and q are situated
with respect to each other, so that there is no need for both to be expressed
by a future form, and the event in the protasis (p) can, via the process of
'linguistic economy', be referred to by the simple present In A- and B-like
sentences, on the other hand, the futurity of the apodosis can no longer' do
duty' for that in the protasis, which therefore must follow the tense system
of main clauses (in essence, this does not differ from H & W's proposal).
There are a number of objections to Declerck's approach:
(i) As will/would can be present or absent in all the nine types of
conditionals recognized by Declerck, its use is apparently fully independent
of them, in the same way in which it has been seen to be independent of
the distinction central-peripheral.
(ii) There is considerable overlap between types A and B I: although
Declerck is right in pointing out that the protases of B I are main clauses
vis-a-vis an embedded subclause (which may only be implied), they are
still subclauses in themselves, and the events referred to in them are still
temporally situated with respect to the moment of speaking. Consequently
B I is no more than a subset of A.
(iii) The only type, then, that seems to remain in a category of its own is
B2, but unfortunately some of Declerck's examples here are not
convincing:
A. Do you think he'll write us a letter when he reaches Hong Kong?
B. If he hasn't forgotten us yet!
If he won't have forgotten us!
Where, in Declerck's view, B's two anwers differ is that the first is to be
interpreted as 'as early as now' and the second as 'as early as then'.
However, the native speakers I have consulted on this matter did not
hesitate to condemn the second answer as ungrammatical, the meaning 'as
early as then' being conveyed by If he hasn't forgotten us by then.
Declerck also quotes an example from Jespersen (1931):
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'If he'll only turn to be a brave and truth-telling Englishman, C ..) that's all
I want.'
Here the present tense of the main clause seems to suggest that the protasis
is temporally situated with respect to the moment of speaking - and in that
case the sentence belongs to type A.
In addition to this, Declerck's article contains a statement which, in spite
of the fact that it appears in a footnote, requires special comment because
of its bearing on one of the crucial issues in the present paper. In this
footnote we read that 'a similar mechanism is at work in adverbial time
clauses', which statement is illustrated by the following example:
Wait until Tuesday, when I shall tell you everything.
Here, of course, when does not mean 'at the time at which', but 'at which
time' and therefore is not a conjunction but a relative adverb - this is also
clear from the fact that the subclause and the main clause cannot change
position; in the sentences under discussion the meaning of if, on the other
hand, remains constant, whether it is followed by will or not.
In sum, Declerck's thorough examination of all the uses to which
will/would can be put in conditional protases does not yield an entirely
satisfactory analysis, and neither his nor H & W's proposal therefore
constitutes an improvement on Close's (1980), which explains will/would
in conditional protases solely in terms of the kind of assumption made in
the protasis: in ordinary conditionals there is said to be 'assumed future
actuality', and in the special ones 'assumed predictability'. Although
Close's terminology is infelicitous and somewhat difficult to interpret
(which may be the reason his ideas have failed to find acceptance), his
semantic analyses, in my view, is correct and does not run into the
difficulties' encountered by H & W and Declerck, who, instead of asking
'Wby do protases which are temporally situated with respect to the
moment of speaking have will?' should have asked themselves the opposite
question: 'Why do conditional protases containing will seem to have a
present point of orientation?' It is the latter question which will be
addressed in this chapter.'
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3 Future reference' in temporal and conditional subclauses and the
absence of will from the former
The core of the problem presented by will in conditional protases is the
assumption that the simple present in temporal and conditional subclauses
can 'refer to the future'. This assumption is implicit in, for example, H &
W's 'future if-clauses'; in Close's 'assumed future actuality'; and in
Leech's (1971) claim that 'the future is denoted by the ordinary Present
instead of the construction with will/shall'.
If the simple present after if has future reference, it becomes difficult to
say what time reference will might have in the same position. H & W's
and Declerck's way out of this dilemma is to claim that both the simple
present and will+inf. refer to the future, but that the former is to be
regarded as a reduction of the latter, made possible, and even obligatory,
by the close temporal link between the events referred to in protasis and
apodosis. This view necessitates an explanation of will+inf. in terms of the
type of relationship existing between the (events referred to in the) protasis
and the apodosis; and we have seen above that such an explanation runs
into serious difficulties.
The view to be defended here, therefore, is the following:
(i) Although it is quite all right to say that in temporal and conditional
subclauses we may have a future event in mind when using the present
tense, it is not all right to say that therefore the present tense in such
clauses denotes the future: a sharp distinction should be made between the
grammatical meaning of a linguistic form and the uses to which this form
is put, and the grammatical meaning of the simple present in temporal and
conditional subclauses is never 'future', but only 'nonpast'.' Obviously, an
exhaustive discussion of the correspondences between tense and real time
is beyond the scope of this chapter; it is claimed, however, that the
descriptive problems caused by the appearance of will/would in conditional
protases will vanish once the idea of 'future reference' of the simple
present in these clauses is given up.
(ii) The nature of the relationship between protasis and apodosis is
irrelevant to the occurrence of will+inf. in the former. This occurrence is
exclusively determined by the kind of condition to be fulfilled - which is
not to deny, of course, that the nature of the condition to be fulfilled
affects the nature of the relationship between the 'events' referred to in the
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protasis and those referred to in the apodosis (the reason for the quotation
marks will be given later); however, to claim that such a different
relationship necessitates the use of will/would is to confuse cause and
effect
Since the rule that will cannot appear in temporal and conditional
subclauses is said to allow of no exceptions in the case of the former, let
us first consider the following, temporal, sentences:
(10) When he arrives, the band will play the National Athem (Quirk et
al. 1972).
(II) When he arrives, he always kisses the tarmac,
Two points should be noted here.
(i) As the subclauses in (10) and (11) are identical, and as the subclause in
(11) cannot be said to refer to the future, the most plausible view seems to
be that it is the main clause in (10) which, retroactively, assigns a future
interpretation to the subclause, which in itself is free from any futurity
whatever.
(ii) Whereas in main clauses the use of the simple present to refer to single
events is highly restricted (to the so-called instantaneous present), no such
restrictions hold for the simple present in the subclauses under discussion:
there it can refer either to a habit (as in [II]), or to a single event (as in
(10)) and consequently is like the simple past, which, even in main
clauses, is ambiguous between the two interpretations.
The 'nonpast neutrality' of the simple present in a temporal subclause is
also evident from the ease with which the subclause can be paraphrased by
a nonfmite clause or by an adjunct without any appreciable loss in
meaning:
(10) a. AtlAfter his arriving/arrival, the band will play the National
Anthem.
(II) a. AtlAfter his arriving/arrival, he always kisses the tarmac.
Of course, the adverbial adjuncts in (lOa) and (lla) cannot be said to have
future reference themselves, since they can just as easily be followed by a
past tense; and the same goes for so-called verbless clauses, as exemplified
in the sentences in (12):
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(12) a. When in Rome, I shall visit the Vatican Museum.
b. When in Rome, I always visit the Vatican Museum.
c. When in Rome, I visited the Vatican Museum.
As the subclauses in (12) contain neither a verbal form nor a time
adverbial, they cannot be said to have any time reference at all; and as the
meanings of (a) and (b) do not change noticeably when I am is added to
the subclause, it would be odd to insist that the addition of the finite form
suddenly imposes future reference on the subclause of (a). Needless to say,
a similar argument can be set up for verbless if-clauses. Consider also the
following sentences:
(13) a. If you have finished your work, show it to me.
b. When you have finished your work, show it to me.
c. If you have finished your work before 20 September, you will
receive a bonus.
d. If you have finished your work within ten days, you always
receive a bonus.
It would needlessly complicate matters to claim that the present perfect in
temporal and conditional subclauses can have present reference (as in [al),
future reference (as in [b] and [c] and nonpast reference (as in [d)). No
complications arise, however, if the present perfect is only looked upon as
denoting a completed event: in a main clause this state-of-being-completed
naturally relates the event to the moment of speaking; in a temporal or
conditional subclause the position in real time depends entirely on context
and is not in any way 'given' by the verbal form itself.
Thus, we take it that the simple present in temporal and conditional
subclauses does not refer to the future or the present, but only to a nonpast
event, whose position in real time is determined by the context, such as the
tense of the verb in the main clause. To use our examples again: in the
subclauses in both (10) and (11) there IS (reference to a) nonpast event,
which in (10) WILL BE attended/followed by the playing of the National
Anthem, and which in (11) IS always attended/followed by the kissing of
the tarmac.
As an abbreviation for 'the event referred to by he arrives', let us adopt
the methode of using capital letters to represent real-world events, so that
HE ARRIVE is the event referred to by he arrives in (10) and (11). Now
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the question can be asked, could he will arrive not refer to this event HE
ARRIVE just as well? This, obviously, would be the stance taken by those
who explain the simple present in a subclause like the one in (10) as due
to 'linguistic economy'; but what is overlooked by such economists is the
fact that. strictly speaking, at the time at which something happens does
not mean the same as at the time at which something will happen (assu-
ming, for the sake of the argument. that this can be said at all). The
difference is this: the former can literally be interpreted as 'at the time at
which SOMETHING HAPPEN' but the latter cannot: what we have there
is not a real-world event. but the prediction of one. And as the prediction
of a future event always precedes the event predicted, the time •at which
something will happen' precedes the time •at which something happens'.






'The band will play the National Anthem {when he arrives}.'





'------- ....y 'he wi 11"rri ve'
'The band will play the National Anthem (when he will arrive).'
Figure 1. Graphic representation of the order of events
Seen in this light. it makes perfectly logical sense for will not to appear
after when: saying 'when he will arrive the band will play the National
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Anthem' would be tantamount to saying that the playing of the National
Anthem will precede HE ARRIVE and would therefore constitute a
resersal of the order of events intended by the speaker. See Figure 1 for a
graphic representation. Notice that in the diagrams the predictions of the
various events are considered to hold for the period starting at the moment
they are made and lasting until the events predicted take place. Notice also
that, although grammatically nothing can be said about the precise location
of point B in the second diagram, pragmatically things may be quite
different: in when-clauses concerning future events the future occurrence of
the event referred to is taken for granted, so although we may not know
the position of point C, we do know that it will come; but if we are certain
of that, where else but at point A could point B be situated? It seems very
difficult to imagine a situation in which, say, we know today that an event
will take place the day after tomorrow, but in which the prediction of that
event will only be valid as from tomorrow. Consequently, 'when he will
arrive, etc.' would be a statement to the effect that the playing of the
National Anthem will take place now.
That this way of looking at things is more than mere hair-splitting can be
seen from the following sentence (quoted from Longman's Dictionary of
Contemporary English):
(14) I can't tell you anything when you won't listen.
The meaning of when here is given as 'considering that'. Wbat makes the
sentence so interesting is, first, that the moment of the making of the
prediction 'you won't listen' (to be interpreted, of course, as 'you are
unwilling to listen') coincides with the moment of speaking, so that we can
literally rewrite (14) as 'I can't tell you anything at this time at which you
won't listen'; and if instead of 'at this time at which' we read 'now that',
it becomes a very short step toward 'considering that'. The crucial point
about (14) is, however, that the inability to tell referred to in the main
clause does not FOLLOW the non listening of the subclause, but PRECEDES it;
it is the making of the prediction 'you won't listen' which is followed by
the nontelling.
All this admits of no other conclusion than that the ungrammaticality of
will in nearly all4 temporal subclauses is not a matter of linguistic
economy, but of plain common sense - a common sense, that is, which
takes the meanings of both conjunction and verbal form quite literally, and
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not semimetapborically, as appears to be the case in a language like
French, where future forms after conjunctions of time are freely allowed.
A final, and most important. argument supporting the above view is
provided by the appearance of will/would in conditional protases, which,
among other things, is the subject of the next section.
4 Temporal vs. conditional, and ordinary vs. special
If we compare temporal subclauses with conditional ones, we may first of
all notice the difference in meaning between when and if. 'at the time at
which' vs. 'on condition that'. The second difference is closely related to
the first: whereas in temporal subclauses we assume that the event referred
to does or will indeed take place, there is no such assumption in
conditional ones: in 'when he arrives' we presume that the 'he' in question
either regularly arrives or will arrive; in 'if he arrives', however, we just
do not know. This may seem quite uncontroversial, but Leech (1971: 60)
claims that 'in the dependent clauses mentioned, the happening referred to
is not a prediction but a fact that is taken as given' (of course, this is
somewhat careless: happenings are never facts and should not be seen as
facts either - only statements, descriptions can be factual, in which case
they are true; happenings cannot be true or false), and further on he says,
'it is appropriate to use the Present Tense, with its assumption of factual
certainty'. Likewise, Rigter (1982) says that 'for the sake of the argument,
the speaker assumes the truth of whatever follows after if. All this misses
the essence of what a conditional sentence is about. A speaker who says,
'if you touch that vase, I'll kill you' does not 'take as a fact', or 'assume
for the sake of the argument', that somebody touches, or will touch, that
vase. He does not assume anything. What he does do is state that there is
one condition on his killing his interlocutor, namely the latter's touching
that vase. In other words: the event that WILL cause, trigger off, precipi-
tate my killing you is YOU TOUCH THAT VASE. Notice, incidentally,
that this view accords nicely with a common colloquial guise of
conditionals: you touch that vase and I'll kill you.
It is these two differences between temporal and conditional subclauses
which together ensure that, whereas in most of the former the appearance
of will would consitute a violation of 'plain common sense', no such
violation need occur if will appears in the latter. Here, mutatis mutandis,
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we can repeat the argumentation employed above with respect to temporal
subclauses with will: on condition that something happens does not mean
the same as on condition that something will happen; the former can
literally be interpreted as 'on condition that SOMETHING HAPPEN', the
condition to be fulfilled being something happening, but the latter cannot -
what we have there is not a real-world event, but the prediction of one.
Now, in many, or most, conditional sentences the condition to be fulfilled
is a nonpast event, such as YOU TOUCH THAT VASE, and this is, of
course, referred to in the same way as an event in a temporal subclause: by
the simple present. But there are also conditionals in which the condition
to be fulfilled is not the occurrence of an event which mayor may not
take place, but the prediction of a future event which mayor may not be
true. In such conditionals actions depend not on things happening, that is,
events, but on things being the case, that is, facts. Consider the following
sentences:
(15) If I die, some people are going to ask nasty questions.
(16) If I'll die anyway, I might as well have another beer.
The condition to be fulfilled in (15) is I DIE referred to by J die (recall the
observation that in temporal and conditional subclauses a verb in the
simple present can refer to a single event; for obvious reasons, J die can
never refer to a habit); hence not until my death will people start asking
nasty questions. The condition to be fulfilled in (16), however, is 'I'll die',
and this condition is, of course, fulfilled now: 'I'll die' is a present fact
(and not a future fact, as Declerck, and probably Close, would have it: the
future fulftlment of the prediction 'I'll die' is an event, not a fact), and
hence there is no reason why I should not indulge in another beer. See
Figure 2 for a graphic representation. Obviously, the question marks in the
diagram indicate the uncertainty of the events referred to and/or of the
predictions made in conditional protases. Notice that, although
grammatically point B in the second diagram may be situated anywbere
between point A and (shortly before) point C, in practice its most likely
position is point A: if, say, a future event will be (!) predictable as from
tomorrow, the odds are that it will also be predictable as from today (see
the discussion of will in temporal subclauses). Hence points A and B
coalesce in most of the examples in this chapter, including, of course, (16).
But the coalescence is by no means necessary, as can be seen, for
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example, in (l7a), and, even more clearly, in (21). It should be obvious
that it is the uncertainty inherent in a conditional subclause which, not only








'Some people are going to ask nasty questions (if I die):
?




V'I'll have another beer (if
Il.. ?
I ,I t 11 d ill"a-ny-w-a-y-'-....I
I'll die anyway).'
Figure 2. Graphic representation of examples ( 15) and ( 16)
The difference between the conditions to be fulfilled in (15) and (16)
can, alternatively, be described without using capital letters: the condition
to be fulfilled in (15) is "'I die" is true', and in (16) "'I'll die" is true'.
Obviously 'I die' will only be true at the moment of my death; for 'I'll
die' to be true, however, no waiting is required, since it is true now.
The present certainty that any future event will take place will, of course,
hardly ever be quite as complete as in example (16), so that this might be
said to be somewhat misleading; but the degree of certainty in any
particular case is not a matter of grammar but of conditions in the real
world. In other words: grammar does not have to account for the varying
degrees of certainty in predictions like 'it will rain tomorrow', 'I shall die',
the lava will come down as far as this', 'I'll foot the bill (it is no accident
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that an example of volitional will is included here), 'he'll be left destitute'.
The point is that, if these statements appear as such - that is, with will - in
a conditional protasis, the future event predicted in the main clause
depends on the question whether, and not on the extent to which, they are
considered facts, either now or later.
Summing up, we may emphasize again that for the explanation of i/+will
no reference needs to be made to the relationship between the event
predicted in the protasis and that predicted/referred to in the apodosis.
Furthermore, the tense to be used in the protasis depends entirely on the
type of condition to be fulfilled: if the condition to be fulfilled is (the
occurrence 00 a nonpast event, the present tense is required (the fact that
this is the case in the vast majority of conditionals is a matter of statistics
rather than of grammar, protases with will being exceptional in terms of
the former, but not of the latter). If the condition to be fulfilled is (the
truth 00 a prediction of an event, any fonn can be used that is appropriate
for predictions, such as will+inf., or be going to, the choice between the
alternatives being determined by the same considerations that determine the
choice in main clauses. The replacement, for example, of the subclause in
(16) by If I'm going to die anyway would result in a sentence that might
be pronounced by someone who considers his death to be imminent; no
such imminence is suggested by the protasis of (16), Of course, there are
other possibilities: the condition to be fulfilled may be the completion of
an event, in which case the present perfect is required (for examples, see
[13]), or it may be a combination of factors, such as the hypothetical
prediction of the completion of an event (for an example, see B I in section
2: If John would have succeeded ...).
It has been noted before that in special conditionals the event predicted in
the apodosis is contingent upon the truth of the statement/prediction in the
protasis,' so there is nothing revolutionary in the analysis expounded here;
but the explanation of the presence of will is exactly the opposite of the
proposals made by H & W and Declerck, who put the cart before the horse
by saying that, because the protasis has present orientation, it can have
will; for it is the presence of will which causes the protasis to contain a
prediction whose validity may constitute the fulfilment of a condition at
the moment of speaking, and thus to have present orientation.
It should be clear now what is wrong with Quirk et al.' s often-quoted
assertion that in conditionals containing i/+wiIl 'the future contingency
expressed in the subclause determines a present decision', It is 'I die' in
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(15) which expresses a nonpast contingency (which, in the speaker's mind,
is no doubt situated somewhere in the future); 'I'll die' in (16), however,
does not express a nonpast contingency but IS a present fact about a future
event, and will continue to be a fact until my death. And because it is a
present fact, a present truth, it can determine a present decision. We can
now also see where Close went wrong: apart from his regrettable reliance
on Leech as far as the structure of conditional sentences is concerned, 6 his
characterizations of the two types of conditinal are ill-conceived: in
ordinary conditionals there is no 'assumed future actuality', since we do
not assume that any event will, indeed, take place; nor is there any
reference to the future. ' Assumed predictability' is clearly better but still
contains the suggestion that in conditional sentences we assume things to
be the case. Again: we do not, We merely state a condition which mayor
may not hold. Consider Close's own example and compare it with a very
similar sentence:
( 17) a. If the lava will come down as far as this, all these houses
must be evacuated at once.
b. As the lava will come down as far as this, all these houses
must be evacuated at once.
In spite of their similarity the sentences are crucially different, for only in
(l7b) can we speak of 'assumed predictability', in that the speaker can be
taken to be assuming that 'the lava will come down as far as this'; in (17a)
the speaker is committed to the truth of that prediction no more than he is
to the occurrence of an event referred to in an ordinary protasis.' It is
important to realize that this noncommittedness, which is inherent in the
nonassertiveness of conditional protases, exists even when (17a) is a so-
called resumptive conditional, that is, when it is a reaction to an interlocu-
tor's prediction 'The lava will come down as far as this'. That this is so
can be seen from the fact that such resumptive conditionals can be
paraphrased as 'If that is true, ...', in which the speaker is not committed
to the truth of whatever it is that that stands for (in our example this would
be 'the lava will come down as far as this').
Now that resumptive conditionals have been mentioned a caveat is in
order. It may be tempting to think that if+will can only occur in the
protases of such 'resumptives'; however, no matter how many i/+will cases
will, in practice, tum out to be 'echoes' of something that has been said
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before, such 'resumptiveness' is by no means necessary - (17a) is a
grammatical sentence, whether the protasis is resumptive or not. See Close
(1980) for a similar view. In the present chapter the protases in examples
(2), (3), and (5) may very well be resumptive, but those in (1) and (4)
most probably are not.
So far the attention has focused on cases of if+will, but it will readily be
appreciated that the analysis presented here also accommodates i/+would:
the only difference brought about by the substitution of would for will is
that the nonassertive prediction becomes hypothetical. This does not make
will and would freely interchangeable, however: whereas if+will clauses
may contain either conditional predictions (as in [19]) or unconditional
ones (as in, for example, [I], [2], [3], [5], and [16]), those with i/+would
probably all contain conditional predictions, the conditions being either
implicit (as in [18]) or explicit (as in [19]):
(18) If ten of these pills would kill an elephant, I suppose five wiu do
for me.
(19) I can/could lend you £5, if that will/would help you (Close 1975:
60).
In (18) the implied condition is something like 'if it took them'; in (19) the
explicit subcondition resides in that, which is to be interpreted as 'if I
lendllent you £5'. One may note in these and similar protases, those in
which the nonassertive prediction is itself contingent on something, the
alternative with be going 10 is unlikely to appear, for the same reason that
such a form is unusual in the apodosis of a conditional (whether ordinary
or special). This corroborates the earlier claim that the choice between the
alternatives in the protasis is determined by the same considerations that
determine the choice in main clauses.
What is more interesting than the apparent interchangeability of will and
would in subclauses like the one in (19) is the fact that they contain a
pronominal reference to (part 00 the apodosis. This special type of
if+willlwould clause (not, oddly enough, recognized as a separate type by
Declerck) has attracted the attention of many grammarians; Palmer (1974)
has called their logic 'quite complex' and even speaks of a 'reversal of
time relations'. The often-quoted example in which this strange
phenomenon is said to occur is
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(20) I'll come if it will be of any use to you.
Of course, there is no reversal of time relations here: what we have in the
protasis is not the reference to a future event which mysteriously manages
to follow the event predicted in the apodosis, but a present fact; or rather,
the event predicted in the apodosis depends on whether it IS a fact. Close
(1980) also discusses this sentence, arguing that. instead of will be, is
would be possible as well, albeit slightly less polite, because in that case
the speaker is 'rather presumptuous' in assuming that his presence will be
useful. Now enough has been said about assumptions in conditional
clauses; but it can easily be shown that is in (20) would. strictly speaking,
be wrong for logical reasons; the referent of it is the future event I COME;
so, with will be, my coming is conditional on 'my coming will be useful to
you', and this may, of course, be true or false at he moment of speaking:
'will my coming be any use to you? If so, I'll come'. If will be is replaced
by is, my coming is conditional on MY COMING BE USERJL TO YOU.
So: first my coming must bear fruit. only then will it take place. This is
impossible. Another example might be helpful here:
(21) If it will/would help other drivers, use your headlights.
Here helps instead of will help, or helped instead of would help, would
make the use of the headlights dependent on the use of the same
headlights, which is a logical impossibility (the same goes for [19]). There
is some irony in the fact that this impossibility is due to precisely the
reversal of time relations postulated for the sentences with will in the
protasis.
So if we say 'I'll come if it's any use to you' and thereby sound less
polite, this is not because we are assuming things, but because we are
guilty of careless speech (which need not be anathematized. as long as it is
recognized for what it is): we run no risk of being misunderstood but we
ARE in conflict with logic. A similar conflict occurs very frequently in
conditionals in which the protasis contains volitional will/would; the are the
subject of the final section of this chapter.
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5 Volitional will/would in conditional subclauses
Consider the following 'standard' conditionals in which the protasis has
volitional will:
(22) If you'll wait here, I'll go and get a taxi.
(23) If you'll come this way, we'll show you our latest model.
Although these sentences are structurally identical, there is a subtle
difference: obviously, the condition to be fulfilled in (22) is YOU WAIT
HERE rather than 'you'll wait here'; but the latter does make sense, since
it is, stricly speaking, possible for the speaker to go and get a taxi if the
addressee is only willing to wait. In (23), however, the addressee's
willingness is not enough: he will actually have to 'come this way' before
the latest model can be shown to him. So whereas (22) manages to be
accommodated by the analysis presented for nonvolitional will/would, (23)
does not: the condition to be fulftlled here is really YOU COME THIS
WAY. For this reason sentences like (23) should be looked upon as
logically incorrect, in that the event predicted in the main clause is not
contingent on the truth of the prediction in the subclause (which
grammatically it should be), but on the event predicted. In this connection
the questions corresponding to the subclauses in (22) and (23) deserve our
attention:
(22) a. Will you wait here, please?
(23) a. Will you come this way, please?
These, taken literally, are questions about somebody's future actions (see
the remarks in the fmal paragraph of this section); pragmatically, however,
they are requests. Logically (but not pragmatically, of course) please in
both these sentences is out of place; it has strayed from the only position
where it really makes sense, after wait here, come this way (in if you will
wait here. please it has wandered even farther away from home).
Therefore what we have in (23), 23a), and (22a) (and probably also in
[22]) is the pragmatic equation of somebody's willingness to perform a
certain action with the action itself; but considerations of politeness should
not blind us to the fact that grammatically these three sentences, no matter
how complete their acceptability, are anacoluthons - time-honoured
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anacoluthons, but anacoluthons all the same." It stands to reason that the
thin boundary line between 'correct' sentences like (22) and 'incorrect'
ones like (23) has contributed greatly to the acceptance and spread of the
latter.
In (24) we do have a 'correct' special conditional in which will may have
volitional meaning:
(24) If you'll help us, we need not worry anymore.
But here it simply does not matter whether the condition to be fulfilled is
paraphrased as 'you are willing to help us' or as the purely predictive 'you
will help us'; in either case it can motivate us to stop worrying even before
the help has materialized.
Now let us see what happens in the case of volitional would:
(25) a. If you would come this way, we'd be delighted.
b. If you would come this way, we'U show you our latest model.
c. Would you come this way, please?
What has been said above about (22) applies to (25a) as well: it is possible
to be hypothetically delighted at somebody's hypothetical willingness;
likewise, what has been said about (23) applies to (25b): it is not possible
to show the latest model to someone who is only (hypothetically) willing
to 'come this way'. But there is more.
Leech (1971: 140) would call the would in (25) volitional, but it is
doubtful whether he is right Stricly speaking (25c) is a question about a
hypothetical situation: 'would you come this way if I asked you to?', and
the reason why this is felt to be even more polite than (23a) is that the
speaker does not 'really' ask anything at all, so that he also avoids making
inquiries about the intentions of the addressee, who in (23a) might feel that
his privacy is being intruded upon. There is no doubt that, like (23a), (25c)
is pragmatically a request, and that consequently the speaker hopes that his
interlocutor will be willing to 'come this way', but that in itself is not
enough to claim that would has volitional meaning: we just USE this kind
of construction as a means of making a polite request. But even apart from
this: there are sentences in which the postulation of willingness in the
meaning of would runs into serious difficulties:
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(26) a. If you would like to see our prospectus, please phone ....
b. Would you like to see our prospectus?
A number of points should be made here:
(i) would cannot be replaced by would be willing (which is Leech's rust
criterion for looking upon would as volitional): that would be pleonastic. if
not plainly nonsensical. In (25c), too, the substitution would result in an
odd sentence, unless please is deleted;
(ii) would cannot be replaced by will either (Leech's second criterion);
(iii) consequently, would must be nonvolitional;
(iv) considering the frequency of sentences like (26) (also with care
instead of like), the phenomenon of nonvolitional would after if is far more
widespread than has hitherto been supposed.
In sum, there is no need to postulate the existence of volitional would in
the protases under discussion," This may seem an unsatisfactory
conclusion, since it breaks up the parallelism between will and would, but
it is in keeping with the earlier observation that. whereas protases with
would are all, either implicity or explicitly, conditional in character, those
with will may be conditional or unconditional; and it might be argued that
at least some of the willingness expressed by will in, for example, T U foot
the bill' is lost if a condition like 'if it doesn't exceed £50' is added - this
must be due to willingness being at least in part beyond our control, so
that we can only make thrutbful statements about our present. but not
about our future or contingent, willingness.
At this point the question may be asked whether the whole range of
interpretations of will/would does not properly belong to the realm of
pragmatics rather than to that of grammar; but even if these interpretations
are relegated to pragmatics, a grammar of English will still have to state
that the rule to the effect that will/would cannot appear in conditional
protases if the condition to be fulfilled is an event can be relaxed if
somebody's willingness is at issue, since in such a case the expression of
willingness to perform a certain action is often taken for the event itself.
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6 Conclusion
This chapter examines both the presence of will/would in some conditional
subclauses and the absence of will/would from most temporal ones in
terms of the characteristics peculiar to the two types of clause, and argues
against the assumption that the simple present in these clauses can have
future reference.
It is made clear that the appearance of will/would in conditional
subclauses is not due to any special type of relationship obtaining between
subclause and main clause, but only to a different type of condition. In
conditionals in which the subclause contains a simple present the condition
to be fulfilled is a nonpast event which mayor may not take place at some
unspecified, nonpast, moment in time; the presence of will/would, however,
indicates that the condition to be fulfilled is something which mayor may
not be the case: the occurrence of the event predicted in the main clause
depends on the question whether the (hypothetical) prediction in the
subclause is considered a fact; in other words, it is the predictability of a
future event which constitutes the fulfilment of the condition.
This view does not differ in essence from Close's (1980) account, which,
however, is couched in unsatisfactory terminology and which, moreover,
suffers from a misguided characterization of conditional sentences as such.
Like Close's, this article accommodates volitional will/would, although it is
shown that many of the sentences containing this type of will/would are
ungrammatical and should be looked upon as conventional phrases whose
acceptability is due to the equation, typical of requests in general, of
someone's willingness or hypothetical intention to perform a certain action
with the action itself.
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Notes to chapter 3
1. First published in Linguistics (1986), 371-392. I would like to
thank Carlos Gussenhoven, Ken Hale, Frederike van der Leek,
and Henk van Riemsdijk for their comment on an earlier
version of this paper. Any remaining errors, of course, are my
own. Correspondence address: kamer Bll1, University of
Tilburg, Postbus 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands.
2. Only recently was my attention drawn to Tense by Comrie
(1985), which contains a short passage about if+will. The line of
approach adopted there also takes as its starting point the
relationship between the location in time of the events predicted
in protasis and apodosis, but adds a new element: for the
protasis with will to be acceptable, a causal relation from
apodosis to protasis is said to be necessary, and the absence of
such a causal relation is said to account for the unacceptability
of a sentence like If it will rain, you should take an umbrella.
However, even though a causal relationship may be present in
many conditionals with will in the protasis, in at least some of
the conditionals under consideration such a relation is absent, a
case in point being (8). Therefore, another explanation of the
unacceptability of the sentence mentioned above is called for. I
would maintain that the sentence is ungrammatical for the
same reason why It will rain is ungrammatical as a main
clause. This is fully in keeping with the claim, made later on in
the present article, that the choice between will+inf. and be
going to in a protasis is made on the basis of the same
considerations that determine the choice in a main clause.
3. See, for an apparent exception, sentence (a) discussed in note 7.
4. In Longman's Dictionary of Contemporary English there is the
following sentence (under before):
'He will die of hunger before he will stea\.'
before is here said to mean 'more willingly than'; but the
sentence can also be interpreted literally as meaning that the
prediction 'he will steal' can only be made after the 'he' in
80 CHAPTER 3
question has died of hunger, so that in fact this 'he' will never
steal. In this connection also sentences like the following are
worthy of note:
'Alle the doors must be shut before the lift will work.'
Here, of course, it is not the working of the lift which must be
preceded by the locking of the doors, but the making of the
prediction: the period of time for which 'the lift will work' holds
will only start after the doors have been locked.
In addition to this, it should be realized that when when
means 'whenever', it is replaceable by if, in which case one
should expect to find the occasional will/would. In Close (1974),
a workbook accompanying Quirk and Greenbaum (1973), there
are a number of such when-clauses, the following of which may
serve as an example:
'Give more than one symbol when that would be appropriate.'
It. remains somewhat odd that the grammaticality of this
sentence cannot in any way be deduced from the grammar to
which the workbook in question provides practice material.
5. In Longman's Dictionary of Contemporary English there is the
following explanation: 'though the condition expressed by iris in
the future, the whole sentence speaks of a truth in the present:
If it will help, I'll lend you £50 (if it is true now that £50 will
help)'.
6. If we are to believe Close, Leech (1971) argues cogently that
this structure is 'If X is a fact, then I predict Y'. Now it can
easily be ascertained that Leech just claims this to be the case:
there is no argumentation, let alone cogency. And indeed, there
could not be. For ordinary conditionals do not have this
structure: the making of the prediction does not depend on X
being a fact, and does not follow X's having become a fact eit-
her, but takes place now, at the moment of speaking; so if
anything, the structure should be: 'I predict that, if X is a fact,
then Y'. But even this improved structure does not stand up to
scrutiny, for presumably we should like X and Y to stand for
similar entities, and, as events cannot be facts, X here stands
for the reference to an event, and Y for an event itself; in
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addition, the futurity of the apodosis is lost. So the structure
should be rewritten either as 'I predict that if X is a fact, Y will
be a fact' (where X and Yare references to events), or as 'I
predict that if X. Y will take place' (where X and Yare events).
One thing is quite remarkable here: if Leech's original structure
is altered only slightly to read 'If X is a fact, then I predict Y
is \ will be a fact', it is appropriate, not ordinary conditionals,
but for the special ones! The reason is that, since X is a
prediction which may be true at the moment of speaking 'then'
just happens to be able to coincide with 'now'. Unfortunately,
however, there is no mention in Leech of anything but volitional
will in conditional protases; it is even stated explicitly that, if
will appears after if, it must be volitional. There is a subtle
irony in the fact that Leech's analysis of conditional sentences is
only (nearly) valid for the one type of conditional that he has
preferred to ignore.
7. It is the wrong terminology, then, which has prevented the
acceptance of Close's ideas; but his article contains two
examples which aptly illustrate his position:
a. If you leave at 6 o'clock tomorrow, you'd better go to bed
now.
b. If you leave at 6 o'clock tomorrow morning, you'll be in
London in good time for lunch.
In (b) the condition to be fulfilled is YOU LEAVE, an event
which is to take place at 6 o'clock the following morning (the
time-at-which being part of the condition, but not, presumably,
of the event); in (a), in which, of course will leave or are going to
leave would have been possible as well, it is 'you leave at 6
o'clock tomorrow morning', a common way of making statements
about scheduled future by means of the simple present. Close's
explanation of the difference between (a) and (b) is essentially
the same.
Of course, one might be inclined to look upon sentences like
(a) as a refutation of the claim that the present tense in
temporal and conditional subclauses never has future reference,
but against this it could be argued that in a main clause like
The train leaves at 7.30 it is never the single present by itself
which refers to the future, but always the verbal form in
combination with a future time adverbial. In (a), too, therefore,
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one might take the view that it is the adverbial which assigns a
future interpretation to the protasis.
8. The 'ungrammaticality' of the sentences under discussion can be
compared with that of certain so-called dangling participle
constructions, which have come to be looked upon as acceptable
and therefore as grammatical (such as 'Considering her age, she
is quite a good piano player'), although STRICTLY SPEAKING
(another example!) they violate a grammatical rule. In other
words, 'acceptable' and 'grammatical' are two different things.
To call a sentence grammatical only because it happens to have
been legitimized by general use is to allow one's view of the
grammatical SYSTEM to be obscured.
9. Confusingly enough, volitional would does seem to occur
occasionally in ordinary conditional protases:
'If Peter would tell me what he wants for his supper, I would
cook it for him (Thomson and Martinet 1980).
'If only he would drive more slowly' (Thomson and Martinet
1980).
According to Thomson and Martinet, both these sentences
suggest that the subject in the if-clause is UNWILLING to do
whatever he is supposed to do. If that is true, the subclauses
cannot be of the special type; consequently, what we have in
these protases is not a hypothetical nonassertive prediction, but
the expression of the absence of volition, in the same way in
which the absence of possession is expressed in a subclause like
if only I had a bike.
POSTSCRIPT Chapter 3
In note 2, I repeat what has been argued in the article itself, i.e. that the
choice, in an if-clause, between will and be going to is determined by the
same considerations that determine the choice in a main clause. The
importance of this remark may not immediately be obvious, but it can
hardly be stressed too much, since it has important implications.
One of the things it means is that, since most cases of will in main
clauses (not necessarily conditional main clauses) are volitional rather than
just predictive in character, so most cases of will in conditional antecedents
will be volitional rather than just predictive in character. (It should cause
no surprise that most grammars of English do not even bother to mention
the rare cases of non-volitional will in if-clauses.) Since for prediction
without volition in main clauses be going to is preferred 10 will, the former
form is by far the more likely choice in conditional antecedents in which
the condition to be fulfilled is the truth of a prediction.
Second, since will is the most usual form in conditional main clauses
(e.g. 'If Harry decides 10 come, there wiU be the devil to pay'), it follows
that this non-volitional will is also likely 10 show up in an antecedent that
in itself is a consequent vis-a-vis a (possibly implicit) antecedent (e.g.
sentences (19) and (20) in the preceding chapter).
Third, as very many, or probably most, cases of would in main clauses
are non-volitional in character (cf. the large number of sentences with I'd
like ...), so are many, or indeed most, cases of would in conditional
antecedents. In the last section of the preceding chapter it is claimed that
whereas main clauses with will can be either conditional or not (i.e. with
respect to an implicit subclause), main clauses with would are all really
conditional. This latter claim, it now seems to me, is too strong, since it
overlooks cases where would expresses a past habit (e.g. 'He would sit
staring into the fife for hours'), where conditionality with respect to an
implicit antecedent is clearly absent.
What the above means for some of the sentences in the preceding chapter
(and I shall restrict myself 10 a few examples) is that whereas in Modem
English sentences like (2) and (5), and less clearly (3), would be rephrased
with be going to, there is no doubt that Modem English would retain
would in (4) - indeed, that in (4) was/were going to would be looked upon
as downright ungrammatical.
So, although etymologically would is the past equivalent of will, their
syntactic roles in Modem English grammar have diverged 10 a point where
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they should no longer be regarded as the past and present versions of one
and the same auxiliary. Interestingly, the same observation can be made
with respect to should and shall. It can hardly be an accident that a
divergence similar to that between will and would has taken place in
Dutch, where zal ('will') and zou ('would'), also linked by etymological
ties, perform entirely different functions. For whereas zal in conditional
antecedents occurs only very rarely, zou in that position is used very
frequently indeed.
Apparently, the situation in English is changing under American
influence - in fact, it may be changing in precisely the direction advocated
by Kellerman (see the remarks in the postscript to chapter 2), and already
taken by numerous Dutch speakers of English. Another reason for the
change may be the fact. commented on in the final section of the
preceding chapter, that at least some antecedents with volitional will/would
should. in spite of their complete acceptability, be looked upon as
ungrammatical, since they violate a rule of logic (see the discussion of
sentences (23) and (25b».
One might conclude that as far as the blurring of the boundary line
between grammatical and ungrammatical wiliwould in conditional
antecedents is concerned. politeness is the thin end of the wedge. But, as I
hope to have made clear, it is the rules pertaining to if + would rather than
those pertaining to if + will which are likely to undergo a change. But a
change in the rules pertaining to would after if will almost certainly have
an effect on the behaviour of should in the same position. Consequently, it
is not clear whether the following rules, which in my view sum up the
situation as it is today, will still apply in ten or twenty years' time. See
also the postscript to Chapter 4.
(i) If the condition to be fulfLlled is (the occurrence of) a non-past event,
use a present tense in the antecedent.
(ii) If the condition to be fulfilled is the (truth of the) prediction of a non-
past event, use be going to + inf., or, less commonly, a present continuous,
or, even less commonly, will + inf. in the antecedent.
(iii) If the condition to be fulfilled is the hypothetical occurrence of an
event, use a past tense in the antecedent.
(iv) If the condition to be fulfilled is the (truth of the) hypothetical
prediction of an event (or the prediction of a hypothetical event), use
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would + infoin the antecedent.
It is rule 3 which is the most likely candidate for revision. One day it may
read as follows:
(iii) If the condition to be fulfilled is the hypothetical occurrence of an
event, then, a) if one wishes to emphasize that the imaginary event in
question is not a real-world event, a past tense is to be used in the
antecedent; b) if one only wishes to convey that the imaginary event in
question is hypothetical and that its real-world status is irrelevant or, in a
sense, 'open', would or should + infinitive is to be used.
But, as I argue at the end of the postscript to the chapter on should, as
soon as would and should have become free variants, a diversification in
their uses may take place, which may ultimately result in a restriction in
the use of should along the lines sketched in the above-mentioned
postscript.
A final point. If one considers the rules for the use of will/would in
English conditional sentences against the background of the remarks made
about 'nomCFs' and 'advCFs' in Chapter 2, it will be clear that will and
would occur especially when the antecedent contains a pronominal
reference to the consequent or vice versa. Interestingly, however, this is a
mere coincidence, for the will/would that frequently occurs in subject- or
object-clauses (that is, in nomCFs), is volitional ('I would greatly
appreciate it if you would open the window'), whereas the will/would
found in the antecedents of advCFs is often non-volitional.
Chapter 4
SHOULD IN CONDITIONAL PROTASES1
abstract
This chapter examines the accounts commonly given of should in
conditional protases and argues that. in allowing should as an alternative to
the Past Tense in the protases of counterfactuals, English grammar
harbours an inconsistency. It also questions the common assumption that a
conditional protasis with should expresses a lower degree of likelihood
than one with a Present Tense. It is argued that this alleged smaller
likelihood is in fact the consequence of the theoreticity conveyed by both
conditional and putative should. and that pragmatically this theoreticity also
accounts for the fact that should + infinitive is chiefly found in the protasis
of conditional sentences whose apodosis contains a present decision as to
the action to be taken when the event referred to in the protasis takes
place.
Introduction
There is considerable agreement among grammarians about the use of the
construction if ... should (alternatively should ...), which is commonly
considered
a) to express a real or 'open' condition (Quirk and Greenbaum
1973, section 3.50; Close 1975: 59; Eckersley & Eckersley 1960:
348) and therefore to be like conditionals with a Present Tense in
the protasis and a Present or Future Tense in the apodosis;
b) to make the condition slightly more tentative (Leech 1971: Ill)
or less likely to be fulftlled (Graver 1971: 91; Swan 1980: section
552) as compared with a protasis containing a Present Tense.
Less generally, the construction is also said
c) to be especially common when the apodosis contains an order, a
piece of advice or a suggestion (Swan 1980. section 307); in
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other words, when a course of action is to be envisaged in
possible future circumstances (Eckersley & Eckersley), so that it
is usually combined with an imperative in the apodosis
(Eckersley & Eckersley; Thomson & Martinet 1980: 192).
'Standard' examples of the construction are the following:
(1) Should you change your mind, please let us know (Quirk and
Greenbaum, 1973)
(2) If you should be interested, I will send you a copy of my book
(Close 1975)
However, there is one different account. In section 11.32 of Quirk et al.
(1972) conditional should is presented as an alternative way of expressing
hypothetical conditions, and the following examples are given':
(3) If a serious crisis should arise, the public would have to be
informed of its full implications
(4) Should you change your mind, no one would blame you
In Quirk & Greenbaum (1973), therefore, should + infois considered to be
an alternative to the Simple Present in that it expresses an open condition;
in Quirk et al. (1972), on the other hand, it is considered to be an
alternative to the Simple Past in that it expresses a hypothetical condition.
It is perhaps worthy of note that Quirk et al. do not even mention the
'standard' use of conditional should exemplified in (I) and (2), which is all
the more surprising as in section 166 of Meaning and the English Verb
Leech, one of the co-authors of Quirk et al., only stipulates that' should is
sometimes used as if it were a marker of unreal conditions rather than of
tentative real conditions (...).' In this article I shall first discuss the use of
should in hypothetical conditionals (section 2); in section 3 I shall examine
the claim made under b) above, also with reference to the improbability
allegedly conveyed by conditional protases containing a Past Tense; in
section 4 the claim made under c) will come under scrutiny; in section 5
an attempt will be made to characterize the meaning of conditional should,
and to show that the restrictions on its use discussed in sections 3 and 4
follow naturally from that meaning. In the same section section the link
between conditional should and so-called putative should will be discussed.
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2 should in the protasis of bypothetical conditionals
The view that should can freely be used in the protases of bypothetical
conditionals as an alternative to the simple past runs up against a number
of major difficulties: first of all, if (Sb) is an alternative to (Sa), one would
expect (Sd) to be an alternative to (Sc):
(5) a. If be did that. they would fire bim
b. Sbould be do that, they would fife bim
c. If be bad done that, they would bave fired bim
d. "Should be have done that, they would bave fired bim
The last sentence, bowever, is ungrammatical. As (5c) and (Sd) only differ
with respect to their protases, these protases cannot be looked upon as
variants; but if they cannot. bow is it to be explained that the protases of
(Sa) and (Sb) can?
It should be empbasized that the ungrammaticality of (Sd) does not reside
in the protasis itself - there is nothing wrong with (Se):3
(5) e. Sbould be bave done that. they will fire bim
In this respect. therefore, protases witb should bebave like ordinary real or
'open' conditionals: there is nothing wrong with (50 either:
(5) f. If be bas done that, they will fire bim
But also with respect to the shift to the past exemplified in (Sa) and (5c)
protases with should and open conditionals behave in the same way; like
(5d), (Sh) is ungrammatical:
(5) g. If be does that, they will fife bim
b. *If be bas done that. they will bave fired him
It is also possible to sbow the grammatical oddity of (5b) in a different
manner. The protasis of (Se) can be paraphrased as 'If it turns out to be
the case that he bas done that ...'. (so that tbe possibility referred to in the
protasis is still open). Notice that the protasis of (Se) does not allow the
paraphrase 'If he had done that ...'. Similarly, the protasis of
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(S) j. Should he do that, they will fife him
cannot be paraphrased as 'If he did that ...', but only as 'If (it turns out
that) he does that ...'. Now consider (Sb) again:
(S) b. Should he do that, they would fire him
If we paraphrase this in the same way, we get 'If (it turns out that) he
does that, they would fife him', which contains a grammatically doubtful
shift from a real condition to a hypothetical consequence. The only
'correct' paraphrase of (Sb) is 'If he did that. they would fire him'.
However, we have seen that this paraphrase does not work for (Se).
There is one more reason to consider (Sb) ungrammatical despite its
apparent acceptability: if in conditional protases should + info is a variant
of the Past Tense, we should presumably like this to go for any
hypothetical conditional sentence. However, that does not seem to be the
case:
(6) a. If I knew the answer, I'd get in touch
b. *Should I know the answer, I'd get in touch
C. Should I know the answer, I'll get in touch
(6b) is clearly ungrammatical; (6c) looks odd as well, but can be made to
sound more or less natural by adding by then, an addition which does not
make (6b) acceptable.
Finally, and most importantly, (7b) shows that should + info cannot be
used if the situation or event referred to in the protasis is necessarily
hypo-thetical, i.e. cannot occur in the real world:
(7) a. If I were a mouse, ...
b. *Should I be a mouse, ...
Our conclusion must be, therefore, that. no matter how acceptable (Sb)
may sound to the native ear, it is nonetheless ungrammatical. This may
seems an extraordinary conclusion, but, as I have argued elsewhere
(Nieuwint 1986: 391), 'grammatical' and 'acceptable' are two different
things, and to call a sentence grammatical only because it happens to have
been legitimized by general use is to allow one's view of the grammatical
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SYSTEM to be obscured. There are at least three considerations which
together may explain why conditionals with should and would in protasis
and apodosis respectively are not felt to be ungrammatical at all: first. in
some of these conditionals the hypothetical event or situation referred to in
the apodosis is contingent on a (possibly implicit) hypothetical event or
situation other than the one referred to in the protasis with should; such
conditionals are, of course, perfectly acceptable:
(8) Should Peter drop in, I'd leave immediately (if I were you)
Second, it is quite usual for people to make halfway switches from one
type of conditional to another, the most common switch probably being
that from a protasis with the Simple Present to an apodosis with would +
infinitive. Needless to say, in such as case the situation may be similar to
the one in (8); indeed, should + inf. in the protasis of (8) may be replaced
by the Simple Present.
Finally, should in the protasis of hypothetical conditionals probably
serves a useful purpose in those cases where the Simple Past is felt to be
inappropriate because of the 'unreal' implications associated with it, and
where the construction with were to + infinitive is felt to have too formal a
ring to it.4
3 (Im)probability
What nearly all the accounts of conditional should have in common is that
they look upon the occurrence of the event it refers to it as less likely than
if it had been referred to by the Simple Present. In this connection it is
interesting to note that the Past Tense in a conditional protasis, in those
cases where it is not simply taken to express unreality, is often looked
upon as expressing a very high degree of improbability. As both the
Present Tense and should + infinitive are (usually) said to express real
conditions, in contrast with the 'unreal' conditions expressed by the Past
Tense, we may assume that protases with should + infinitive would be
regarded as expressing smaller improbability than those with the Past
Tense. If, therefore, we were to list the three forms in order of alleged
decreasing probability, we would arrive at the following:
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If he arrives, ...
Should he arrive, ...
If he arrived, ...
The problem is, to begin with, that it is doubtful whether the last form
really expresses unreality, or even improbability. We use the past tense in
protases for hypothetical, imaginary events, i.e. events which only take
place inside the speaker's head (the use of the past tense in protases to
refer to real past events is ignored here), and although it may be quite true
to say that speakers wiIJ usually use this past tense when they consider a
particular event very unlikely, or even that they have no alternative but to
use this past tense when a particular event is necessarily hypothetical, i.e.
impossible, that does not automatically mean that the form itself means, or
implies, improbability or impossibility. Consider the following sentences:
(9) a. If I win the football pools, I'll take a holiday
b. If I won the football pools, I' d take a holiday
Note that (9b), but not (9a), can be uttered both by someone who does,
and by someone who does not. play in the football pools. Speaking in
terms of (im)probability we would have to say that (9b) expresses
improbability when uttered by a player, and impossibility when uttered by
a non-player. In either case, however, the claim would be beside the point.
The crux of the matter is that a person who utters (9b) indicates that his
winning the pools is hypothetical, imaginary, and not that he considers
such winning unlikely to any degree at all - 'imaginary' and 'unlikely' are
not equivalent concepts.
In short. from the fact that we also use the past tense in a protasis when
talking about unlikely or impossible events we should not draw
conclusions with regard to the meaning of the form itself; and the form
itself only means that the event in question takes place in the speaker's
imagination, the state of affairs in the real world quite simply being
irrelevant. Compare Lewis (1973:3), who argues that 'Some or all sorts of
presupposition, and in particular the presupposition that the antecedent of a
counterfactual is false, may be mere matters of conversational implicature
(. ..).'
Now, if (im)probability does not playa role in the meaning of the past
tense in a protasis, there is consequently no point in comparing this form
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in terms of probability with a protasis with should. This leaves the
question whether a comparison in terms of probability can be made
between protases containing should and those containing the Simple
Present. One would tend to answer that question in the affirmative on the
basis of a pair like (l0):
(l0) a. If the engine catches fire, press the red button
b. Should the engine catch fire, press the red button
There can be little doubt that a pilot who considers it likely that one of the
engines will catch fire will employ (lOa). If he were to use (lOb), he
would thereby indicate that the possibility of the engine catching fire does
exist. but that there is now no reason to fear that this will indeed happen.
But does that mean that a protasis with should expresses greater
improbability than one with a present tense? At this point a caveat is in
order, similar to the one put in above: if a particular form is also used to
refer to events which in the speaker's eyes are likely to occur, the
conclusion that this likelihood is therefore an inherent part of the meaning
of the form in question is unwarranted. Such a conclusion can only safely
be drawn if in no matter what sentence this likelihood is an integral part of
the meaning of the form. It is not particularly difficult, however, to fmd
protases in which the present tense rather than the construction with should
is used to express a maximum of improbability:
(11) a. If England win tomorrow, I'll eat my hat
b. Should England win tomorrow, I'll eat my hat
Although both sentences are possible, (lla) would seem to be a more
likely choice, as in (lIb) the speaker appears to take a more neutral view
of the result. a neutrality which stands in a strange contrast to the rather
emotional content of the apodosis.
Now, if a protasis with a Present Tense manages to convey both a
comparatively high and a comparatively low degree of probability, then
such a protasis cannot possibly be said to have a particular (high) degree
of probability as part of its meaning. As (lla) shows, the Present Tense in
a protasis can be used to express any degree of uncertainty, which can
only mean that it does not itself express any particular degree of
uncertainty. A protasis with should, on the other hand, does express a
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particular degree of uncertainty, namely complete uncertainty, and a
speaker employing the form therefore necessarily (i.e. compelled by the
meaning of the form) indicates that he looks upon the event referred to as
a possibility and as no more than that.
It should be emphasized that for an event to be completely uncertain it is
necessary for the speaker to have no control over it; hence the rareness of
a protasis like Should I come as compared with the quite common Should
he come. This point will be taken up again in the next section; for the time
being it is sufficient to notice that an explanation of the difference in
frequency cannot be given in terms of probability or tentativeness.
That complete uncertainty is not the same as improbability is also aptly
illustrated by the following pair:
(12) a. If you want to know more about this product, fill in the
coupon
b. Should you want to know more about this product, fill in the
coupon
If the subclause in (12b) really expressed a higher degree of improbability
than the one in (l2a), a manufacturer would think twice before putting
(l2b) in a brochure; yet the sentence has the air of having been taken
straight from such a brochure. Improbability has as much to do with (l2b)
as probability has with (l2a). The reason why the former may be felt to be
more polite than the latter is discussed with reference to (15) below.
Consider also the following pair:
(13) a. If you're bitten by an adder, you must suck the wound dry
b. Should you be bitten by an adder, you must suck the wound
dry
Both (l3a) and (l3b) may be employed to give useful advice to someone
who is about to set off on a mountain trip, but only (l3a) can be used in a
conversation among laymen about actions to be taken in all sorts of
emergencies; it will be clear that in such a conversation the concrete
possibility that one of the interlocutors is actually bitten by an adder does
not even exist, so that it makes no sense at all to talk of the probability of
such a bite. Sentences like (l3a), therefore, may be said to have two
inextricably linked meanings: firstly, the 'specific' meaning that is also
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found in (l3b), a sentence which refers to a practical, real-life possibility
only, and secondly, a meaning that might be labelled 'generic', in the
sense that a general truth is expressed. (This 'genericness' causes (LOa),
rather than (IOb) to sound like a general rule.) This may in some way have
contributed to the idea that events referred to by should + infinitive are
less likely: the temporal 'range' of the subclause of (13b), which can only
refer to a concrete event, is smaller than that of the subclause of (l3a),
which in addition allows a 'timeless' interpretation. It is perhaps worth
emphasizing that protases with should do not allow such a general,
'timeless' interpretation, witness the ungrammaticality of (14):
(14) *Should an aeroplane crash, the passengers usually get killed
In summary we may say that a protasis with the Present Tense is capable
of expressing any degree of uncertainty, whereas one with should + inf.
can only express complete uncertainty, in the sense that the possibility that
the event referred to will in fact occur is 100% open. There are only two
things that, with any certainty, can be said about the difference between
the two forms: firstly, in the case of should the degree of uncertainty is
made explicit, whereas in the case of the Present Tense the degree of
uncertainty is left undecided, so that the speaker is free to consider the
event in question as (im)probable as he wishes; secondly, protases with
should refer to concrete events and cannot be used for generalizations.
There are two interesting pragmatic aspects to the complete uncertainty
expressed by subclauses with should that are worth discussing here. First
of all, consider the pair in (15):
(15) a. If you want to come with us (tomorrow), I'll order the tickets
b. Should you want to come with us (tomorrow), I'll order the
tickets
The speaker (S) in (I5b) explicitly presents the event referred to in the
protasis as something that is fully uncertain at the moment of speaking;
and as he could simply ask the hearer (H) what the latter wants, S seems
to suggest that he assumes that H has not made up his mind yet, so that
the decision about the event in question is automatically postponed. In
contrast, (I5a) might be understood as an invitation to H to tell S 'now'
whether H wants to join the party or not. Whereas (I5a), therefore, might
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make H feel slightly uncomfortable by giving him the feeling that he has
to make his wishes known, (ISb) leaves him entirely free to make up his
mind whenever he wants to. Alternatively, one might say that (1Sa), but
not (ISb), has the force of a question, an answer to which is expected at
the moment of speaking.
Interestingly, this may constitute a second reason why protases with
should are felt to express a smaller likelihood than those with the the
Simple Present: the former refer to events which are mostly (see below)
situated in the future, whereas the time-reference of the latter is nonpast,
so that here again we may speak of a wider temporal range.
It is to be noted, however, that the shift towards the future takes place
only in ordinary conversation; as soon as a sentence like (ISb) is written
down it may have present reference as well. And this brings us to the
second pragmatic aspect: there are subclauses which are not likely to be
used in conversations, but which in letters or in lectures, i.e. when there is
a certain distance between 'speaker' and 'hearer', sound perfectly natural.
A case in point is sentence (12b), which, as we have seen, belongs
typically in a brochure, and which would not be out of place in a lecture
either. In a normal conversation, in which a speaker can simply inquire
what his interlocutor wants, the sentence is not likely to appear (of course,
this recaIIs claim c), made at the beginning of this chapter, to the effect
that protases with should + info are chiefly found in written instructions).
What the pragmatic difference between protases with should in
conversations, and those outside of them boils down to, therefore, is that
the former only refer to possible future events or situations, whereas the
latter, at least potentially, also refer to present ones.
4 The relationship between protasis with should and apodosis
According to claim c) protases with should are used chiefly when the
apodosis contains a piece of advice, an instruction, etc. In order to see
whether this is correct, consider the following sentences:
(16) ? Should you take another whiskey, you'll get drunk
(17) ? Should he run, he'll get there in time
(18) ? Should the hotel tum out to be full, that'll be just our luck
(19) ? Should Peter come, he'll probably start pestering me for money
again
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If these sentences do indeed sound somewhat odd, this must have
something to do with the content of the apodoses; for it is not difficult to
find apodoses which would sound completely natural after the protases of
(16) to (19). It would seem, then, that the claim under c) can be made
even stronger: the use of should in a protasis is only fully acceptable when
in the apodosis some course of action 'is to be envisaged in certain
possible future circumstances' (Eckersley & Eckersley 1960: 348); in other
words, when in the apodosis the speaker makes up his mind as to what
sort of action will, or is to, be taken when the event or situation referred to
in the protasis becomes reality. If, by contrast, the event or situation in the
apodosis is one that, via a direct causal relationship, results from the event
or situation referred to in the protasis, then these consequences are
obviously beyond the speaker's control, so that it does not make sense to
make any decisions about them. In these cases the use of should in the
protasis leads to sentences whose acceptability is at least questionable.
Therefore the Present Tense will be preferred in the protases of (16) and
(17). As the bad luck referred to in (18) is constituted by the hotel being
full, some sort of causal relationship may be said to exist between the
protasis and apodosis of (18) as well; however that may be, neither this
bad luck, nor the begging referred to in the apodoses of (19) can be
characterized as present decisions, on the part of the speaker, concerning
action to be taken in possible future circumstances.
In the preceding section we already noted the rareness of a subclause like
Should I come; here we might add that a conditional with such a protasis
would also be odd because speakers do not usually make plans with
respect to future contingencies over which they themselves have a measure
of control, witness (20):
(20) a. If I come (to your party), I won't stay long
b. ?Should I come (to your party), I won't stay long
The above, in addition to explaining the popularity of should in protases
which are followed by apodoses containing an imperative, also accounts
for the impossibility of should in the protasis of any conditional in which a
logical conclusion is drawn: as with respect to a certain contingency we
can make any number of decisions, the relationship between the events
referred to in a protasis with should and and those referred to in the
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following apodosis is in principle arbitrary; in a sentence like (21),
however, this relationship is anything but arbitrary, the logical conclusion
drawn in the apodosis being crucially dependent on the state of affairs
referred to in the protasis. Therefore should + info cannot replace the
Present Tense.
(21) If this is sauerkraut, I've never eaten sauerkraut
Of course, should in the protasis of (21) would also be also strange
because the apodosis cannot be said to contain a present decision with
respect to action to be taken in future circumstances; but this cannot count
as a sufficient explanation, for whereas in the protases of (16) to (19)
should is merely odd, it would be quite unthinkable in the protasis of (12).
In view of the evidence presented above, English grammar should not
only make a distinction between open and unreal conditions, but also one
between types of consequence: a) apodoses that are logically or causally
linked to their protases; and b) apodoses that specify a decision with
respect to future action. It is only in the latter type that should 'statutorily'
appears.
5 Meaning and use of conditional should
If we ignore its use in hypothetical conditionals, we can say that the
standard use of conditional should is subject to the following:
a) a protasis with should only refers to concrete events or situations;
b) the event in question is 100% uncertain, and is therefore
(necessarily) beyond the speaker's control;
c) the apodosis contains a present decision with respect to action to
be taken in certain future circumstances;
d) there is no causal or logical link between (the events referred to
in) protasis and apodosis.
Obviously, c) entails d). As it only makes sense to make present decisions
with respect to concrete future events or situations, c) also entails a). This
leaves us with condition b), which does not seem to be linked logically
with any of the others, but which can perhaps be shown pragmatically to
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entail c): if we are entirely uncertain about the future occurrence of a
particular event (in the sense that there is simply no telling whether it will
happen or not), why should we mention it at all in the protasis of a
conditional, except to be prepared for it in case it does indeed take place?
So condition b) takes precedence over, and pragmatically entails, all the
others. Below it will be shown that condition b) follows naturally from the
meaning of should.
So far hardly any attempt has been made to characterize this meaning. In
Leech (1973: 1110 conditional should is said to be like putative should in
expressing theoretical meaning, the essence of which, according to Leech,
is that it is neutral with respect to truth-commitment, and as such contrasts
with hypothetical meaning, which is claimed to be negative with respect to
truth- commitment. However, Leech himself admits that the negative
truth-commitment of hypothetical conditionals is often a matter of
conversational implicature (recall Lewis (1973), quoted in section 3 of this
paper); and there are many cases in which the neutral truth-commitment of
putative should changes to positive truth-commitment - compare (22) and
(23a):
(22) It is laughable that Septimus should be in love (Leech 1971: 112)
(23) a. It is odd that you should have said that
b. It is odd that you have said that
When a subclause with should has positive truth-commitment, the
difference in meaning between it and a similar subclause without should
(see (23b» is, of course, only slight: according to Quirk et al. (1972)
sentences like (23a) focus on the 'very idea' of the event referred to rather
than on the event itself. In other words: in spite of the fact that the event
in question is factual, it may be said to be considered as an abstraction, as
something presented in its own right, 'at one remove from reality', i.e. 'in
theory'. This means that although 'theoreucity' cannot be characterized in
terms of truth-commitment, it is in itself an acceptable characterization of
the meaning of putative should.
Likewise, although truth-commitment is not a very useful criterion for the
differentiation of the notions 'theoretical' and 'hypothetical', that does not
mean that there is no fundamental difference. Events can take place (or
situations obtain) in two ways: in the real world or inside the speaker's
head, i.e. factually or hypothetically, and only when speaking loosely could
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we say that an event takes place theoretically. Strictly speaking, what we
ought to say is that there is the theoretical possibility of an event occurring
- and this can only be said of events which can really take place. This
makes the terms 'theoretical' and 'hypothetical' crucially different, for
whereas theoretically only things can happen which are practical
possibilities, hypothetically anything can happen. Therefore hypothetical
constructions, but not theoretical ones, can be used to stipulate conditions
which are patently false, as in (7), which is here repeated as (24):
(24) a. If I were a mouse, ...
b. *If I should be a mouse, ...
That this provides additional evidence for the view put forward in section
2 is obvious. It is only to be expected that in the case of conditions which
are capable of being fulfilled the concepts of 'theoretical possibility' and
'hypothetical possibility' are occasionally mixed up - the result being
conditionals with should in the protasis and would in the apodosis.
The ungrammaticality of (24b) shows that also conditional should can be
said to have 'theoreticity' as a basic ingredient of its meaning, and that
Leech is right in postulating a similarity between putative and conditional
should in this respect. The effect of the theoreticity of should in a subject
clause (which is where putative should typically occurs) is for the event in
question to be considered as an abstraction, i.e. divorced from reality. Its
effect in a conditional protasis, on the other hand, is for the event in
question to be presented as a purely theoretical possibility; in other words,
as 100% uncertain. It is theoreticity, then, which lies at the root of
condition b) above.'
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Notes to chapter 4
1. First published in Linguistics, 1989, 305-318. Thanks are due to
Henk van Riemsdijk (Tilburg University) and Carlos
Gussenhoven (Nijmegen University) for their comments on
earlier versions of this paper. Any remaining errors, of course,
are my own.
2. In Quirk et a1.'s later A Comprehensive Grammar of the English
Language (1985) conditional should is also dealt with under
hypothetical conditonals (section 15.36), and the same example
(3) is given, but among the other examples there is one (Should
she be interested, I'll phone her) which is in accordance with
claims a), b) and c). The same sentence also appears in section
14.25 Note d, with the following comment: 'Similar to putative
should is the tentative should used in open conditions with
if-clauses.'
3. If the sentence has an odd ring to it, one may imagine a
situation in which a reporter is sent on a trip to the interior of
Africa, where he will probably arrive after three weeks, and
where he will stay for one week. On his departure, his editor
might say to him:
Should any drastic changes have occurred (i.e. should it be the
case, upon your arrival, that drastic changes have occurred in
the meantime), we'll ask you to stay a little longer.
4. It is worthy of note that the construction with were_to +
infinitive can truly be regarded as an alternative to the Past
Tense in protases, witness the following sentence:
If you were to have asked me, I would have been only too
willing to help (Graver 1971:99)
5. This theoreticity, which causes a concrete event or situation to
be presented as a theoretical possibility, is to be distinguished
from the 'genericness' discussed in section 3, which refers to the
theorizing, i.e. the expression of general truths, that frequently
makes use of conditional sentences.
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It is also to be noted that the two distinctions 'generic' vs
'specific' and 'causalJlogical' vs 'non-causalJlogical' are not
hierarchically ordered, i.e. they are just two independent
categorizations. Thus conditionals can be generic and causal (a),
generic an non-causal (b), specific and causal (c), or specific and
non-causal (d):
a. If you heat ice, it melts
h. If I'm depressed, I always go the movies
c. If you drop that vase, it will break
d. If you do the washing up, I'll get the tickets
POSTSCRIPT Chapter 4
There are interesting parallels between the English situation, as outlined in
the preceding chapter, and the Dutch situation with regard to conditional
mocht, but also a number of differences, although the parallels are so
strong that there is good reason to assume that whatever goes for the
standard use of should in a conditional antecedent also goes for that of
mocht in the same position. It is a well-known fact, for example, that
whereas Dutch allows any verb (main verb or auxiliary) to take up initial
position in a (temporal or conditional) subclause, English allows only were,
had and should in that position, and both mocht and should seem to be
exceptions to the general rule, in both languages, that such front-position
lends a rather formal ring to the sentences in which they occur. For
example, whereas 'Had Peter arrived in time, we would not be in this
mess' sounds rather bookish, no such bookishness attaches to a sentence
like 'Should Peter arrive late, tell him to phone me'.
Another important point of correspondence is that Dutch mocht, like its
English counterpart, is often used 'incorrectly' (i.e. with zou + inf. in the
consequent), so that the whole conditional must retroactively be interpreted
as an Sc. Native speakers very often judge such sentences as entirely
grammatical, the reasons for which may be the ones mentioned at the end
of section 2 of the preceding chapter, i.e. a) in some of the sentences under
consideration, the hypothetical event specified in the consequent may be
contingent on a(n implicit) hypothetical event other than that referred to in
the antecedent - see, for an example, sentence (8); and b) the fact that
often people make a (grammatically doubtful) switch from one type of
conditional to another, the most common 'ungrammatical' shift no doubt
being from an open antecedent to a hypothetical consequent, or vice versa.
The third reason given for English, however, ('should probably serves a
useful purpose in those cases where the simple past is felt to be
inappropriate because of the 'unreal' implications associated with it, and
where the construction with were to + infinitive is felt to have too formal a
ring to it') does not apply to Dutch, for in the cases referred to, the latter
language is in a position to use zou + info However, there is also a third
reason in Dutch for regarding mocht in conditional antecedents as a variant
of the hypothetical construction; it is that Dutch mocht. even in condi-
tional antecedents, can have the meaning 'had permission to', so that the
following sentence is ambiguous, at least for some speakers of Dutch:
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Als ik mijn leven over mocht doen, zou ik arts worden
'If I my life again should I could do, would I doctor become'
(,If I should / could live my life again, I would become a doctor')
Obviously, my strictures are aimed only at the interpretation where English
has should; for it stands to reason that if the meaning of mocht is 'could',
the sentence is prefectly grammatical. It requires a good deal of acumen to
see that the grammaticality of the sentence in question depends on the
meaning of an auxiliary, so that a more or less naive speaker will not
condemn the sentence if the intended meaning of mocht turns out to be
'should' rather than 'could'.
Interestingly, although in both meanings of mocht initial position is
possible, it seems to me that such position is more usual when the meaning
is 'should', so that, to my ears at least, 'Mocht ik mijn leven overdoen,
dan zou ik arts worden' sounds more like the English translation with
should than like that with could.
One final factor should be mentioned in a discussion of should in
conditional antecedents: it is the role of American English, where should I
would conditionals seem to have been quite common for a considerable
period of time now, witness, for example, the frequency with which
Sanford (1989) uses them as examples throughout his textbook on
conditionals - without any comment as to the degree of their acceptability.
There is another development which may be making its influence felt
here: it is the use, ignored by most, or, for all I know, all grammars of
English, of should in temporal subclauses, the following sentence being a
case in point:
He waited until the enemy should attack
Here it seems that English simply has no other auxiliary available to
express the uncertainty of the event referred to in the subclause. In Dutch,
again, there is no problem, for zou + inf. expresses just that, whereas the
Past Tense would imply that the attack did indeed take place.
In view of the above, the chances of survival of Dutch mocht in what I
have been so bold as to label as its only correct use seem to me better than
the chances of survival of English should as an exclusive marker of
conditional theoreticity. Indeed, as I have pointed out in note 2 of the
preceding chapter, conditional should may already have gone over to the
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other side, what with the most authoritative grammar of Englisb only
dropping a single bint about 'theoretical' should in 'open' conditionals.
Althougb I am aware that my comments on this 'defection' will strike the
reader as somewhat scboolmasterly, the equation of 'theoretical' should
with the bypothetical Past Tense in conditional antecedents must. in my
view, be regretted - not for puristic reasons, but simply because it
constitutes a loss rather than a gain, as I hope to bave made clear. Of
course, one can talce the opposite view and congratulate English on the
possession an all-purpose auxiliary.
Given, bowever, what I bave written in the postscript to the last chapter,
the matter may not as yet be definitively settled, and there is a good deal
of irony in the fact that it is the increasing use of 'ungrammatical' would
in conditional antecedents wbich may, ultimately, restore should to its
'original' role of marker of theoreticity in open conditionals.
I do not know at what precise stage the reassignment of roles to should
and would in temporal and conditional subclauses is at the moment, but I
gladly leave the researcb into these matters to the computer linguists and
statisticians.
There is one more argument in favour of the view that the fundamental
meaning of should is 'theoreticity'. The difference between conditional
antecedents containing a present tense and those containing should + info is
mirrored in the difference in meaning between the auxiliaries may and can
in their 'possibility' -meanings. To give one example: 'If the guilder is
devalued' implies 'The guilder may be devalued', so that the threat of
devaluation is presented as a real possiblility, whereas 'If the guilder
should be devalued' only implies 'The guilder can be devalued', which is
an obvious truth, since it is always possible, theoretically, for a currency to
be devalued.
The theoreticity of conditional should belps to explain its frequent use as
an alternative to the Past Tense in antecedents, since, like putative should,
it puts the event referred to 'at one remove from reality'. But even if we
grant that conditional should occupies a position balfway between 'open'
and 'hypothetical' conditionals, it is doubtful whether much is gained by
allowing it to be neutral with respect to 'real-worldhood' or 'imaginary-
worldhood'.
Chapter 5
IMPLICATION IN NATURAL LANGUAGE AND IN LOGIC
1 Introduction
With regard to the correspondence between the implication in conditional
sentences in natural language and the material implication in logic, there
are two schools of thought, one maintaining that such a correspondence
does indeed exist (cf. Comrie (1986), Grice (1989), Smith (1983», and the
other claiming that there are important differences (cf. Cooper (1979),
Gazdar (1979), Sanford (1989), Seuren (1985), Stalnaker (1968». Since,
however, it is admitted even by proponents of the latter view that some
measure of similarity does exist between material implication in logic (MI)
and implication in natural language (NLI), it would be interesting to see at
exactly what point the two types of reasoning part company. Therefore the
arguments standardly put forward against the equation will pass in review
below. It turns out that some, if not all of them (I shall make no attempt to
resolve the ambiguity), can be shown not to be fully convincing.
Since to the best of my knowledge the fullest account of the alleged
differences between MI and NLI is given in chapter 8 of Cooper (1978), I
shall deal with that chapter in detail. Like Cooper, I shall only consider
indicative conditionals (i.e. Present Tense in protasis, Present Tense or will
+ infinitive in apodosis). Subjunctive conditionals (Past Tense in protasis,
would or some other modal verb + infinitive in apodosis) require separate
treatment.
To begin with, I shall have a brief look at the (undisputed) similarities
between NLI and MI.
It is uncontroversial that MI and NLI have a lot in common, Modus
Ponens and Modus Tollens being usually valid for both. Thus, in the
following arguments NLI works exactly like MI:
(1) a. If it rains, the street gets wet
Modus Ponens: It rains; therefore, the street gets wet Modus
Tollens: The street is not wet; therefore, it doesn't rain
Contraposition: If the street does not get wet, it does not rain
b. If it rains, the street gets wet
It does not rain. Invalid conclusion: therefore, the street does not
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get wet
The street gets wet. Invalid conclusion: therefore, it rains
That in ordinary language the invalid conclusions mentioned under b) are
often drawn is a consequence of the fact that. in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, people tend to interpret a conditional as a biconditional, i.e.
they sometimes interpret if as meaning 'if and only if. Such a
misunderstanding, however, is usually easily resolved
As in logic, NLI is equivalent to inclusive disjunction; hence, (Ic) is
equivalent to (Id):
(1) c. If it rains, the street gets wet
d. It doesn't rain, or the street gets wet
where (Id), being inclusive, allows for the possibility that both conjuncts
are true, i.e. that it doesn't rain and the street gets wet nonetheless. Truth-
functionally, exclusive disjunction ('Either it doesn't rain or the street gets
wet, but not both') is the reverse of the biconditional, also called the
double material implication ('If and only if it rains does the street get
wet'); again, in this respect natural language and logic do not differ.'
So, if for these basic bits of reasoning MI and NLI show a strong family
likeness, there is every reason to look askance at the alleged
counterexamples.
One of the major differences between MI and NLI is said to be the
causal link which usually exists between the protasis and apodosis of the
latter, but which need not exist between the protasis and apodosis of the
former. However, since in logic it simply does not matter whether or not
there is a causal link between p and q in 'p implies q', it could be
maintained that the causal link in question is just an extra condition which
NLI has to fulfil, but that the correctness of the reasoning is not affected
by it. In addition, not even in natural language is the causal link between
protasis and apodosis a necessary condition: there are conditionals in which
the causal link is absent - indeed, which only make sense because of the
very fact that it is:
(2) If you're the Pope, I'm the Empress of China
which, by the way, also provides a good illustration of the fact that in
natural language, as in logic, ex falso sequitur quod libet.
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2 Contraposition
The argument most often adduced against the equivalence of MI and NLI
is based on the apparent failure of contraposition to work in sentences of
the following type:
(3) a. If you're thirsty, there's beer in the fridge
b. If you need petrol, there is a gas station down the road
c. If you want to know, I think you're being impolite
(3a), for example, does not allow the inference 'If there is no beer in the
fridge, you're not thirsty'. That here contraposition doesn't work is due to
the fact that the presence of beer doesn't depend on the addressee being
thirsty - indeed, that the truth of the protasis (the p in logic) is irrelevant to
that of the apodosis (the q in logic). Therefore, as Akatsuka (1986: 337)
has cogently argued, in sentences of type (3) the 'real' q is, at least
partially, absent, and is something like 'then the information that there is
beer in the fridge will be of interest to you', or 'then you'll be happy to
hear ...'. As soon as we fill in this real q, contraposition can be applied
again, and yields unimpeachable results. In ordinary conversation it is left
to the addressee to fill in this (partially) missing q, there being hardly any
risk of him misinterpreting it - as the two possible interpretations of q
given above show, there is some freedom of choice. In other words, the
exact content of q simply doesn't matter - which is precisely why the
speaker left it out in the first place. It would indeed be difficult for the
addressee to misconstrue the meaning that the speaker wants to convey,
which is that the possible truth of the protasis is only a reason for him to
stipulate that the proposition expressed in the main clause holds. But it
should be stressed again that main clause and apodosis are not one and the
same, the former only being part of the latter.
In Cooper (op.cit.: 178) there is a sentence in which it is less obvious
that q is partially absent:
(4) If he didn't win, he tried his hardest
Here it is obvious that, again, the truth of the apodosis is independent of
that of the protasis, the most plausible interpretation being something like
'Maybe he didn't win; but he certainly tried his hardest', which is not a
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conditional sentence at all. I suggest that the real q is something like 'then
the very least we can say is that he tried his hardest'. Now contraposition
can be applied again, resulting in a sentence which, notwithstanding its
oddity, is logically consistent with (4): 'If the very least we can say is not
that he tried his hardest. he (must have) won'. If this is not immediately
clear, it should be remembered that one can say: 'the very least we can say
is that he tried his hardest' about anybody - except about the winner.
A translation of sentence (4) into Dutch also supports the view that
'something is missing', since in ordinary conditional sentences, in which p
precedes q. inversion is required in q; in the 'apodosis' of (5), however, no
inversion need take place:
(5) Als hij niet gewonnen heeft, hij heeft (hoe dan ook) zijn best
gedaan.
Cooper (op.cit.) gives two other examples of sentences in which, allegedly,
contraposition fails to apply; one of these (,There is some sugar in the
cupboard if you want some') provides yet another instance of the missing
q dealt with above, but the other belongs to a different category:
(6) If it rains, there will be not a tremendous cloudburst
in which, according to Cooper, contraposition yields 'If there is a
tremendous cloudburst it will not rain'. Here, of course, Cooper has
carelessly moved the modal auxiliary from one clause to the other, and it
should cause no surprise that thereby the equivalence is destroyed. A
stricter application of contraposition to (6), with, for the sake of
naturalness, will replaced by be going to, results in: 'If there is going to be
a tremendous cloudburst it does not rain', which not only makes more
sense than Cooper's reordering, but is also consistent with (6).
A more insidious pair of sentences in which MI and NLI seem to part
company as far as contraposition is concerned is the following (taken from
Seuren (1985: 339»:
(7) a. If Harold goes to the party then Sue does not go
b. If Sue goes to the party then Harold does not go
Which, according to Seuren, should be equivalent on any truth-functional
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account, but which in natural language are quite different. It can, of
course, be readily admitted that in spite of the logical equivalence, b)
doesn't mean the same as a), since in the former b) it is Harold's rather
than Sue's motives which are being considered. However, the causal links
between protasis and apodosis, which constitute our reason for assuming
the existence of the motives, are pragmatic implicatures, and therefore they
do not belong to the semantics proper of the sentences. That this is so is
evident from the fact that the implied causality can be cancelled: imagine a
situation in which Harold and Sue, both avid party-haters, have agreed
never to go to parties together; then sentence (7a) can be uttered without
even the suggestion of a causal link between p and q, in which case
contraposition no longer results in any difference between (7a) and (7b).
Seuren's sentences therefore, rather than forcing us to give up the view
that MI and NLI are basically one and the same, highlight the need for a
rigorous division of labour between semantics and pragmatics. Indeed, the
case for the similarity is strengthened rather than weakened by (7a) and
(7b), for they show that the causal link between the conjuncts of
conditional sentences, which, as was noted above, is often claimed to
constitute the crucial difference between MI and NLI, is really a matter of
pragmatics.
In view of the above, it will cause no surprise that, if we are explicit
about the causal relationship in (7a), i.e. if we make it part of the
semantics of the sentence, contraposition bas the expected result:
(7) c. If Harold goes to the party then Sue does not want to go
d. If Sue wants to go to the party then Harold does not go
It is not difficult to interpret (7d) not only as the logical, but also as the
natural-language equivalent of (7c), although here, too, some effort is
required in order to ignore the possible (pragmatic) inference that Harold is
being compliant.
A last remark about (7a) and (7b) is in order here: if the speaker has one
particular party in mind, then he would be more likely to use will + infini-
tive in the apodosis; if, on the other band, no particular party is being
referred to, then a party would be more natural than the party. Thus it
seems that for (7) as it stands, the most plausible interpretation is the one
given above, with Harold and Sue as partners in a party-dodging
agreement.
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In Sanford (1989: 225-239) there are three sentences in which
contraposition yields very strange results. First of all, there is (8), which
differs from Sanford's example in that, for reasons which have been hinted
at above in the discussion of (6), and which will be repeated below, the
apodosis does not contain will:
(8) a. If I draw a flush, I do not draw a straight flush
b. Therefore, if I draw a straight flush, I do not draw a flush
In order to see what has gone wrong here, all we need to do is to rewrite
(8a) as 'If I draw a flush, I draw a flush which is not straight';
contraposition now results in 'If I do not draw a flush which is not
straight, I do not draw a flush', which admittedly is not easy to interpret,
but which can be made less elusive by replacing 'a flush which is not
straight' by 'an ordinary flush', so that we get: 'If I do not draw an
ordinary flush, I have no flush' - which is entirely consistent with what the
speaker wished to convey by (8a), namely that he never draws straight
flushes. The error committed in going from (8a) to (Sb), therefore, resides
in ignoring the fact that what is inside the scope of not in (8a) is not the
whole apodosis, but only the word straight, But this is not the only
possibility; (8a) might not only be uttered by a pessimist, but also by a
realist wishing to convey that drawing a flush does not automatically mean
drawing a straight flush. If, in that case, (8a) is rewritten as 'It is not
necessary that if I draw a flush I draw a straight flush', contraposition
yields 'It is not necessary that if I do not draw a straight flush, I do not
draw a flush', which, needless to say, is consistent with the message in
(8a). Again, therefore, it is an incorrect assignment of scope to the
negation which produces the undesirable result in (8b).
Sanford's second sentence, with, again, will removed, is the following:
(9) a. If we have more than two children, we do not have more than
ten children
b. Therefore, if we have more than ten children, we do not have
more than two children
IL is not difficult to see that here, too, the most natural interpretation
assumes the existence of an implicit necessity-operator: 'It is not necessary
that if we have more than two children, we have more than ten children',
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which under contraposition does not becomes(9b) but: 'It is not necessary
that if we haven't more than ten children, we haven't more than two
children', which, notwithstanding its extreme oddity, is no doubt as true as
(9a) - which certainJy isn't lacking in oddity either.
Sanford's third sentence allegedly proving that contraposition does not
work in NLI is the following:
(l0) a. If you use it (i.e. a shampoo), no one willlrnow
b. Therefore, if someone will know that you use it. you do not
use it
In Sanford's view, the conclusion in (lOb) constitutes a paradox, since the
truth of the apodosis is a sufficient condition for the falsity of the protasis.
However, there is no paradox at all. What (lOb) means is, quite simply,
that the knowledge that my using the shampoo will be lrnown to somebody
prevents me from using it.
Sentence (10) thus demonstrates the importance of keeping the modals
where they are: we are not entitled to follow Cooper's example and to
allow contraposition to change (lOa) into: 'If someone (or everyone)
lrnows about it. you won't use if, for there we do have the paradox that
Sanford wrongly sees in (lOb).
A comparable carelessness with the modals can be found in Stalnaker
(1968), in which an attempt is made to prove the failure of contraposition
to work for NLI by means of the following pair:
(11) a. If the U.S. halts the bombing, then North Vietnam wilJ not
agree to negotiate
b. If North Vietnam agrees to negotiate, then the U.S. will not
have halted the bombing
What strictly speaking is (1 lal's contrapositive is not (Llb) but 'If North
Vietnam will agree to negotiate, the U.S. does not stop the bombing',
which does not seem to mean the same thing. This is, however, probably
due to the same shift in the pragmatic ascription of motives that was noted
in (7) above. Be that as it may, the difference in meaning evaporates if we
make explicit what (lla) is undoubtedly intended to convey, by simply
adding the word only: then from 'If the U.S. only halts the bombing, then
North Vietnam will not agree to negotiate', we derive by contraposition:
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'If North Vietnam will (i.e. is going to) agree to negotiate, then the U.S.
does not only stop (i.e. has not only stopped) the bombing'.
A final case against contraposition in NLI is made by Appiah (1985) on
the basis of an experiment in which there are two urns, A and B, the first
containing a million white balls and the second 999,999 white balls and
one black ball, and subjects obtain one ball, which they do not get a
chance to see, from one of the urns completely at random. Then, says
Appiah, since there is only a negligible chance of getting a black ball out
of urn B, one ought to consent to:
(12) a. If this is urn B, I am not holding a black ball
which, by contraposition, yields
(12) b. If I am holding a black ball, this is not urn B
Appian's argument hinges, of course, on our consent to (12a) - and there is
no doubt that it should be withheld. The only claim that one would
willingly subscribe to would be 'If this is urn B, there is an infinitesimal
chance that I am holding a black ball', the contrapositive of which
sentence it is not necessary to give.
3 Transitivity
In logic, 'if p then q', and 'if q then r' together license the conclusion 'if
p then r', Cooper gives the following example to show that in natural
language transitivity does not work:
(13) premises:
If Brown wins the election, Smith will retire to private life
If Smith dies before the election, Brown will win it
conclusion:
If Smith dies before the election, then he will retire. to private life
It can easily be seen what is wrong here. The circumstances under which
the first sentence is uttered are completely different from those under
which the second is. The (pragmatic) implication of the first sentence is
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that Smith is a candidate in the elections; the second implies that he will
not be able to be a candidate. Therefore the q of the second sentence is not
identical with the p of the first (assuming, for the moment. that the
presence of will in the former, and its absence in the latter, makes no
difference), and transitivity should not even be expected to apply.
The same goes for Cooper's second example:
(14) premises:
If I am ever in California I shall take up yachting
If I commit a crime and am sentenced to San Quentin Prison then
I shall be in California
conclusion:
If I commit a crime and am sentenced to San Quentin Prison then
I shall take up yachting
It would indeed be strange for any speaker to add to the protasis of the
first premise: 'and if I am not there as an inmate of San Quentin Prison';
the speaker takes that condition for granted, and assumes that the addressee
will do the same. Therefore, again, the q of the second sentence differs
crucially from the p of the first, and (14) no more constitutes a
counterexample to the rule of transitivity than does (13). In natural
language it would be extremely cumbersome, if not totally impossible, to
state all the conditions that have to be met for any conclusion to be
correctly drawn. Indeed. if the ceteris paribus condition did not hold in
everyday speech, it can safely be said that no argument would ever come
to a conclusion.
The ceteris paribus condition also takes care of a number of other
would-be counterexamples given by Cooper under the heading 'further
inference patterns'. There is one 'counterexample', however, which seems
to be more elusive. According to classical logic, 'if (p and q) then r'
implies 'if (p and not r) then not q'. But, says Cooper, the following
argument does not hold in ordinary language:
(15) premise:
If you strike this match and wear a hat. the match will light
conclusion:
If you strike this match and it doesn't light, then you won't be
wearing a hat
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The problem here is that Cooper merely stipulates that the conclusion does
not follow; no explanation is offered why it doesn't. which is to be
regretted, since it is not immediately obvious that it does not. What is
obvious, however, is, first. that for a sentence from natural language (15)
is very odd indeed, and second, that Cooper shows the same carelessness
with his modal auxiliaries that was already noted in connection with
sentence (6).
4 Negation of conditionals
According to classical logic, 'not (if p then q)' implies 'p and not q'.
Thus, it seems difficult to deny the correctness of the conclusions in (16):
(16) premise:
It is not the case that if the peace treaty is signed, war will be
avoided
conclusions:
The peace treaty will be signed
War will not be avoided
It is equally undeniable, however, that no speaker or hearer will deem both
conclusions valid. The question is, therefore, whether logically the premise
in (11) does indeed have the form 'not (if p then q)'. Cooper himself
(p.l99) suggests an answer: 'Perhaps It is not the case that when followed
by a conditional statement is sometimes understood to mean 'II is not
necessarily the case that.' In that case, of course, neither of the
conclusions follow, anymore than do p or q (or, for that matter, not-p or
not-q) from the ordinary 'if p then q', Therefore Cooper's supposition is
probably correct. although an alternative might be that the logical form of
the premise of (16) is 'if p then not necessarily q', in which case no
conclusions as to the truth of p or q can be drawn either. Whatever the
correct answer is, all we need to say at this point is that. notwithstanding
the prima facie similarity, 'not (if p then q)' is not necessarily the logical
equivalent of the natural-language phrase 'it is not the case that if ... then
In natural language, speakers use the phrase 'It is not the case ...' to
indicate that the state of affairs referred to in the protasis does not warrant
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the inference made (usually by an interlocutor) in the apodosis. This is a
far cry from the meaning of the logical formula 'not (if p then q)', which
might be interpreted as 'it is a contradiction that if P then q' (which is why
both p and not q follow from it - for only when p and not q, is the formula
'if p then q' false, i.e. a contradiction); if, therefore, there does indeed
exist a difference between logic and natural language, that difference might
reside in the meaning of not rather than in that of 'if ... then ...'?
Grice (1989: 80) gives one example of a negated conditional which does
indeed seem to behave like the logical formula 'not (if p then q)': if, in a
game of bridge, partner A has indicated that a certain bid means 'if I have
a red king, then I also have a black king', then partner B might, during the
post-mortem, say: 'What you told me during the bidding was not true' -
meaning that in the game A proved to have had a red king, but not a black
one. In other words: A has, in retrospect, contradicted himself by saying 'if
p then q'. Notice that this special case is in accordance with the meaning
of the logical negation of the material implication given above; notice also,
however, that this sort of situation can only arise when the truth-values of
both p and q are known, and in addition are known to be true and false
respectively. This, however, will rarely happen in the real world: in the
vast majority of natural-language conditionals we just do not know whether
or not p; we just postulate p as a given, on the basis of which we conclude
that q or that not-q. Notice, finally, that, in the situation sketched above,
no card-player B would dream of saying: 'It is not the case that if you
have a red king, you also have a black king'; he would be far more likely
to say something like 'you lied when you said that etc.' - which is one
more reason to assume that the formula 'It is not the case that if p then q
...' does not correspond to the formula 'not (if p then q)' in logic. In
conclusion, we may say that, although the logical formula 'not (if p then
q)' only rarely has a counterpart in natural language, it does not follow
that NLI and MI are fundamentally different, for it can still be maintained
that the reasoning that does go on in natural language proceeds in
accordance with the rules of logic, i.e. those of material implication. See
for a similar view Hom (1989: section 6.2.2.).
(17) If today is Monday then today is not Monday
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5 Self-contradictory conditionals
According to classical logic, sentences of the type exemplified in (17) are
not self-contradictory:
for, if P is false, the whole conditional is true, regardless of tbe content of
q. In natural language, however, the sentence can only be looked upon as
inconsistent, so that Cooper's conclusion, viz. that human reasoning does
not proceed along the same lines as MI, seems warranted at last. However,
it has already been shown (see sentence (2) above) that human beings do
occasionally make use of the fact that 'not p' makes the whole conditional
true, and here it may be added that, in spite of the extreme oddity of
sentences like (17), it is possible to think of circumstances in which they
can be made to sound more or less acceptable even in natural language.
All that is needed for this is a paradox, and the good old bromide about
the lying Cretan will do very well here. When his famous assertion that all
Cretans are liars is taken literally, we may say, without inconsistency:
(18) If he's lying, he's not lying
Even in this extreme case, therefore, Cooper's claim falls to the ground.
6 Disjunction of conditionals
Under classical logic a number of curious arguments follow, exemplified
by (19), (20) and (21), which are all taken from Cooper.
(19) a. premises:
If John is in Paris, then he is in France
If John is in Istanbul, tben he is in Turkey
conclusion:
If John is in Paris he is in Turkey, or, if he is in Istanbul he is
in France
The conclusion no longer follows if we add to the premises that, for
obvious reasons, John cannot be in France and Turkey at the same time.
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But even when we choose premises that can hold at one and the same
moment, the argument looks extremely doubtful; see (19b):
(19) b. premises:
If John is in Paris, then he is in France
If it rains, then the street gets wet
conclusion:
If John is in Paris, then the street gets wet, or, if it rains John is
in France.
In order to see what is going on here, we need only look at the first
disjunct of the conclusion. That first disjunct, i.e. 'If John is in Paris, then
the street gets wet', is either true or false. If it is true, then the whole dis-
junction is true. If it is false, then, according to the logical formula for
negation of conditionals adhered to by Cooper (see the discussion of
sentence (16) above) it follows that a) John is in Paris, and b) the street
doesn't get wet. But if John is in Paris, it follows, by the first premise, that
he is in France, and that consequently the second disjunct is true. The flaw
in this argument is, of course, that the negation of the first conjunct does
not warrant the conclusion either that John is in Paris or that the street
does not get wet.
(20) premise:
If the main switch is on and the auxiliary switch is on, then the
motor is on.
conclusion:
If the main switch is on the motor is on, or, if the auxiliary
switch is on, the motor is on.
Here the conclusion no longer follows if the premise is changed in such a
way that it reflects the probable intentions of the speaker, i.e. if it is made
to read 'If both the main switch and the auxiliary switch are on, then the
motor is on.' And if that is indeed what the speaker has in mind, it seems
somewhat improbable for him to choose Cooper's formulation.
(21) premise:
If Albert's age is greater than twenty and less than twenty-three,
then Albert is either twenty-one or twenty-two.
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conclusion:
If Albert's age is greater than twenty then Albert is twenty-two,
or if his age is less than twenty-three then he is twenty-one.
Any listener hearing the premise of (21) will automatically take it that
Albert will be either twenty-one or twenty-two, but not both at the same
time; and if the premise is made to stipulate explicitly that exclusive rather
than inclusive disjunction is meant, the conclusion no longer follows.
Cooper's remaining arguments against the equivalence of MI and NLI
need not be discussed here, since they are either based on combinations of
the logical derivations that have already been dealt with above, or suffer
from a failure to take the ceteris paribus condition into account.
7 Other arguments
In Seuren (op.cit.: 338) the following conversation is presented in
refutation of the alleged equivalence of MI and NLI:
(22) A: If the king of France has any dignity left, France is safe
B: But there is no king of France
A: All right, then France is safe
According to Seuren, this argument should be valid since the antecedent
clause of A is radically false. However, it is at least a moot point whether
B's assertion does indeed make the antecedent false: it is not at all certain
that the failure of a referring expression to refer automatically results in
the assignation of a negative truth-value to the sentence in which it figures.
As Grice (1989: 269) states: 'There is, indeed, something unnatural about
assigning a truth-value, as far as ordinary discourse is concerned, to
statements made by means of sentences containing vacuous descriptions.'
This is not the place to discuss the literature about reference and
presupposition; suffice it to say that, like Seuren's other examples, (22) in
itself is not enough to decide the issue that we are concerned with here.
In the same passage in which (22) is discussed, Seuren tries to show that
the so-called 'true alternatives condition' (see below), which applies to dis-
junctions, does not work in the same way for conditionals. witness:
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(23) If Charlie is dead. he has not been killed
which, according to Seuren, is fully acceptable. Roughly, the argument is
as follows. If (23) is analysed as 'Either Charles is not dead, or he has not
been killed', the true alternatives condition demands that not only 'Charlie
is dead and he has not been killed' should be without contradiction (which
it is), but also 'Charlie is not dead and he has been killed' (which it is
not). What Seuren has overlooked is that (23) is a deficient conditional in
exactly the same way in which (4) is one: part of the q is missing (the
complete q being something like 'the very least we can say is that he has
not been killed'). Hence (23) simply is not a conditional sentence proper
and should not be used to substantiate a claim about a difference between
implication and disjunction, let alone figure prominently in a discussion of
the differences between MI and NLI.
A final argument against the equation of MI and NLI could be based on
the fact that in natural language conditionals with false antecedents and
true consequents do not occur. There may, however, be a very good reason
for this. If we start from the basic assumption that anyone making a
conditional statement wants to say something (contingently) true,
conditionals with false protases and true apodoses simply serve no useful
purpose, since any conditional with a false protasis is vacuously true.
However, as we have seen above (example (2», what sometimes does
occur is a false protasis which is followed by a false apodosis (see
example (2». But conditionals of that type do serve a useful purpose in
that they serve as an ironic invitation to the listener to apply Modus
Tollens: the apodosis contains a wildly, patently false statement, so for the
whole conditional to be true, or at any rate to make sense, the listener is
forced to the conclusion that the protasis must have been false as well.
This same ironic effect could not possibly be produced by a false protasis
followed by a true apodosis.
8 Conclusion
There is no reason to suppose that there are two distinct ways of
reasoning, the one being valid in natural language, and the other in logic.
All that the alleged counterexamples make clear is that the semantics of




Attempts to prove that implication in natural language and in logic are
two fundamentally different things suffer from a tendency to take the
surface form of a conditional sentence for granted, which may have any of
the foUowing results:
a) the equation of a main clause of a conditional sentence with the q
of logic in cases were the former is only part of the latter;
b) carelessness as far as the place of modal auxiliaries is concerned,
which results in their being shifted from apodosis to protasis and
vice versa;
c) neglect of the precise scope of negatives, so that what had narrow
scope in an apodosis ends up with wide scope in a protasis;
d) neglect of the ceteris paribus condition, which destroys the
transitivity of conditionals;
e) the equation of 'it is not the case that if ..then ... ' of natural
language with 'not (if p then q)' of logic.
All the alleged counterexamples LO the claim that implication in natural
language and in logic are one and the same can be reformulated in such a
way that the evidence that they were intended to provide evaporates.
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Notes to chapter 5
1. First published in Methodology and Science Volume 23-4, 1990,
200-216.
2. There is, in Dutch, a construction which is seemingly idiomatic,
but which on closer inspection provides an interesting
illustration of the logical equivalence (if not in natural language
in general, at least in one particular natural language) between
implication and disjunction. The construction goes by the name
of balansschikking ('balance arrangement' - cf. Algemene
Nederlandse Spraakkunst (AN.S.), p. 647f.) and typically
involves, besides the coordinating conjunction of ('or), a
negative element in the first disjunct (all examples are from the
AN.S.):
(1) Er is geen mens of hij moet sterven
'There is no human being or he must die'
(= If there is a human being he must die)
(2) Je kunt nergens meer komen of je hoort
achtergrondmuziek
'You cannot go anywhere anymore or you hear muzak'
(= If you go anywhere you hear muzak)
(3) Ik kon geen woord zeggen of Louise begon te lachen
'I couldn't say a word or Louise began to laugh'
(= If I said a word, Louise began to laugh)
(4) Het scheel de geen haar of hij was verdronken
'It hardly made any difference or he was drowned'
(= If there had been a difference he would have
drowned)
The same construction occurs, rather more frequently, with
temporal meaning (usually something like 'as soon as'; cf an
alternative interpretation of (3): 'As soon as I said a word,
Louise began to laugh'); in this context it may be worthy of note
that Dutch als can mean both 'if and 'when'.
3. For this observation I am indebted to Prof. De Swart (Brabant
University).
POSTSCRIPT Chapter 5
As far as I know, the impossibility of applying Contraposition to so-called
Semifactuals has not been remarked on in the literature. For example,
consider the following sentence with its alleged contrapositive, or rather
contrapositives (as I argue in the next chapter, it is not quite clear whether
the word even should be taken to belong to the antecedent or to the
consequent):
(1) a. Even if you drink less, your boss will fire you
contrapositive:
b. ??If your boss won't fire you, you don't even drink less
c. ??If your boss won't even fire you, you don't drink less
There is, however, a way of solving this problem, if it is a problem. We
can, presumably, rewrite (I a) as a pair of sentences, linked by a
coordinating conjunction, that together have the same meaning as the
original:
(1) d. If you drink less, your boss will fire you, and if you don't
drink less, your boss will ftre you
Now, if Contraposition is applied here, we get:
(I) e. If your boss won't fire you, you drink less, and if your boss
won't fire you, you don't drink less
which, as far as it can be interpreted at all, seems a contradictory
statement. Notice, however, that the truth of the pair in (Ie) can be
salvaged by taking it that the antecedents are false, for then the two
coordinated conditionals become vacuously true. And this is precisely what
is the case: sentence (Id) makes it clear that the addressee's drinking
habits have nothing to do with his being fired (although something else
may have), so that we may say that the addressee will be fired anyway.
Hence the consequents of (Id) are true regardless of the truths of the
antecedents. But if the consequents of (ld) are true regardless of the truths
of their antecedents, it foUows that the antecedents of (Ie) are false; and if
the antecedents of (Ie) are false, the truth or falsehood of the consequents
ceases to matter for the truth of the whole conditional, and the two,
apparently contradictory, conjuncts in (Ie) can be said to be true at the
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same time.
Hence also in the case of Semifactuals, Contraposition can be said to
work logically, even though from the point of view of the language user
the results look very odd indeed. And so they should: it must always be
borne in mind that, with the exception of one single type of IC (i.e. the
type in which the consequent is patently false), antecedents are always
treated as true by the language user.
In this context a remark made by Sanford (1989: 83) is relevant. He
claims that a theory of (subjunctive) conditionals 'ought not to preclude the
joint truth of subjunctives with the forms if A, then C and if A, then not-
C.'. It seems to me that the subjunctive version of (1a), and more
generally, any subjunctive semifactual, can, via Contraposition, be turned
into apparently contradictory conditionals.
In my view the above can be fruitfully applied to sentence (4)('If he
didn't win, he tried his hardest') in the preceding chapter. An alternative to
the explanation presented there would, it seems to me now, be one in
which the sentence is looked upon as a covert semifactual, i.e. as the same
sentence starting with Even if If that is correct, the same logical operations
can be applied to it that have been applied to (a) above. Whichever
explanation of the alleged failure of Contraposition to apply to (4) is the
correct one, is something that can be left undecided. It is enough to
conclude that (4) does not present an insurmountable obstacle to a theory
which holds that MI and NLI work along the same lines.
At this juncture another interesting phenomenon may be discussed,
namely the conditional sentences that do not allow themselves to be turned
into semifactuals. A typical case is the old bromide:
(2) If you're the Pope, I'm the Empress of China
It is not difficult to see why the addition of even to the antecedent turns
the sentence into something that can hardly be understood at all (leaving
aside the theatrical situation, where an actress could be using the sentence,
with even, to a colleague to indicate that he will be playing the Empress of
China anyway). The addition of even would make the speaker's being the
Emperor of China independent of the addressee's being the Pope - and, of
course, the former crucially depends on the latter.
There are also SCs that do not have a version with even, an example
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being:
(3) If I hated Mozart, I wouldn't be sitting here
in which the addition of even would make the sentence contradictory, in
that it would suggest that the speaker is not sitting where he is sitting.
Notice that the sentence with even is all right when the word not is
deleted; and that the deletion of not would make (3) contradictory in the
same way in which it would be made contradictory if even were added to
it.
Chapter 6
THE SEMANTICS OF SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS
1 InUOduction
It is not the aim of the present chapter to present something that might be
called a new theory of subjunctive conditionals; nor does it pretend to
solve all the problems associated with this type of conditional. I have no
basic quarrel with Stalnaker and Lewis' possible-world account apart from
the ones mentioned in Chapter 1; as indicated there, I call into question
some of the assumptions widely held by logicians, the most important of
which is that SCs do not behave truth-functionally. Also, I will try to show
that there is no point in making a distinction between those SCs which the
speaker considers to have false antecedents (often called Counterfactuals
(CFs)), and those which the speaker considers to be, in a sense, 'open' (in
which reference is mostly made to an imaginary future).
Before the question of the truth-functionality of subjunctive conditionals
(SCs) can be addressed, however, it is essential that the boundary-line
between their semantics and their pragmatics should be sharply drawn, and
in this respect the central question is no doubt: do SCs 'mean' the negation
of their antecedents? A term like 'unreal condition', which is in frequent
use in grammars of English, strongly suggests that such negation is indeed
felt to be integral to the meaning of SCs. Linguists like Comrie (1986: 90)
and Dudman (1984: 151) have argued that CSs do not mean the negation
of their antecedents, and, following Lewis (1973:3), the standard view
among logicians seems to be that the negation of the proposition expressed
in the antecedent is nothing more than pragmatic implicature (cf. the
remarks made about this in Chapter 4); this does not prevent antecedents
from frequently being called false (see below). Since, according to the
rules of material implication, a conditional with a false antecedent is
automatically true, these false antecedents would make all counterfactual
sentences in which they occur vacuously true; and this would, of course,
mean that there is at least one class of conditional sentences in natural
language that does not behave according to the rules of classical logic. The
issue therefore deserves close attention, which it will receive accordingly
below; unlike the majority of writers on the subject, who content
themselves with presenting one sentence which, in their view, either refutes
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or corroborates a particular claim, I shall list. and scruumze, all the
arguments against and in favour with respect to the question in hand.
It is not difficult to understand why the negation of the propositions
contained in the antecedent and (less clearly) the consequent is usually felt
to be an integral part of the meanings of subjunctive conditional sentences:
this is no doubt because it does not make sense to talk about imaginary
events or situations if these events or situations correspond to events or
situations in the real world.
But first the question must be addressed what it is for a sentence to mean
something. A comprehensive discussion of the literature on the 'meaning
of meaning' is certainly beyond the scope of this study, but in what
follows I shall start from Tarsiers dictum that to know the meaning of a
(declarative) sentence is to know under what conditions it is true.
According to this 'definition' of meaning two sentences only differ in
meaning when it is possible to think of circumstances in which one is, and
the other is not. true. Although the definition is helpful in the case of
synonymy, it is cer- tainly inadequate as a general definition of meaning in
that it only covers declarative sentences, for which, however, it serves a
useful purpose in that it does allow one to separate the pragmatic aspects
of their meaning from those aspects which cannot be revoked without con-
tradiction.' What belongs to the semantics of a sentence is therefore only
what the sentence means under all circumstances, i.e. necessarily and
undefeasibly.
Knowing under what conditions a sentence is true is not the same thing
as knowing whether the sentence in question is true. For example: we
know the meaning of John's in the office if we know that the sentence is
true if and only if John is in the office. But we need not know whether
John is in the office in order to interpret the sentence, i.e. to know what it
means. Consequently, the truth of a declarative sentence is not. or only
indirectly, of interest to a language user or linguist. This same point is
made by Allwood et aI. (1977: 163): 'Certainly it is not a linguist's job to
specify what sentences in a language are actually true; but to specify the
conditions under which they are true is quite another thing.'
One more point may be made here. When we say 'John's in the office',
we are committed to the truth of that sentence, i.e. we may be taken to
task if it later turns out that John is/was elsewhere. Likewise, we assume
that other speakers are speaking the truth when uttering the same sentence.
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Hence if a born liar were to say to us 'John is in the office', he would still
be committed to the truth of that sentence, although we would have our
doubts about it (i.e., about its truth). But, of course, these doubts would not
affect the meaning of the sentence, or make its interpretation more
difficult. So, again, we need not know the truth of a declarative sentence in
order to get at its meaning, and there is a world of difference between
'knowing under what circumstances a sentence is true' and 'knowing
whether a sentence is true'. Whereas specifying the truth conditions of a
declarative sentence is always possible, saying whether it is true or false is
a different matter altogether. Now, if we need not know the truth of a
declarative sentence in order to be able to interpret it, it seems that there is
even less need to know the truth of a non-declarative sentence in order to
know what it means. This raises the question whether conditional sentences
are declarative. Even if the majority of them are what one might call
contingently declarative, there are many conditional sentences whose
consequent is a command or a question, and which therefore cannot be
called even that. In what follows, attention will be restricted to those
conditional sentences whose consequents are declarative.
2 The falsehood of antecedents
Various arguments have been put forward to prove that hypothetical con-
ditionals do not really 'mean' the negation of the propositions contained in
protasis and apodosis. A frequently quoted example is Comrie's (1986:
90):
(1) If the butler had done it, we would have found just the clues that
we did in fact find
However, Comrie himself admits that not all speakers will find this
particular sentence entirely convincing; indeed. it seems as if the listener is
first deliberately wrongfooted and only later apprised of the true state of
affairs, so that the relative subclause has the effect of a conjuror's rabbit.
This does not prove that Comrie's view is untenable, of course, but only
shows that we are in need of better arguments. One such argument is the
following.
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In any sort of text (groups of) sentences of the type exemplified in (2) can
be found quite frequently:
(2) a. If he had missed the train, he would have called, so since he
didn't call, he must have made the train
b. If the gardener had done it, there would have been footprints
in the parlor, but there were not
c. If the engines had been rotating at the time of the accident, we
would have found all sorts of debris. And, yousee, we did not
What all these examples have in common is that the imaginary event
referred to in the consequent is explicitly stated not to have taken place in
a subsequent sentence, which, however, does not seem to be pleonastic at
all. And surely, if the negation of the propositions in the antecedents and
consequents of (2) were an integral part of the meanings of the
conditionals in which they occur, the three sentences following the
conditionals should strike the listener or reader as very pleonastic indeed.
Another argument is provided by what is sometimes called the future
counter- factual, exemplified in (3):
(3) If anyone stole my bike, I'd go to the police
Clearly, sentences like (3) do not deny the occurrence of the events in
either antecedent or consequent; and since they have exactly the same form
as sentences that do seem to 'mean' the negation of the propositions
contained in antecedent and consequent, this negation must be looked upon
as a con versa- tional implicature rather than as a part of the meaning. The
term 'future counterfactual', therefore, is at least infelicitous; but, as will
be seen later, so is the term 'counterfactual' itself.
In connection with sentences like (3) it is worth pointing out that Dutch
has no fewer than four possible counterfactual constructions (see Ch. 2),
which, when translated into English, all end up the same, i.e. like the
construction found in (3). Now, if the claims made in that chapter are
correct, and Dutch does indeed have a way of indicating potentiality rather
than counterfac- tuality, then it follows that the one English form, which
also does duty for this Dutch 'potentialis', cannot in itself have
contrary-to-factness as an integral part of its meaning.
THE SEMANfICS OF SUBJUNCfNE CONDmONALS 129
Thirdly, consider a sentence like:
(4) If there were savages on the other side, I would not cross
This can be said by someone who is travelling in a forest and who is about
to cross a bridge, on the other side of which there are no savages - but
also by someone who is participating in a quiz-game, and who has been
asked to answer the question 'What would you do if you were Iravelling in
a forest and you came to a bridge?' In this latter case there is, of course,
not even a hint that either there are savages on the other side, or that the
participant is, in fact going to cross (or, indeed, that there is another side).
Interestingly, in cases like these, the difference between indicative and
subjunctive conditionals disappears altogether. But not only should this
cause no surprise, it is exactly what is to be expected: for if an indicative
conditional (IC) is used here, we nonetheless explicitly enter the world of
the imagination:
(4) a. Q.: Suppose you are travelling in a forest and you come to etc.
A.: If there are savages on the other side, I won't cross
Conceivably, Comrie might look upon this as confmnation of his 'scale of
hypotheticaJity' -thesis. But he would be wrong if he did, for if the
transition to an imaginary world is not expressly signalled, the fundamental
difference between ICs and SCs remains (see Chapter 1).
Further evidence is provided by 'counterfactual' sentences which can also
be interpreted as statements about past habits. The following two examples
are taken from Dudman (1984: 145):
(5) a. If she played the Schubert as an encore she would leave out
the repeats
b. If it broke they would make us pay for it
Of course, one can take the view that these sentences are semantically
ambiguous to start with, and that one of the meanings is contrary-to-fact, It
would be preferable, however, to assign one core meaning to these
sentences, a meaning which allows two (or more) pragmatic constructions
to be put on them, one leading to the counterfactual, the other to the
past-habit interpretation. The reason why 'or more' was added
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parenthetically to the last sentence is that sentences like (5a) and (5b) can
be given yet another interpretation, i.e. they can be looked upon as
instances of so-called free indirect speech:
(5) c. Then, finally, she had made up her mind. If she played the
Schubert as anencore she would leave out the repeats. Yes,
that was what she was going to do.
Closely linked with this is the argument from ordinary indirect speech:
although (6a) will mostly be given a contrary-to-fact interpretation, this is
by no means the only possibility, as is clear from the fact that (6c) can
either be interpreted as contrary-to-fact. or be taken as the indirect-speech
version of (6b):
(6) a. If I had carried out 10 assignments, I would have finished the
course
b. If you have carried out 10 assignments, you will have finished
the course
c. He said that if I had carried out 10 assignments, I would have
finished the course
Another argument is provided by would like in such sentences as:
(7) I'd like a cup of coffee / to go to the theatre
Clearly, the conditionality of sentences like (7) has paled - but that does
not mean that it has disappeared. Even if in certain cases it may be
extremely difficult to supply the missing antecedent, I would maintain that
it is always possible; in (7) it may be something like 'if I were allowed to
make a request'. As I have argued elsewhere (Ch. 3), the reason why we
use hypothetical constructions in requests is that we want to be as polite as
possible, and that, if we make our request hypothetical, we are not 'really'
making any request at all (,Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that I
were to ask you to open the window, would you open it?'). But in spite of
the hypotheticality of the wish expressed in (7) nobody would take it that
the speaker does not 'really' want a cup of coffee etc.
Then there is the evidence provided by what are known as semifactuals,
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i.e. counterfactual conditionals with even (or a comparable word. such as
also) added to the antecedent:
(8) a. If he had not asked me, I would have agreed
b. Even if he had not asked me, I would have agreed
As far as the consequents are concerned. the sentences in (8) carry
opposite implications: a) will be understood as implying that the speaker
did not, and b) that he did, agree. It is clear that it would be a very
difficult task, however, to try to give an account of this difference in
semantic terms, for in ordinary (i.e. non-conditional) declarative sentences
the addition of the word even never causes a comparably drastic reversal.
Therefore (8a) should not be said to mean (in the strict sense of the term)
that the speaker did not, in fact, agree - it can only be said to imply this. A
speaker only uses a sentence like (8a) when at some moment in the past he
did not in fact agree to something. The meaning of (8a), on the other hand.
is no more than an unverifiable claim: the claim that in a certain past
situation, which only took place inside the speaker's head. the speaker
retroactively commits himself to agreeing to something. Since this claim
can never be verified, we can only take the speaker's word for it - indeed.
even the speaker himself can only take his own word for it. In (8b), too,
the speaker retroactively commits himself to agreeing to something in the
same imaginary past situation, and again we can only take his word for his
imaginary past agreement. The consequents of (8a) and (8b) therefore
mean exactly the same thing, although the word even in the latter allows,
or even forces, the inference that in the real world the speaker did. in fact,
agree to something.
With respect to sentences like (8) it is to be noted that if the order of
antecedent and consequent is reversed, we simply cannot draw any
inferences about the latter until we have heard the former - for only when
we have heard the antecedent can we deduce whether the speaker did or
did not in fact agree (of course, this hinges on the assumption that the
word even belongs to the antecedent rather than to the consequent):
(8) c. I would have agreed even if he had not asked me
A typical, and telling, error with respect to semifactuals is made by Poun-
lain (1983: 108), who says that the consequent of a concessive conditional
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is always asserted as a fact. Applied to a sentence like (8b) the error is the
following: although it is true that the speaker in (8b) did in fact agree, that
is certainly not what the consequent 'asserts as a fact'. There is no factual
claim (i.e. one pertaining to the real world) in the consequent; there is only
a hypothetical claim, which is contingent on the similarly hypothetical state
of affairs specified in the antecedent. And the real-world fact that may be
deduced from, i.e. is entailed by, (8b) is 'I agreed', and not '1 would have
agreed'; but again, the consequent of (8b) most certainly does not mean, or
assert as a fact. '1 agreed'. Pountains's error is entirely in line with a
remark made by Sanford (1989: 78) to the effect that authors who discuss
counterfactuals often write as if the component clauses were indicative.
And this is something that is done time and again. To take a recent
example: Jackson (1987: 64) describes an imaginary situation in which, by
sheer bad luck, his daughter dies during an operation. Then, says Jackson,
the sentence: 'If 1 had not agreed to the operation, my daughter would be
alive now' is true, whereas 'If 1 had not agreed to the operation, my
daughter would be dead now' is false, although the latter has a false
antecedent and a true consequent (italics mine), so that. logically, it ought
to have come out true.
This, in my view, is a double error - for, first, in the world of the
imagination the speaker does not agree to the operation, and hence in that
world the sentence 'I did not agree to the operation' is, if anything, true,
and hence the antecedent must, if anything, be considered true as well, for
it is about an imaginary world. Likewise, Jackson is wrong about the
consequent. for it does not make a claim about the real world, but about
the same imaginary world in which the speaker has not agreed to the
operation. In that imaginary world the daughter is now alive. What we end
up with, therefore, is indeed a false conditional, but one which is false
because it bas a true antecedent and a false consequent. Jackson's
sentences therefore confirm rather than vitiate the essential similarity
between the reasoning that goes on in natural language and that of logic.
A logician's objection at this point would undoubtedly be that for him, as
for Jackson, 'true' and 'false' should be taken to mean 'true in the real
world' and 'false in the real world' respectively. Such criticism, however,
cuts no ice, because the sentence is not about the real world: ' If I had not
agreed to the operation, ...' is not the same thing as ' If I did not agree to
the operation ...', which might not only be construed as an SC, but also as a
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Past IC (if, for example, the consequent reads: ' ..., they usually suggested
a different remedy'), which can be said to be about the real world. See
also the remarks made in section 4 about truth and falsehood, later on in
this chapter. But it is also necessary to have a second look at Jackson's
first sentence, which he calls true without further comment However, if
we adopt the same line of reasoning that Jackson employs for his second
sentence, we might say that 'If I had not agreed to the operation, my
daughter would be alive now' is true because it has a false antecedent (in
which case the fact that it also has a false consequent is irrelevant to the
truth of the whole sentence). Be that as it may, is it correct to call the
sentence 'true in this world'? I would maintain that, even if we agree to it,
the sentence is only true in an imaginary world, and never in the real
world (which does not mean it is false in the real one - it simply does not
apply to it). For if we say: 'Yes, that's true', we mean: 'Yes, it is true that,
if you had not agreed to the operation, your daughter would be alive now',
the domain of which is still the imaginary world; this is also evident from
the paraphrase: 'Yes, it is true that, in the imaginary world in which you
did not agree to the operation, your daughter is now alive'.
Allwood et al. (1977: 39) commit the same error as Jackson, when they
claim the following: analysing a sentence like 'If I were invisible
everybody would see me' as the material implication 'if p then q', has the
undesirable result of making the whole sentence come out just as true as
'If I were invisible nobody would see me', since it is 'empirically
probable' that p is false. But the empirical improbability of my invisibility
is entirely beside the point, for I am not talking of my invisibility in the
real world; rather, I am talking of my imagined invisibility, and simply by
imagining it, I make my invisibility - at least hypothetically (see the next
paragraph) true. Therefore the whole sentence comes out false, exactly as
it should, for in the world of my imagination it is highly likely that if am
invisible, no one will see me. So the antecedent of 'If I were invisible no
one would see me' is no more false than that of its indicative counterpart
'If I am invisible, no one can see me', an IC which is not vacuously true
as a result of having a false antecedent, but true because 'I am invisible' is
no more than a starting point for my reasoning, and therefore must be
taken as true for the sake of the argument. The question whether it is
really true should not even arise.
It should be borne in mind at this point what exactly the word hypothesis
means. In The Oxford Concise Dictionary it is defined as 'supposition
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made as a basis for reasoning, without assumption of its truth, or as a
starting point for investigation; groundless assumption'. This fits in with
something I have argued elsewhere (Chapters 1 and 3): it is wrong to
speak of things being 'assumed' in conditional antecedents; when I say 'If
I am invisible, ...' I do not assume that I am invisible; I just posit my
being invisible as a 'basis for reasoning'; I reason on the basis of the
imagined truth of '1 am invisible'. Although 'hypothetically true' comes
close to being a contradiction in terms, I shall henceforth use that
expression to refer to the imagined truth of the antecedents of SCs.
To show just how widespread the fallacy of considering antecedents of
SCs false is, it is perhaps useful to add one more example. In 'The
Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals' Goodman (1983: 4) uses sentence
(9a) as an example:
(9) a. If that piece of butler had been heated to 150 F., it would
bave melted
and then says 'Considered as truth-functional compounds, all
counterfactuals are of course true, since their antecedents are false. Hence
(9) b. If that piece of butter had been heated to 150 F., it would not
bave melted
would also bold'. It should be obvious where I disagree. The antecedent of
(9a) is not false, but true. The fact I did not heat a piece of butter in the
real world at some moment in the past is entirely irrelevant. By uttering
the antecedent of (9a), I enter a world of the imagination which is situated
in the past, and by imagining a piece of butter being heated to 150 F. in
that imaginary world, I am making it happen in that imaginary world,
thereby making it true in that imaginary world. Since the antecedents of
(9a) and (9b) do not have anything to say about conditions in that
imaginary world being different from those in the real world, we may take
that they are the same (recall the importance of the ceteris paribus
condition that was discussed in the last chapter), and that therefore in the
imaginary world butter will melt wben heated to 150 F. exactly as it does
in the real one; and that, consequently, (9b) is false.
At this point a few words may be added about the use speakers make of
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sentences like (9a); for in spite of its not saying anything about the real
world, it allows us to draw interesting conclusions about this real world:
since the piece of butter in question evidently has not melted. we are
justified in assuming that in the real world it has not been heated to 150 F.
But it should be emphasized again that that fact does not allow the
inference that the antecedent of (9b) is false-in-the-real-world. It just does
not apply to the real world.
So the antecedent of an SC should be looked upon as true - and this is
even the case when the point of the whole conditional seems at first glance
to be to prove the antecedent false. Consider, for example:
(10) If I hated Mozart. I would not be sitting here
There is no doubt that the purpose of this sort of sentence is to prove that
the speaker loves, or at any rate does not hate, Mozart. It is equally clear
that one cannot utter the sentence when one hates Mozart. But it must be
insisted that the antecedent of (10) does not mean that the speaker does not
hate him. The only meaning that (10) can be said to have is that in any
imaginary world in which I (the speaker) hate Mozart. I am not sitting
where I am sitting while uttering the sentence. Since it is an observable
fact that I am sitting wherever it is that I am sitting, it follows, by Modus
ToUens, that in the real world I do not hate Mozart. Although the listener
is therefore entitled to conclude that I do not hate Mozart. the conclusion
that the antecedent of (10) is false is totally unwarranted. The only thing
the antecedent of (10) does is present my hypothetical hatred of Mozart as
a starting point for my reasoning.
The conclusion must be, then, that even though it is usually infelicitous
or downright impossible to use an SC if the state of affairs described by its
component clauses corresponds to that of the real world. it is wrong to
infer that therefore SCs mean the negation of these clauses, and utterly
wrong to infer that their antecedents are false.
There is no need, therefore, to make a distinction between those SCs
whose antecedent contain propositions which are at variance with the
situation in the real world (notice that this is not the same thing as saying
'whose antecedents are false'), and those SCs whose do not: neither type
has anything to say about matters in the real world.
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Again: 'If I were you, ...' does not mean that I am not you; and it is not
false either. It is only I am not you which means 'I am not you', and only
I am you which is false. The subject of truth and falsehood in conditional
sentences will be taken up again at the end of this chapter.
3 The truth-functionality of SCs
It is now time to look at the logic of subjunctive conditionals (SCs) more
closely. Even a cursory look at the literature will show that it is more or
less taken for granted that SCs do not behave truth-functionally. The
number of arguments to show that they do not. however, is far smaller
than that adduced for ICs. This should cause no surprise, since there is
hardly any point in discussing the difference(s) between the logic of SCs
and Material Implication, if even ordinary conditionals do not behave in
accordance with Material Implication. However, as was shown in the last
chapter, none of the arguments adduced for ICs is entirely convincing, so
that there is every reason to take a very critical look at the arguments
against the equation of implication in natural language and material
implication, as adduced for subjunctive conditionals.
If we want to see how SCs fare under contraposition, there is at least one
major difficulty, however. As I argued in the last chapter, when
contraposition is applied, care should be taken not to move the modal
auxiliary carelessly from one clause to the other; that is, when applying
contraposition to 'If it rains, there will not be a tremendous cloudburst' we
do not get 'If there is a tremendous cloudburst it will not rain', but rather
'If there will be (= is going to be) a tremendous cloudburst, it does not
rain'. Unfortunately, if we insist on the same rigour with respect to SCs,
we end up with ungrammatical sentences, for SCs always require a modal
auxiliary, mostly WOUld, in the consequent. and in the majority of cases do
not allow it in the antecedent (see Chapter 3 for a comprehensive
discussion). For similar reasons, the same difficulty arises when an attempt
is made to apply Modus Ponens to SCs, or, for that matter, to show the
correspondence between material implication and disjunction for SCs.
There is no need to discuss this separately here, for whatever applies to
Contraposition applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other logical operations.
So, the strict application of contraposition to (Ila) yields the
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ungrammatical (l lb) (the example is taken from Posch (l980:7):
(11) a. If you had remained silent, you would have been a
philosopher
b. If you would not have been a philosopher, you bad not
remained silent
It is to be noted that it is not the antecedent of (lib) which is necessarily
ungrammatical - only its consequent is. Hence it looks as if there is
nothing for it but to accept (lle) as the contrapositive of (l la):
(11) c. If you would not have been a philosopher, you would not have
remained silent
One may note here that the difficulty need not arise in Dutch, because in
that language both antecedent and consequent of a SC may contain either
zou ('would') + infmitive or a past tense.' Since, therefore, would in (11a)
may be there for granunatical reasons alone (compare the IC 'If you
remain silent, you're a philosopher'), we may, after all, be justified in
taking (11d) rather than (11c) as the 'correct' contrapositive of (11a):
(11) d. If you had not been a philosopher, you would not have
remained silent
Obviously, (11a) and (lid) carry opposite implications: a) can normally be
felicitously asserted only if the addressee did not, in fact, remain silent,
and d) only if he/she did. But (11a) no more means that the addressee did
not remain silent than (l ld) that the addressee was a philosopher: these are
pragmatic inferences which only seem to be an integral part of the
meaning. The real meaning of (11a), which is that in the hypothetical
world of the past that the speaker bas in mind, the addressee's silence
marked a philosophical attitude, is truth-functionally the same as the
conditional assertion made in (I Id), which is that in the hypothetical world
of the past, not being a philosopher meant not remaining silent (compare
again the IC 'If you remain silent, you're a philosopher', and its
contrapositive 'If you aren't a philosopher, you don't remain silent'). At
this point it may be recalled what I have written in Cb. 2 about the two
closely intertwined meanings of the past tense in conditional antecedents.
138 CHAPTER 6
According to the analysis presented there, a sentence like 'If you looked a
bit more honest, I would believe you' will be taken to mean not only that
the addressee does not look honest enough, which results in his being
disbelieved, but also that in a hypothetical world, in which the addressee
looks more honest, the speaker does believe himlher. It should by now be
clear that it is only the latter interpretation which can be said to belong
undefeasibly to the meaning proper.
One example (taken from Jackson 1987:85) allegedly proving that
Contraposition does not work for SCs, shows a striking similarity to one
already dealt with in the discussion of ICs and material implication (see
Chapter 5, sentence (8)):
(12) a. If it had rained, it would not have rained heavily
b. If it had rained heavily, it would not have rained
As one may expect, the failure of Contraposition to apply here has nothing
to do with (l2a) being an SC, but is due only to the incorrect assignment
of scope to the negative; when we rewrite (l2a) as 'If it had rained, it
would have rained lightly', contraposition yields 'If it had not rained
lightly, it would not have rained', which is simply an odd way of saying
that at that particular hypothetical moment in the past it only rained lightly
- which is also what (12a) conveys.
That contraposition does, in fact, work in SCs can be ascertained
relatively easily for those SCs that allegedly have future reference - not
surprisingly, since in these cases the pragmatic inference that the state of
affairs referred to in the antecedent does not in fact obtain, is less likely to
be made. An example is sentence (3), which, for the sake of convenience,
is here repeated as (13a):
(13) a. If someone stole my bike, I'd go to the police
b. If I didn't go to the police, someone would not steal my bike
Of course, the 'not going to the police' in (13b) should here be interpreted
as applying at some future date, and the consequent as applying at a
moment preceding that date: 'If at some moment in the future I did not go
to the police, someone would not have stolen my bicycle'. This is truth-
functionally the same as (l3a).
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Other arguments to show that reasoning by means of SCs does not go
according to the rules of material implication also resemble the ones
already discussed with respect to ordinary conditionals, and fail as well. It
has been noted by many writers, for example, that the alleged failure of
transitivity to apply to SCs is due to a change in the background as-
sumptions:
(14) Premises:
a. If J. Edgar Hoover had been a communist. he would have
been a trai tor
b. If J. Edgar Hoover had been born a Russian, he would have
been a communist
Conclusion:
c. If J. Edgar Hoover had been born a Russian, he would have
been a traitor
Now, as has been pointed out by, among others, Braine (1979: 40), the
context in which (l4a) holds is different from that in which (14b) holds: in
(14a) we automatically assume J. Edgar Hoover to have been born an
American. Therefore, to draw the conclusion in (14c) would be to violate
the ceteris paribus condition which was already seen to play such an
important role in ICs.
Closely related to transitivity is the logical operation that goes by the
name of 'strengthening the antecedent' (from 'if p then q', infer 'if p and
r, then q'), which according to, among others, Stalnaker (1981: 48) fails to
apply in the case of SCs, although it is said to hold for ICs. Stalnaker's
example is the following:
(15) a. If this match were struck, it would light
b. If this match had been soaked in water overnight and it were
struck, it would light
This, of course, violates the ceteris paribus condition in the same way in
which it was violated by the conclusion to (14) in the last Chapter. There
is nothing in the application of 'Strengthening the antecedent' to SCs,
therefore, that does not also hold for its application to ICs.
Summarizing, the only new argument against material implication as a
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basis of analysis for conditionals is that adduced by Posch (op.cit), who
regards the negation of antecedent and consequent as an inherent part of
the meaning of a CS, which, as we have seen, is an untenable assumption.
The conclusion must be, then, that like ordinary conditionals SCs behave
exactly in accordance with the rules of material implication (but with
respect to an imaginary world), and that logically there is no difference
between ICs and SCs. This conclusion is what we should want it to be for
at least four reasons: first, logic is concerned with the preservation of truth
in complex sentences rather than with the domain about which declarative
sentences have something to assert, so that for the correctness of our
reasoning it should make no difference whether the world we are talking
about is the real or a hypothetical one; a second reason (closely linked
with the first) is that we can now understand, at least partially, why there
is such a high incidence of conditionals with indicative antecedents and
subjunctive consequents (and vice versa): such half-way switches from one
domain (i.e. the real world) to another (i.e. an imaginary one) simply leave
the correctness of the reasoning unaffected (this should not be construed as
an argument in favour of calling such sentences grammatical); third, in the
same way in which it would be highly undesirable for there to be
differences between the reasoning that goes on in natural language and that
of (classical) logic, so it would be undesirable for there to be two types of
reasoning in natural language, one being valid for real-world conditionals,
and the other for hypothetical conditionals.
The most important reason of all is probably something that was already
hinted at in the previous section: any SC can be rewritten as an IC with
the addition of 'in the imaginary world inside my head'. Since the last
chapter has made it at least not entirely implausible that ICs may, after all,
behave truth-functionally, it is difficult to see why an IC with the above
addition should suddenly fail to behave in the same way.
Unfortunately, there are (pairs 00 conditional sentences that at first glance
do seem to prove that there is a logical difference between lCs and SCs.
One of the standard examples is the following (taken from Lewis 1973: 3):
(16) a. If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, then someone else did
b. If Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy, then someone else would
have
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Since the first seems obviously true (Kennedy was, in fact. killed), whereas
the second is a very dubious claim that would only be affirmed by
someone with weird views about historical necessity, it seems that. after
all, it cannot be maintained that ICs and SCs are logically the same. But,
as was argued by Barwise (1986:29), it is at least doubtful whether (16b)
should indeed be considered the hypothetical equivalent of (16a). Instead,
Barwise suggests that (16c) should be looked upon as (16b)'s equivalent
(16) c. If Oswald hasn't killed Kennedy, then someone else will have
Assuming, says Barwise, that one of the conspiracy theories is correct, this
sentence could be uttered, a short while after the time of the murder, by
the mastermind behind the assassination, who had several marksmen lined
up along the route, and who was not watching the scene of the crime
himself. Some years later, he might utter (16b), which then seems to make
just about the same claim as (16c).
Although Barwise's solution is ingenious, it cannot be the whole story,
for it is clear that in a great many pairs which show a marked resemblance
to (16a) and (16b) no difficulties arise at all:
(17) a. If someone stole my bike, I went to the police
b. If someone had stolen my bike, I would have gone to the
police
So what is it that makes the pair in (17) different from (16a) and (16b)? I
suggest that it is the type of reasoning involved. According to Bradley &
Swartz (1979: 266-7) a distinction should be made between 'logical',
'causal' and 'stochastic' reasoning. For our present purposes it is enough
to distinguish between logical or causal reasoning on the one hand, and
stochastic reasoning on the other. Now, in both (17a) and (lTh) the
reasoning is of the stochastic type, i.e. the link between antecedent and
consequent is free in the sense that it is up to the speaker to decide what
he will do in the circumstances specified in the antecedent. Therefore (17a)
and (17b) are logically the same (it makes no logical difference that only
the former can be uttered by someone who actually possessed a bicycle).
No freedom of choice, however, exists in the case of (16a), for there the
consequent is a matter of logical necessity, and hence what we are dealing
with is not stochastic but logical reasoning. In (l6b), on the other hand, the
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logical necessity found in (16a) no longer holds: the consequent contains
no more than the speaker's personal view regarding the hypothetical past
situation in which Oswald did not kill Kennedy. As in (17a) and (17b),
therefore, the reasoning in (l6b) is of the stochastic type. Note that it is
absurd to respond to an SC like (l7b) by saying 'that's true', and that such
a response to (17a) is only possible when one knows from personal
experience that the speaker was indeed in the habit of going to the police
whenever his bicycle had been stolen. To (16a) on the other hand, there is
nothing for it but to reply 'that's true', whereas the only appropriate
response to (16b) would be something like 'not necessarily'.
Summing up, whereas Stalnaker looks upon (16a) and (16b) as evidence
that ICs and SCs are logicaUy different, my view is that (16a) and (l6b)
prove no such thing. It may be that Barwise is right, and that (l6c) rather
than (16b) is the subjunctive equivalent of (16a), but there is yet another
possibility: there may be ICs which have no subjunctive version, and, vice
versa, SCs which, at least at first sight, seem to lack an indicative
counterpart (for further details, and for a different view of the alleged
correspondence of Past SCs and Past ICs, see the next chapter). Sentence
(16a) may belong tho the former category. That there may be conditionals
which do and others which do not have subjunctive counterparts is, in fact,
also the view taken by Ellis (1984: 54). However, from the fact that (16a)
is different from (l6d):
(16) a. If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did
d. If Oswald does not kill Kennedy, then someone else will
Ellis also concludes that at least one of these sentences cannot be truth-
functional, which, in my view, is something that does not necessarily
follow. For (l6a) is an instance of logical reasoning, whereas the
consequent of (16d) is no more than a prediction, so that the sentence as a
whole is an instance of stochastic reasoning. The sentences can easily be
rewritten in such a way that they need not be looked upon as truth-
functionally the same at all:
(16) a' If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then it follows necessarily
that someone else did
(16) b' If Oswald does not kill Kennedy, then I predict that someone
else will
THE SEMANflCS OF SUBJUNCfJVE CONDmONALS 143
But even apart from this, it is not clear to me why only one of two
conditionals which differ only with respect to tense can be truth-functional,
as Ellis clearly suggests. To take a different pair, the reasoning in each of
which is of the stochastic type, why should the truth-functionality of (100)
entail the non-truth-functionality of (l6b)? In other words: it seems strange
to insist that tense has no role to play in truth-functionality.
(16) a. If I don't go to the opera, I (will) go to the cinema
b. If I didn't go to the opera, I went to the cinema
In order to silence those who would still maintain that if (l6a) is truth-
functional, then (l6b) cannot be (or vice versa), we might perhaps add
nowadays to the antecedent of the former, and in those days to that of the
latter.
4 Truth and falsehood
I now return to the subject of truth and falsehood in conditional sentences.
There are a number of things that can be said about the truth of
conditional sentences in general, the most important of which are, first,
that no user of a conditional sentence is ever committed to the truth of the
antecedent, and, second, that a speaker using a conditional sentence is
contingently committed to the truth of its consequent (cf. Gamut 1982:
264); that is, as soon as the antecedent has materialized, the commitment
becomes operative. It would therefore be wrong to say that in conditional
sentences there is no commitment to either p or q.
Antecedents are non-assertive; that is, they do not assert, and since only
assertions can be true or false, antecedents cannot be said to be either.
When I say: 'If you touch that vase, I'll kill you', I do not assert anything
with respect to your touching that vase - nor do I assume that you touch or
will touch it. I only lay down the condition that your touching the vase
will result in my killing you. And when I say: 'If you touched that vase. I
would kill you', I am not making any hypothetical claim with respect to
your touching that vase either, nor am I hypothetically assuming that you
touch that vase, or making the minimal revisions to my stock of beliefs
required to assume the antecedent (a procedure which goes by the name of
'Ramsey's test' - see Chapter 1). So antecedents of SCs are not factually
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true or false either. Antecedents, whether of ICs or of SCs, are givens, on
the basis of which we either make predictions or incur commitments
(stochastic reasoning), or draw logical or causal conclusions (logical or
causal reasoning).
The clearest evidence that the antecedents of SCs never contain anything
that might be labelled an 'assertion' is provided by those (numerous)
conditionals (both ICs and SCs) whose antecedents have the form of a
non-finite phrase. The sentences in (l7a) and (17b), and those in (17c) and
(l7d), clearly mean the same thing:
(17) a. To do a thing like that will be foolish of you
b. If you do a thing like that. it will be foolish of you
c. To do a thing like that would be foolish of you
d. If you did a thing like that, it would be foolish of you
The 'antecedent' of (l7c) does nothing but specify which is the
hypothetical action that the speaker considers foolish. It would be odd, to
say the least. even to try to label 'to do a thing like that' true or false.
Barwise (1986: 28) discusses the sentences in (18), the indicative
counterparts of the famous VerdilBizet pair (also to be discussed below),
and says that the statements could be made by less knowledgeable
contemporaries of Bizet and Verdi:'
(18) a. If Bizet and Verdi are compatriots, then Bizet is Italian
b. If Bizet and Verdi are compatriots, then Verdi is French
Barwise's view is that on the material conditional account. both sentences
are true since their antecedents are false, and then says: 'Imagine someone
who knows that Verdi is Italian, knows what it means for two people to be
compatriots, but does not know the nationality of Bizet'. Such a person,
according to Barwise, is in a position to make an informative statement by
means of (18a). But is seems to me that. precisely because of the
circumstances sketched by Barwise, the antecedent of (18a) must be looked
upon as (hypothetically) true, for it is on the truth of 'Bizet and Verdi are
compatriots' that the speaker of (l8a), who, after aU, does not know
whether or not they are compatriots, bases his conclusion that Bizet is
Italian; and even if the speaker were a professional logician, he would be
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forced to admit that this is not a vacuous truth.
In order to see that in itself the antecedent of (18a) should not be looked
upon as false, consider sentences like (l8c) and (l8d):
(18) c. If Bizet and Verdi are compatriots, France and Italy must have
become one country
d. If Bizet and Verdi are compatriots, I'll eat my hat
These conditionals are certainly not vacuously true, although according to
Barwise they probably would be. Even (l8d), which can only be uttered by
someone who holds the ftrm belief that Bizet and Verdi are not
compatriots, must not be looked upon as having a false antecedent
Of course, the antecedents in (18a) and (18b) can also be put to a
different use. They could be used to prove that Bizet and Verdi are not
compatriots, although it is clear that in that case an SC would be a more
likely choice. But it is possible for a speaker to use (18a) and then to say:
but since I happen to know that Bizet is French, I conclude that for the
whole conditional to be true, the antecedent must have been false in the
ftrst place. In that case the conditional can be classed with the (by now)
famous sentence about the Pope and the Empress of China But we can
only decide that the antecedent must have been false when we have seen
the consequent Until we have, we have no option but to consider them
hypothetically true. To make this even clearer, consider (19):
(19) If water boils at 800 C, it must have been heated at a certain
height
Since under normal circumstances water boils at 1000 C, an
undiscriminating logician might declare (19) to be vacuously true, which it
certainly is not if anything, it is the truth, not the falsehood, of the
antecedent which makes the whole conditional true.
There are many conditional sentences the consequents of which do
nothing but defme whatever it is that the antecedent is about; although (19)
may also be said to belong to that category, sentence (20), which has
already been discussed, probably provides a clearer case in point:
(20) If you're invisible, no one can see you
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To say here that the sentence is vacuously true because the antecedent is
false is to miss a point that, by now, should not need to be laboured any
longer.
What sentences (l8a,b,c), (17) and (20) have in common is that they are
all instances of logical reasoning. Since for the correctness of our logical
reasoning (stochastic reasoning cannot ever be said to be 'correct' - see,
for example, (18d» it does not matter what we choose as premises,
anything can function as an antecedent, even if it violates a logical or
analytical truth, as in (21):
(21) If bachelors are married, I don't know the meaning of the word
bachelor
Here, too, we have to do with a hypothetically true antecedent - unless,
again, the speaker wishes to indicate that it is a blatant falsehood that be
does not know the meaning of the word bachelor, and that therefore
bachelors cannot be married.
As antecedents of ICs are bypothetically true, so are those of SCs.,It is not
surprising that attempts to describe the logic of SCs which start from the
assumption that the antecedents of SCs are false, should end in disaster. In
the discussion of individual sentences I have made it clear that any
antecedent of an SC must be treated as true, and that the real-world truth
of the antecedent situation or event is simply irrelevant to its imaginary-
world truth. To talk of the antecedent situation or event in an SC as 'an
unrealized possibility' is to make the fundamental error of not seeing that
the possibility in question IS realized, namely in the speaker's head.
To draw a simple comparison: a stage director assigning roles to the
members of his theatrical company may, during the preparation of a
performance, say to one of his actors: 'You're Hamlet'. It would be an
absurd reaction of this player to respond with: 'But that's not true!' Yet, if
one calls the antecedent of an SC false (in this world), one makes exactly
the same error. To pursue the comparison a little further: if the actor in
question, after accepting his role, goes about in the theatre telling everyone
that he is Hamlet, he will be congratulated; if, on the other band, he goes
out into the street saying the same thing to passers-by, people will
probably call an ambulance.
That the quest for the truth of an SC in this world is a hopeless
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endeavour may be even clearer from the foUowing analogy: if, in
Amsterdam, I look at my watch and say: 'It is five o'clock', and my
interlocutor answers: 'Ah, but is that true in New York?" he overlooks the
fact that I am only making reference to my real world, i.e. the world in
which I am in Amsterdam. Now, for 'Amsterdam' read: 'an imaginary
world', and for New York 'the real world'; then the silliness of my
interlocutor is comparable to that of the person who wants to know
whether an SC I have uttered is true in real world. The best reply one can
make to such a person would probably be: 'Look, if I were talking about
the real world, I would be employing an IC'.
The truth of SCs is often discussed in the literature with respect to the
following pair, which was first mentioned by Quine (1950: 14), and the
indicative counterpart of which has already come under scrutiny:
(22) a. If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would have
been Italian
b. If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Verdi would have
been French
Again, both conditionals can be true (in some hypothetical world) - but not
given the same time and the same circumstances. Sentence (22a) can
truthfuUy be asserted when Verdi's nationality is taken to belong to the
background assumptions that remain unchanged, i.e. the 'ceteris paribus',
and for (22b) this same situation applies, with, of course, Verdi's
nationality replaced by Bizet's. The mistake made by Quine and others is
that they assume that somehow we should choose between (22a) and (22b),
since in their view it is obvious that only one of them can be true. My
position differs from Lewis', on whose analysis both (22a) and (22b) come
out false, and from that of Stalnaker, who claims that both sentences are
indeterminate in that they are neither true nor false (Harper et al.: 92). To
Stalnaker's question: 'Why should we be required to adjudicate?', his own
answer is that in cases like these we simply cannot, but my answer would
be that we can, and that aU we need to do is specify under what
circumstances a) comes out true, and under which (other) circumstances b)
does. But a verification of either (22a) or (22b) is, of course, impossible.
To insist that we should be able to decide which of the two is true is to try
to take the unwarranted step from stating the truth conditions of a sentence
to stating their truth or falsity.
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What has not been noted before in connection with the sentences in (22)
is that they can also be employed for an entirely different purpose, namely
to prove that the antecedent is false, or rather, that the indicative version of
the antecedent is: in that case the sentences belong to the same category as
sentence (lO) (,If I hated Mozart, I would not be sitting here'), which, I
repeat. should not be looked upon as having a false antecedent
Another example figuring prominently in the literature on the truth of
SCs and allegedly showing that establishing the truth of past SCs is an
tricky matter, is the following:
(23) a. If Caesar had been in charge in Vietnam, he would have used
a nuclear bomb
b. If Caesar had been in charge in Vietnam, he would have used
catapults
The reasoning in (23) seems to be of the stochastic rather than of the
logical/causal type, so that neither (23a) nor (23b) can ever be labelled true
or false with any certainty. But we can agree or disagree, depending on the
background assumptions with respect to Caesar's mental makeup, that we
share with the speaker. What we envisage in a) is a present-day Caesar,
who has all the accoutrements of modem warfare at his disposal; in b) it is
the Caesar of antiquity, who can only use what equipment was available in
those days. Needless to say, we make these mental adaptations on the basis
of the claim made in the consequent. Until we have heard it. we can have
no idea of the changes entailed by the antecedent. Recall Sanford's remark
(quoted in Chapter l) to the effect that the antecedent is not enough for us
to know what exactly the conditional is about In this respect Goldstick
(1978) has made an important contribution by postulating a mutatis
mutandis condition for SCs. One of the claims of his paper is that 'the
whole problem of counter/actual conditionals is the problem of fixing the
boundary between the appropriate mutanda and the cetera.' Goldstick's
cetera are, of course, the same thing as the 'ceteris paribus' discussed
before.
If the whole problem of SCs is to specify under what conditions they are
true, then what this means for the sentences in (23) is that a) is true if the
speaker is right in believing Caesar's character to have made it possible for
him to use nuclear weaponry, and that b) is true if the speaker is right in
believing that in Caesar's days a possible weapon, or possibly the ultimate
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weapon, was the catapult. which he would have been capable of using.
Hence both a) and b) can be agreed to, i.e. looked upon as true, although it
should be emphasized that they take us into different imaginary worlds,
and can therefore never be true at the same time, since that would violate
the ceteris paribus condition; and if either is true, it is of course true in an
imaginary world.
To give one fmal example of the confusion that sometimes arises as a
result of attempts to establish the truth-in-this-world of SCs, consider the
following pair, which only differs slightly from one already discussed (cf.
sentence (16) above, and which I take from Jackson (1987: 77):
(24) a. If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, no one did
b. If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, no one would have
Jackson makes a distinction between the probability of a conditional given
its antecedent and the probability of its consequent given its antecedent (a
distinction which I must admit I find it extremely difficult to grasp). For
ICs the probabilities are said to be identical; in the case of SCs the
situation is different: the two probabilities may either be identical, in which
case the assertibility of an IC and the corresponding SC will be the same;
or they may diverge, which is the case with SCs whose probability is
highly dependent on their antecedents. Now, Jackson calls (24a) 'highly
unassertible' and (24b) 'highly assertible' - which, to all intents and
purposes, may be regarded as meaning roughly the same as 'false' and
'true' respectively - but then Jackson continues about (24b) and says (I
quote in full, replacing his numbering by mine):
The (unconditional) probability of (24b) is very high, but its
conditional probability given its antecedent is very low. For given
that Oswald did not kiU Kennedy, the right thing to believe about
(24b) is, of course, that it has a true antecedent but - as even
given it was not Oswald, certainly someone killed Kennedy - a
false consequent, and so that (24b) is itself false. r ,
This certainly does not correct, and, apart from the assumption that (24a)
and (24b) are each other's indicative and subjunctive counterparts (which,
as we have seen, is at least questionable), Jackson's error seems to be to
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allow the real-world fact that Kennedy was killed to play a role in the
hypothetical, i.e. imaginary, world in which Oswald did not kill him. That
fact need not play a role at all. If I believe that there was no conspiracy,
and that therefore Oswald was the only killer, I can, by uttering (24b) ,
make a statement which I consider true. Indeed, when I utter (24b), it may
be precisely in order to convey this belief. But if I believe there was a
conspiracy, I would certainly contradict anyone who uttered (24b). So
whereas (24a) is a necessary truth (given the fact that Kennedy was killed,
and given the fact that the domain of (24a) is the real world), it is
impossible to label (24b) true or false. The only thing we can do is - I
repeat - specify the circumstances under which (24b) comes out true in an
imaginary world, and under which other circumstances it comes out false
in an imaginary world. Theories that make (24b) either true or false should
be eyed with extreme suspicion, as should theories that attempt to make it
true in the real world.
In summary, false antecedents do not occur in SCs, and are found only
sporadically in one very special type of IC. ICs and SCs which are
instances of logical or causal reasoning are capable of being labelled 'true'
or 'false'; ICs and SCs the reasoning in which is of the stochastic type in
principle are not, although there may be cases when they, too, can and will
be affirmed; whereas ICs can, in principle, be verified, SCs in principle
cannot - for whereas the domain of ICs is the real world, that of SCs is an
imaginary one; fmally, if an SC is labelled 'true', it must be looked upon
as true in an imaginary world. To ask whether it is true in the real world is
to ask the wrong question.
5 Conclusion
Anyone taking an interest in the logic of natural language, and especially
that of conditional sentences, should be careful to realize the following: a)
with one exception, all antecedents of conditional sentences are to be
looked upon as true, or at any rate true for the sake of the argument, the
only exception occurring in one type of IC - in SCs, therefore, false
antecedents do not occur; b) there is no point in trying to decide whether
any SC is true in the real world, since any sentence can only be true with
respect to its proper domain, the domain of SCs being an imaginary world;
c) the ceteris paribus condition must be satisfied.
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Once all this is taken into account, all conditional sentences will be seen
to behave exactly in accordance with the rules of classical logic i.e. truth-
functionally.
For a discussion of the non-logical differences between the two types of
CS, see Chapters 1 and 7.
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Notes to chapter 6
1. Tarski's truth-criterion can, by the way, be easily adapted to
cover non-declarative sentences: to know the meaning of a
sentence is to know under what circumstances it is appropriate;
and it stands to reason that for a declarative sentence to be
appropriate the first requirement is for it to be true.
2. So, if (11) is translated into Dutch, Contraposition yields a
sentence which many people will accept as grammatical,
although it would be classed under the 'odd' sentences in the
enumeration of the possibilities in Chapter 2, section 5: Als je
niet gezwegen zou hebben, was je filosoof geweest ('If you would
not have been silent, you had not been a philosopher).
Unfortunately, this sentence is not really very much easier to
interpret as something that does not imply the negation of its
IC version than is 'If you had not remained silent, you would
not have been a philosopher').
3. As a matter of historical fact, Verdi could not really be called
Italian during Bizet's lifetime, since in those days Italy did not
yet exist as one country.
Chapter 7
THE PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS OFCONDn10NALS
COMPARED
1 Preliminary remarks
As there is no limit to the things one can do with language, a chapter on
pragmatics must necessarily be incomplete; by the same token, a grammar
that 'ventures out into the pragmatic cold' is doomed to incompleteness.
There is some irony in the fact that despite this inherent incompleteness,
such a grammar runs the risk of becoming very much fatter than one that
limits itself to the semantics of a language - although it is highly doubtful
whether such a grammar (i.e. such a grammatical textbook) exists at all.
Grammars are often intended for learners, who, for practical reasons, need
not, and indeed, should not be bothered with the often very subtle dividing
line between pragmatic and semantic aspects of meaning. But from the
point of view of the researcher, the distinction is essential, since if aspects
which are ultimately pragmatic are counted as semantic, all hope must be
given up that the semantics of a natural language can ever be described.
The last two chapters have tried to show that semantically, or at any rate
logically, ICs and SCs do not differ; at the same time, it is clear to every
language user that there are considerable differences between the two types
of conditional. Gibbard (1981: 239) goes so far as to claim that the two
types of conditional 'have distinct jobs, and do them in ways that have
little important in common'. Against this view I would argue that ICs and
SCs do exactly the same jobs, and do them in ways which are very
similar, but that the fact that they have something to say about totally
different domains causes them sometimes to be spectacularly different
The view that will be defended below is that the pragmatic differences
between ICs and SCs follow automatically from the fact that the former
are about the real world and the latter about an imaginary one. Since for
'imaginary world' one may read 'possible world', it goes without saying
that ICs should not be looked upon as also being about possible worlds.
The issue will be discussed in detail below.
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2 ICs and possible worlds
The view that, like SCs, ICs are about possible worlds, has the advantage
of being more general than a theory which only accords possible-world
status to SCs. It is defended by Stalnaker and Davies, who postulate the
existence of a selection function, which selects the actual world whenever
possible, which means whenever the antecedent is true in the actual world.
Jackson (1987) contains a number of cogent arguments against a
possible-world theory for ICs, the most convincing of which, in my view,
is the following (op.cit.: 75):
If you accept both 'B is not the way things actually are' and 'If A
had been the case, B would have been the case', you say 'If A
had been the case, things would have been different from the way
they actually are'. But even if you accept both 'B is not the way
things are' and 'If A is the case, B is the case', you do not say 'If
A is the case, things are different from the way they actually are'.
This leads Jackson to conclude that 'indicative conditionals do not take us
from the actual world at aU'.
Another argument against the possible world view for ICs may be the
inherent ambiguity of virtually all SCs; consider, for example, sentence (1),
which was also discussed in Chapter I:
(1) If she played the Schubert as an encore, she would leave out the
repeats
Besides the subjunctive interpretation there is the past-habit one: 'whenever
she played .. .', which is the most likely reading when the context contains
a description of what things were like in a particular past situation. In such
a case the conditional is, of course, a (past) Ie. Now, presumably, if the
proponents of the possible world view for both ICs and SCs are right,
listeners will first recreate a possible world inside their heads, only tater to
conclude that there was a past moment at which the real world coincided
with the possible one, so that the possible world in question was the real,
past one after all. This, it seems to me, would call for a rather complicated
interpretative mechanism, and it seems preferable to assume that in the
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absence of evidence to the contrary, conditionals are about the real world;
that is if, in a present tense context, if + a past tense is used, the listener
will automatically assume that a switcb to an imaginary (i.e. a possible
world) is being made by the speaker. Wben, by contrast, if + past tense is
used in a past context, the listener will correctly surmise that the
conditional concerns the real world of the past. Similarly, if in a past
context a speaker uses if + a Pluperfect, it will be assumed that a switcb is
being made to an imaginary past world; but wben the same Pluperfect is
used in a past-in-the-past context, a listener will correctly take it that the
conditional concerns the real, past world seen from a past-in-the past
viewpoint.
There is a third argument against the view that ICs are about possible
worlds. It bas to do with the fact that some ICs do not allow themselves to
be turned into SCs without a radical change in their truth-value, for the
simple reason that the (contingent) claim they are make depends on
matters of bistorical fact - a dependence that is lost as soon as the link
with these matters is severed. Sucb a severance takes place wben an IC
that is situated in the past is rewritten as an Sc. An illustration is provided
by the following example, which already figured prominently in Cbapter 6:
(2) If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, someone else did
Even if we accept that the antecedent takes us into a possible world in
which Oswald did not kill Kennedy, there is no doubt that the wbole
conditional applies to the real world, since the necessity of its truth
crucially depends on the real-world fact that Kennedy was killed. The
proponents of the possible-world view for ICs seem to want to bave their
cake and eat it, since in their possible world in wbicb Oswald did not kill
Kennedy, Kennedy was nevertheless killed.
Sentences like (2), the SC 'counterparts' (as was argued in Chapter 6, the
sentence probably has no SC counterpart) of wbicb differ radically in
meaning, show a measure of similarity with conditionals wbicb cannot be
turned into SCs at all (for example, 'If 2 + 2 make 4, ...', also to be
discussed below). In both types of sentences a crucial dependence can be
seen on things that we know actually to be the case. Now, if both the non-
existent SC *'If 2 + 2 made 4, ...' and its IC version are about possible
worlds, it seems bard to explain wby the IC version is perfectly acceptable.
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By far the strongest argument against the claim that both ICs and SCs
are about possible worlds remains, however, the fact that they are
grammatically distinct (see also Chapter 1). Every speaker of a language
that possesses a construction comparable with an English 'subjunctive',
immediately recognizes this distinction, no matter the strength of the terms
in which linguists like Dudman or Comrie condemn it. And there can be
no doubt that psychologically the distinction is as real as it is
grammatically. I take it to be a psychological truth that any speaker of
English recognizes an IC as being about the real world, and any SC as
about an imaginary world.
3 Degrees of probability
Many textbooks on English grammar explain the difference between ICs
and SCs in terms of the (im)probability of the events/situations referred to
in the antecedent. That probability has no role to play there at all, should,
however, be clear from the following sentence (if it has not already
become clear from the discussion in Chapter 4):
(3) If it rains, the match will be played inside, and if it does not rain,
the match wiu be played outside
If a present tense in an antecedent made the situation or event referred to
in any way probable, sentence (3) would contain a contradiction. Since it
clearly does not, it follows that speakers are entitled to regard the event or
situation referred to in the antecedent as (un)likely as they please.
It is also doubtful whether probability has a role to play in SCs; for
further arguments (also with respect to should in conditional antecedents)
see Chapter 4.
One of the proponents of the probability-thesis is Comrie, who argues for a
scale of hypotheticality - a continuum, that is, from high hypotheticality, as
expressed by SCs, to low hypotheticality, as expressed by ICs. The
argument is based on a) the fact that the negation of the proposition
expressed in the antecedent is not part of the meaning of SCs, as Comrie
rightly observes (see the last chapter); and b) the fact that in a number of
cases, such as when we are referring to the future, it does not matter very
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much whether we use an IC or a Se. Here is Comrie's (1986: 88)
definition of 'hypotheticality':
'The degree of probability of realization of the situations referred
to in the conditional, and more especially in the protasis ... a
factual sentence would represent the lowest degree of
hypotheticaIity, while a counter- factual clause would represent
the highest degree.'
This definition is infelicitous since, first, even in the antecedents of what
Comrie calls factual sentences (by which we may assume he means ICs), it
is possible to refer to quite unlikely or even impossible propositions, for
example, 'If you travel at ten times the speed of light'; 'If the back of the
moon is made of green cheese'; etc.). Antecedents like these seem to
suggest that the whole idea of probability playing a role in the semantics
of conditional sentences is fundamentally mistaken.
This also goes for SCs, which may contain antecedents the indicative
version of which are capable of becoming true (e.g. 'If John came
tomorrow'); this, of course, is something Comrie adduces as evidence that
ICs and SCs are basically similar.
The word probability should have no place in a definition of
hypotheticaIity. Hypothetically, anything can be the case, and everyone is
free to consider any antecedent, be it of an IC or of an SC, as (un)likely as
they please. But the domains of ICs and SCs remain the real world and the
world of the imagination respectively. That sometimes an imaginary world
is capable of materializing does not make the SC that made reference to it
an Ie. There is no such thing as a scale on wbich the real world gradually
sbades off into an imaginary one. The fact that in a particular situation it
does not really matter whether we use one construction rather than another
(the standard case being when we are referring to the future), does not
make the two constructions the same, or even similar, and certainly does
not provide an argument for a scale of bypotheticality. Nor is sucb an
argument provided by the fact that the only difference between ICs and
SCs that bave 'future' reference is felt, by many speakers, to be one of
remoteness. See also the next section.
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4 Differences IC - SC
What follows below is a list of arguments to show that the difference
between ICs and SCs is always a fundamental one, even in those cases
where it does not really matter which is used.
First of all, as has been pointed out by, among others, Appiah (1985:
161fO, both antecedent and consequent of ICs can often stand on their
own, i.e. are ordinary indicative sentences. This is never the case with SCs.
So, whereas (4a) could be said to correspond with (4b) (but see belowl),
(Sa) does not correspond with (5b), or (6a) with (6b):
(4) a. If Mary is coming, John is coming, too
b. Mary is coming
(5) a. If Mary were coming, so would John
b. *Mary were coming
(6) a. If Mary had come, John would have
b. Mary had come
It should be stressed that the correspondence between the antecedent of
(4a) and (4b) is really an accident.,since the latter is assertive, whereas the
former is not; in order to see this, all that is needed is the addition of a so-
called negative polarity item to antecedents like the one in (4a): 'If Mary is
doing any work tonight' no longer has a (4b)-like counterpart. In Chapter 1
mention has already been made of Dudman' s stance with respect to
antecedents which are, and those which are not, independent sentences of
English, and of his conclusion that the division of CSs into ICs and SCs is
wrong in principle and that, rather, the categorization of CSs should be
based precisely on the question whether or not antecedent and consequent
can stand on their own. See Chapter l.
As was pointed out in the last chapter, the fact that antecedents of SCs
are never sentences of English means that it is impossible to carry out such
simple logical operations as Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens on SCs as
they stand. However, it was made clear at the same time there is no reason
to conclude that therefore SCs are not truth-functional.
Second, SCs whose purpose it is to show that the proposition contained in
the antecedent must be false (which is not the same thing as saying that
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the antecedent is false!), do not. at first sight. seem to be capable of being
reformulated as an IC:
(7) a. If I hated Mozart, I would not be sitting here
b. ?If I hate Mozart, I'm not sitting here
Although, of course, (7b) is an unacceptable sentence, it may be argued
that its oddity is pragmatic in nature - for if the English language lacked a
hypothetical conditional construction, a sentence like (7b) might well be
used to express precisely what is expressed by (7a). It might, therefore, be
argued that it is the existence of the construction in (7a) which makes (7b)
odd. It is to be noted that (7b) can be made to sound a lot better, or even
perfectly acceptable, if the antecedent is rewritten as 'If, in an imaginary
world. I hate Mozart', or, slightly less awkward, 'In an imaginary world in
which I hate Mozart'. If this is true, it has important consequences, for if
any SC can be rewritten as an IC, it can no longer be maintained that the
two types of conditional differ as regards truth-functionality: if ICs are
truth-functional, then so are SCs.
At this point a generalization may be ventured on: there are, it would
seem to me, no SCs which cannot be reworded as ICs with 'if replaced by
'in the or an imaginary world in which ...'. Below it will be shown that the
reverse does not hold.
ICs whose purpose it is to prove that the proposition contained in the
protasis must be false, cannot be reformulated by means of an SC without
at least some loss of irony:
(8) a. If you're the Pope, I'm the Empress of China
b. ?If you were the Pope, I'd be the Empress of China
Akatsuka (1986: 334) discusses sentences of type (8a), and calls them
'indicative counterfactuals', adding that he has never come across a
principled discussion of the difference between the two types of
counterfactual.
What follows is meant to be such a principled discussion. The crucial
point about sentences like (8a) is that they purport to make a true
statement about affairs in the real world - as any declarative IC does -, and
that they do so on the basis of something which is first presented as true-
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for-the-sake-of-the-argument - as any antecedent is - but which must be
reinterpreted as false - as, indeed, any ironic statement must be -, in order
to salvage the truth of the whole conditional; for, since the consequent is
patently, i.e. observably, false, and meant to be understood as such at that.
a true antecedent would result in a false conditional. But a false antecedent
licenses (= makes true) any conditional in which occurs, a fact on which
the speaker in (8a) capitalizes.
The reason why the irony is lost in (8b) is that in a hypothetical world in
which the addressee is the Pope, it is not entirely inconceivable for the
speaker to be the Empress of China, so that the consequent ceases to
contain an observable falsehood.
Recall, at this point, what I have said about the term 'counterfactual' in
Chapter 1: it is an infelicitous term because SCs, including Past SCs, do
not mean the negation of the proposition contained in antecedent or
consequent. One might say, therefore, that subjunctive counterfactuals do
not exist at all, and that Akatsuka is wrong in labelling (8b) a subjunctive
CF. But he is certainly right in labelling (Sa) an indicative CF. Only
sentences of type (Sa) make conditional claims which are true by virtue of
a false antecedent and a false consequent, and hence the conclusion is
warranted that the only true CF that English and Dutch have is the
indicative one.
Sentences like (Sa) need not necessarily force the conclusion that the
antecedent is false; it may also be used by one actor in conversation with
another, in which case, of course, it is the assignment of roles which is at
issue, so that the domain of the sentence is a subdomain of the real world
(i.e. the theatrical subworld) rather than the real world itself.
Fourth, ICs the antecedents of which are known to be true, and which
consequently can only be concerned with the correctness of the reasoning,
cannot be reformulated as SCs:
(9) a. If 2 + 2 = 4, then 4 - 2 = 2
b. ?If 2 + 2 were 4, then 4 - 2 would be 2
What makes (9b) odd is the fact that '2 + 2 = 4' is presented as applying
to an imaginary world, so that, presumably, it does not apply to the real
one - which it does. If there is one type of sentence whose natural domain
is the real world, it is, of course, a scientific statement. It should be noted,
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however, that even though the proposition contained in the antecedent of
(9a) is true, the speaker is not committed to its truth, since no speaker is
ever committed to the truth of an antecedent.
At this point a caveat is in order, for there are sentences which are
concerned with 'scientific' reasoning, but which do seem allow formulation
by means of both ICs and SCs:
(l0) a. If you're invisible, no one can see you
b. If you were invisible, no one would be able to see you
Although (lOb) looks like the subjunctive counterpart of (lOa), this is only
the case to the extent that if in (lOa) does not mean 'whenever'. Sentence
(lOa), in which if can be replaced by when, is ambiguous in that it can
have either specific or generic meaning; sentence (lOb) only has the
former. So whereas (lOa) can be looked upon as a defmition as invisibility,
(lOb) cannot. This should cause no surprise, since generic statements may
be said to apply everywhere - so that we may take it that they also apply
to imaginary worlds. And indeed, (lOa) applies everywhere, in all possible
worlds. If, on the other band, (lOb) were a generic statement, it would also
apply to the real world - which would be a fatal blow to its very raison
d' etre. Hence the fact that in SCs if never means 'whenever', and can
never be replaced by when. To the best of my knowledge, no one bas ever
addressed the question why the meaning 'whenever' is not available for if
in SCs. But that question has now been answered: general rules apply
everywhere. To further illustrate this, notice that althougb there is nothing
wrong with (lOc), (lOd) looks very odd indeed:
(10) c. If someone is invisible, no one can see bim
d. *If someone were invisible, no one would be able to see him
The reason for (lOd)'s oddity is twofold. First there is the violation of the
rule that in SCs if does not have generic meaning; second there is the
pragmatic implication that 'someone is not invisible', whicb is a very
strange thing to imply, even though it may well be true, and is completely
beside the point if all the speaker is trying to do is defme invisibility -
which, as the consequent shows, is precisely what he is doing.
Sentences (8) to (10) together warrant the conclusion that there are ICs
which cannot be rewritten as SCs. Above we bave seen that the reverse
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does not hold, and it is not difficult to see why: when conditional
reasoning takes place which depends crucially on events which we know
actually to have taken place in the real world (such as 'someone killed
Kennedy' - see the last chapter), or on propositions that we know to be
true (such as '2 + 2 make 4'), a switch to a construction that refers to an
imaginary world would suggest that these events or facts only belong to
the world of the imagination - which they do not. ICs in which such
reasoning goes on are no longer 'open' in the sense in which most
ordinary ICs are. It is, in other words, precisely the real world which
prevents some ICs from having SC counterparts.
What sentences like (9a) and (lOb) also make clear is that SCs cannot be
used for generic statements, i.e. statements that lay down rules of whatever
kind. This explains why (IIa), despite its awkwardness, is just possible,
whereas (II b) is unacceptable:
(11) a. If airplanes crashed (all the time), people would prefer to
travel by train
b. *If airplanes crashed, all the passengers would be killed
Although in 01a) it is no doubt the continual crashing that causes people
to look for other means of transport, the link between antecedent and
consequent is stochastic rather than causal in nature. In (lIb) the link is
(exclusively) causal, and there is the suggestion of a general rule also
applicable to the real world. In (11a), but not in (11b), the implication
'airplanes do not crash' makes sense, which proves that the sentence is not
a general statement also covering the real world. Note that the IC versions
of the two SCs are 'If airplanes crash (all the time), people will prefer to
travel by train' and 'If airplanes crash, all the passengers are killed'
respectively. In the last sentence If can be replaced by Whenever, and the
unacceptability (lIb) is thus comparable to that of (lOd), the only
difference being that the reasoning in the former is (purely) causal, and
that in the latter (purely) logical in nature.
Above, I have argued that every SC can be rewritten as an IC if the
antecedent is rewritten as 'in the or an imaginary world in which'.
Sentences (11) to (13) all seem at first sight to be cases in point.
(12) a. If I were rich, I'd buy a motor yacht
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b. ?If I am rich, I'll buy a motor yacht
(13) a. If I knew the answer, I would give it to you
b. ?If I know the answer, I win give it to you
Sentences (7a) and (7b) (,If I liked Mozart, I would not be sitting here'
and ?'If I like Mozart. I am not sitting here) also fit into this list, of
course. Recall that the oddity of (7b) was attributed to the existence of its
subjunctive variant. It need cause no surprise that, given the existence of
the subjunctive construction, we do not use (7b) or the other b)-sentences
above, since it is unusual, to say the least, to present as uncertain
something that we are not at all uncertain about, namely whether or not we
are rich, and whether or not we know certain things. The reason why it is
worthwhile to discuss sentences like (7), (12) and (13) again is that adding
'in the or an imaginary world' is not the only way to make the b)-
sentences acceptable. This can also be achieved by selecting a different
consequent:
(7) c. If I like Mozart, that does not mean I have to buy the whole
Philips collection
(12) c. If I am rich, I don't have to throw money away, do I?
(13) c. If I know the answer, I am supposed to press the green button
What makes these new ICs acceptable has to do with the type of link
between antecedent and consequent. In (7c) the situation is like that in
02c), in which the speaker is not concerned with the question whether or
not he is rich - his only concern is with what is implied by being rich (or
rather with what is not implied by it), and 1 can be taken to mean 'one',
i.e. people in general. The reasoning is of the logical kind. In (l3c) the
reasoning is, of course, not logical or causal, but the sentence does make a
generic statement, which is why If can be replaced by When.
It seems, then, that the only subjunctive antecedent that can only be
rewritten as an indicative one if 'in the or an imaginary world' is added to
it (mutatis mutandis) is a sentence with an antecedent like the one in (14):
(14) If I were you, I'd do it
The reason why we never use 'I am you' as a basis for our reasoning is
that it is necessarily false. It is probably only in the theatrical (sub)world
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that a conditional beginning with 'If 1 am you' would make any sense at
all.
Fifth, as 1 have pointed out elsewhere (Chapter 4), certain implications
with respect to states of affairs in the real world (not surprisingly!) hold in
the case of ICs, but not in SCs:
(15) a. If 1 win the football pools I'll go on a holiday
b. If 1 won the football pools I'd go on a holiday
The first. but not the second sentence can be uttered by someone who does
not play in the football pools. This, in my view, also counts as a strong
argument against a possible-worlds theory for ICs.
Sixth, since, as 1 have also argued in Chapter 4, hypothetically anything
can be the case, it is possible for the antecedent of a CS to contain utterly
impossible propositions, e.g. 'If 1 were a mouse ...'. (Notice that the
impossible proposition in question is not *'1 were a mouse' or 'I was 1
mouse' but 'I am a mouse") One would have to think of a very bizarre set
of circumstances in order to make 'If 1 am a mouse', an acceptable
sentence pertaining to the real world (when the domain is the theatrical
subworld there is again no problem). Obviously, this is also connected with
the fifth point made above. Notice that this kind of impossibility is
different from that discussed above (,If you travel at 18 times the speed of
Iight...'), since one can credit the ordinary speaker of a language with
knowledge as to whether or not he is a mouse, but hardly with a
knowledge of the laws of physics.
The only argument that Comrie has left is that based on the
interchangeability of ICs and SCs in one particular set of circumstances,
viz. when the CS clearly has 'future' meaning. Compare Johnson-Laird
(1986: 66), who says that. when reference is being made a some possible
future event. the only distinction between ICs and SCs is that in the latter
case the possibility is more remote. , A case in point might be the
following:
(16) a. If somebody steals my bike, I'll go to the police
b. If somebody stole my bike, I'd go to the police
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But even if a) and b) are interchangeable in most circumstances, it does
not follow that they always are; and it is not difficult to think of situations
where b), but no a), can be used, the simplest case being that in which the
speaker has no bicycle (see also 15) above). But - more importantly - the
assumption that a) and b) mean the same when the speaker does possess a
bicycle is also mistaken. Since in b) the speaker is referring to an
imaginary event with a certain imaginary consequence, the whole
conditional could be said to apply now, i.e. at the moment of speaking. At
this point it may be recalled what I have written in Chapter 6 about the
error of talking about unrealized possibilities with respect to SCs: the
events or situations ARE realized, namely in the speaker's head. In a),
however, we have a clear prediction of a real-world future event,
contingent on a possible event which likewise will be situated in the future
by the listener. So whereas (16a) can be said to be a future conditional,
(l6b), strictly speaking, is only seemingly about the future.
This has important consequences if we want to verify a) or b). For the
former to be verified, we can wait for somebody to steal the speaker's
bicycle (which, considering the present state of the world, will not take
long); but the verification of b) is a different matter. It is impossible when
the speaker has no bicycle - then we (and, the point has been made before,
the speaker himself) can only take his word for it. But even if the speaker
does possess a bicycle, the verification of b) is not the same as that of a).
For it only seems as if b) can be verified at all. The antecedent of b)
transports us to a imaginary world in which the speaker's bike is stolen. If
his bike happens to be stolen in the real world we just happen to fmd
ourselves in a position to label b) true retroactively, because an imaginary
world just happens to have materialized. But this would be a matter of
chance, in the same way in which it is a matter of chance whether the
utterer of b) does or does not own a bike.
Now, it is possible to argue here that the verification of (9a) is a matter
of chance as well, but there is a crucial difference: for the important thing
is that (13a) is in principle capable of being realized in the real world,
whereas (l3b), again in principle, is not.
Since it would be undesirable to base a categorization of conditional
sentences on chance, ICs and SCs are to be kept apart in principle. For it
is in principle impossible to verify an SC, unless the reasoning it contains
is of the causal or logical kind, although, as we have seen, SCs which are
purely logical or causal do not exist (cf. (1Od)and (l lbj). Conversely, it is
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in principle possible to verify an IC, although there may be cases where
such verification is impossible in practice.
In conclusion, the thesis that there is no basic difference between ICs and
SCs fails for at least three reasons: first. whereas there are no SCs which
cannot be rewritten as an IC, there are numerous ICs which cannot be
reformulated by means of an SC, which is fully in keeping with the view
that the domain of ICs is the real world and that that of SCs is an
imaginary one; second, it is wrong to start from a situation in which it
does not make much of a difference whether an IC or an SC is used, and
then to conclude either that there is no difference between the two types of
conditional, or that the difference is only gradual (a comparable error has
been referred to in Chapter 1: the mistaken view that sometimes if means
the same as as); third, it is wrong to take probability as a basis for the
description of conditional sentences, as I have also argued at some length
in chapter 4. Although Johnson-Laird, and with him numerous
grammarians, is right in saying that the switch from IC to SC makes the
possiblility seem more remote, this is not something that belongs to the
meaning of SCs. It would be better to say that it follows 'logically' from
the fact that SCs are about an imaginary world rather than about the real
one, since the real world is always necessarily closer to us than any
imaginary one.
5 'Now' versus 'not now'
Before the main issue of this section is addressed, it may be fruitful to
make a couple of remarks about truth, or more precisely, about what we
do when we say 'that's true'. We may react in that way to all of the
following sentences:
(17) Two plus two make four
(18) Paris is the capital of France
(19) Kennedy was murdered
(20) If you ask John. he will do it
(21) If I had been on that plane, I would be / have been dead now
Sentence (17) contains a so-called analytic truth, which is true in any
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world. and consequently also in ours; sentence (18) is a contingent truth,
not 'true in any world', but only in ours. Both (17) and (18) are therefore
true in the real world. The domain of (19) is the past, but as the past may
be considered to be part of the real world, the reaction 'that's true' is as
appropriate to (19) as it is to (17) and (18). In (20) the appropriateness of
'that's true' depends on how well the listener knows John; in most cases
contingent statements about the future will not elicit that response. I shall
not go into the logical problems posed by calling the prediction of a future
event true at the moment of speaking, but be that as it may, (20), like (17)
to (19), is a claim about the real world. In (21) the situation is different
the sentence is not about the real world. but about an imaginary one, and
when we respond to it by saying 'that's true', we do not mean 'true in our
world', but 'true in the imaginary world in which the speaker was on that
plane'. Recall how in an earlier section of this chapter that claim was
substantiated: we can get rid of the past tense in the antecedent, and of the
modal auxiliary in the consequent, if we rewrite (21) as 'In an imaginary
past world in which I was on that plane I am now dead' (the consequent
of which is the real-world counterpart of 'I would be dead now', the real-
world counterpart of 'I would have been dead now' being 'I will be dead
now').
Now for the main question. Is it possible to give one meaning to SCs
which also does justice to their inherent ambiguity, i.e. which explains that
generally SCs can also be interpreted as being about past events or
situations?
This question can be answered in the affirmative if we take it that the
basic meaning of the Present Tense in a conditional antecedent is 'now',
and that of the Past Tense in a conditional antecedent 'not now', which is
to be understood as either 'not now, i.e. the world of the past' or 'not now,
i.e. the world of the imagination'. In the former interpretation we stay in
the real world. only moving back in time (in a graphic representation, this
might be indicated by means of a horizontal arrow pointing to the left); in
the latter we leave the real world altogether (in the same graphic
representation this might be indicated by means of an arrow pointing
upward). See Figure 1.
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past ~(__ MoS future
The reason why in the preceding paragraph reference is made to the
meaning of 'the Present Tense in a conditional antecedent' rather than to
that of the Present Tense tout court is that in conditional antecedents 'now'
includes the future. In main clauses, of course, we can only use the Simple
Present to refer to the future if the future event in question is so certain
that. in a way, it can be looked upon as having become part of the present
this is the case with statements about timetables, the calendar etc. (e.g.
'Tomorrow is Wednesday'). This is not to suggest that the Present Tense
in a conditional antecedent can have future reference - it would be better to
say that it has non-past reference; and non-pastness, obviously, includes the
future. See for a detailed discussion Chapter 3 (for the rare cases where
the Present in an if-clause can be looked upon as having future reference,
see the same chapter, note 7).
Similarly, the reason why above the meaning of 'the Past Tense in a
conditional antecedent' is discussed rather than 'the Past Tense tout court'
is that it is only in an if-clause that the Past Tense, or the Pluperfect, is
capable of taking us away from the real world into that of the imagination.
(A different way of making the same point would be to say that, unlike
Dutch, English does not allow a modal past in a main clause.)
So, to go into a little more detail now, if + Past Tense takes us away
from 'now', i.e. the moment of speaking, either into the past, in which
case it is up to the listener to interpret it in any of the following three
ways: a) as referring to a past habit; b) (a far less likely choice) as
referring to a single past event (see the discussion of sentence (10) in
Chapter 1 for the reason why this a less likely choice); and c) as (free)
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indirect speech; or the listener will interpret it as referring to the world of
the imagination. The choice will depend on the context if the context is
past, the listener will take it that if + Past Tense also refers to the past; if
the context is the present, the listener will correctly surmise that if + Past
Tense refers to an imaginary world.
It is important to realize that SCs do not have 'imaginary-worldhood' as
an integral part of their meaning; the only meaning of a construction with
if + Past Tense etc. is 'not now', which can be put to use in a number of
different ways. It would be wrong, therefore, to say, that what we have is
one construction with a number of (potential) meanings. Rather, what we
have is one construction with one meaning, which can be employed to do
a variety of jobs, and be interpreted in a variety of ways. (Below, it will be
shown that this claim is is need of modification when applied to Past SCs.)
Fundamentally, therefore, ICs and SCs only differ in one way. SCs mean
exactly the same as the corresponding ICs, with 'not now' added, and
interpreted as referring to an imaginary world. This is fully in keeping with
a remark made by Ellis (1984: 53), who makes the point that the
difference between ICs and SCs should be 'more like the difference
between 'is' and 'was', say, than the difference between 'is' and 'must
be". This, in my view, hits the nail on the head. The difference between
ICs and SCs is the difference between 'is' and was', for what distinguishes
was from is is precisely the semantic component 'not now'.
Now how does the above work out for Past SCs? In Chapter 1 I have
claimed that the only thing that distinguishes 'If that happened, I would
take immediate action' from 'If that had happened, I would have taken
immediate action' is that the point of reference is shifted from the MoS to
moment in the past. That does not, however, detract from the fact, noted in
this chapter and elsewhere, that there are Past ICs that do not seem to have
an SC version, and from the fact, noted in Chapter 1 and above, that the
single-event reading of a Past IC is very often rather far-fetched, the past-
habit reading often seeming to be the only one available. To give two
examples: it is not difficult to see that 'If you did that, you were a fool'
refers, or can refer, to one occasion; but it is less easy to see that 'If that
happened, I went home' can, strictly speaking, also refer to one occasion.
Indeed, at first sight it seems only to refer to a habit. So how can we
maintain that 'If that had happened, I would have gone home', which only
makes reference to a single occasion, is its Past SC version?
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In order to answer this question, it is useful to have a second look at
Figure 1 above, and to notice that in the case of Past SCs there are two
roads to the imaginary past:





Of course, there is one strong argument in favour of route a): Past SCs are
normally used in a past context. and the quickest way to get from real-
world past to an imaginary-world past is to go up from the point where we
were already. It seems somewhat silly, therefore, and at first sight
psychologically implausible, in such a past context to make a detour which
takes us, via the MoS and the imaginary present. to our destination, i.e. the
imaginary past. But there are at least two very good arguments in favour
of route b). First, whenever we imagine anything, we imagine it now. Very
often the claims made in Past SCs can be looked upon as present
comments on past events or situations. For example, when we say 'Then
he cycled home. If he had stayed with us, he would not have been dead
now', we do not really hop straight from the real to the imagined past;
rather, we comment now on an imagined past alternative, often, as in this
example, making ample use of hindsight. Second, if route b) is accepted as
the ' correct' one, there is no longer any need to relate the clearly one-time
'If his bike had been stolen, he would have taken a taxi' to the very much
less clearly one-time 'If his bike was stolen, he took a taxi.' What we can
do now is first relate the Past SC to its Present SC counterpart 'If his bike
were stolen, he would take a taxi', whose one-time SC reading is just as
obvious as its past-habit IC one, and then relate that to its IC version 'If
his bike is stolen, he will take a taxi.'
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But these two arguments are only arguments, and do not constitute proof.
There may, however, be a third third argument which does just that. It has
to do with the fact that whereas ordinary SCs can mostly also be
interpreted as Past ICs (cf. sentence (2) above), this becomes considerably
more difficult, if not totally impossible, in the case of Past SCs; the Past
SC version of sentence (2), for example, (,If she had played the Schubert
as an encore, she would have left out the repeats') can no longer be said to
be 'ambiguous' between a subjunctive and an indicative reading, a fact, by
the way, to which I have been unable to find any reference in either the
literature on conditionals or in English grammars, and which Dudman
(op.cit., see Chapter I), will find it very difficult to explain. Now why
should this be so? Note that the antecedent by itself is still capable of
being indicative, and that therefore it is the consequent which forces the
subjunctive interpretation. So this is what the question boils down to: how
is it possible for 'he would do that' to be either indicative or subjunctive,
while 'he would have done that' can only be subjunctive? The answer may
be that route b) is, indeed, the correct one, and that therefore the former
consequent can be arrived at by moving either to the left or upwards from
the MoS, whereas the latter consequent can only be arrived at via route b),
that is, via the backshifting of subjunctive 'he would do that'. Notice that
this is not backshifting under reported speech, for in indirect speech 'he
would do that' does not change at all (although not everyone would agree
here'). 'Backshifting', therefore, should here only be taken to mean
'moving from imaginary Present to imaginary Past.'
This, then, is what I should like to suggest: Past SCs are to be looked
upon not as versions of Past ICs, but as backshifted versions of 'normal',
i.e. Present SCs, which in their tum can always be looked upon as the
subjunctive versions of Present ICs. We should not, therefore, allow
ourselves to be taken in by those Past ICs that seem to make the same
claim as their SC counterparts (e.g. 'If he did that, he was a fool' and 'If
he had done that, he would have been a fool'), for their correspondence is
the exception rather than the rule.
This way of looking at things has considerable advantages in the case of
such Past SCs that clearly mean something completely different from their
Past IC 'counterparts'. I shall demonstrate this with an example that has
already played a major role in Chapter 6. The Past SC 'If Oswald hadn't
killed Kennedy, someone else would have' should first of all be looked
upon as the past version of 'If Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, someone else
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would', which in its turn can be related to its indicative version 'If Oswald
doesn't kill Kennedy, someone else will'. There is surely no need to argue
that this last IC is not the Present Tense version of 'If Oswald didn't kill
Kennedy, someone else did', an IC which, therefore, lacks a subjunctive
counterpart. If, on the other hand, the same procedure is applied to 'If you
had done that, you would have been a fool', we first get ' If you did that,
you would be a fool', which relates to the indicative 'If you do that, you
are a fool' - which is, indeed, the Present Tense version of 'If you did
that, you were a fool.'
Above I have said that whatever is imagined is imagined now. Hence,
route b) also applies, mutatis mutandis, to those SCs which are said to be
about the future (cf. (l6b) 'If someone stole my bike, ...' etc.). It is worth
stressing here that whereas the consequents of ICs can have either explicit
future reference (cf. (l6a) 'If someone steals my bike, I'll go to the
police') or non-past reference (' ..., I go to the police'), those of SCs
cannot, since they must contain would or some other modal auxiliary (the
same point was made, in a different context, in Chapter 6). Therefore,
there seems to be no point in postulating a separate category of 'future'
SCs. Formally, i.e. grammatically, there is nothing in these SCs to set them
apart from 'present' SCs, and both types of SC can be looked upon as
belonging to the category of non-past Sc.
One final remark: the basic division into 'now' and 'not now', where the
former includes the future, is entirely consistent with the basically two-way
tense system of English and Dutch. Both languages, but especially the
former, make use of a number of makeshift devices to refer to the future;
in the latter language reference to the future can freely be made by means
of the Present Tense.
6 (Apparent) switches from Ie to SC
Speakers switch as easily from the real to an imaginary world as they do
from the present to the past, and listeners have no problems keeping track
of these switches. Speakers telling anecdotes will often make seemingly
haphazard switches from Past to Present Tense and vice versa, and the
purpose of these is no doubt to add vim and liveliness to the narrative;
nonetheless, they are usually condemned by stylisticians when they occur
in serious writing. In exactly the same way, although not for the same
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reason, speakers employing conditionals will make half-way switches from
ICs to SCs and vice versa, as has also been noted in Chapter 4. In these
types of switches the listener is taken from the real world into that of the
imagination (or vice versa). It is to be noted, however, that there are
sentences in which such switches only seem to take place, as is shown in
the following examples (sentences (22) and (24) also figured in Chapters 4
and 3 respectively):
(22) If Peter drops in, I'd leave immediately
(23) If you bad needed some money, there was some in the bank
(24) If ten of these pills would kill an elephant, I suppose five will do
for me
In (22) there is a hidden hypothetical antecedent (for example 'if I were
you'); the sentence therefore consists of two conditionals, one of which in
an IC and the other an Sc. Written out in full, it would read like this: 'If
Peter drops in, then the following applies: if I were you, I'd leave
immediately.' Sentence (23) is mentioned by Johnson-Laird (1986: 70),
who comments that his theory 'has thus led to the discovery of a class of
conditionals which combine counterfactual antecedents with indicative
consequents - a class to which I have been unable to find any reference in
the literature.' What Johnson-Laird has failed to notice is that (23) is a
defective conditional of the type discussed in Chapter 5 (sentence (3a): 'If
you're thirsty, there's beer in the fridge'); if the missing part of the
consequent of (23), i.e. something like 'I would have been able to tell
you', is ftlled in, we are left with a perfectly ordinary Sc.
For sentence (24) an argument can be set up which shows a measure of
similarity with that given for (22). Despite its subjunctive looks, (24) is an
IC - or rather, it is an IC in which an SC is embedded. Written out in full,
it becomes 'If "ten of these pills would kill an elephant (if it took them)"
is true, I suppose five will do for me.' This paraphrase has the advantage
of showing at a glance why, in (24) as it stands, will can take the place of
would (in the paraphrase takes will then replace took).
It goes without saying that it is the very existence of perfectly
grammatical sentences like (22) to (24) which paves the way for the
acceptance of sentences in which there is a real switch from indicative to
subjunctive or vice versa, and whose grammaticality is at least doubtful.
Such sentences can be compared with the ones mentioned at the end of
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Chapter 3, with 'ungrammatical' non-volitional will in the antecedent.
7 A note on intonation
In a chapter dealing with the pragmatics of conditional sentences, a few
words about the role of intonation will not come amiss. However, since
even a cursory description of the various theories of intonation is most
certainly beyond the scope of this book, I shall restrict myself to making a
number of more or less interesting observations.
It is a well-known fact that the meaning of a sentence can change
radically under the influence of intonation. The following sentence
provides a case in point with respect to conditionals:
(25) If I had no money, I would not be living it up like this
With the unmarked intonation, i.e. with the accent on money, the speaker
implies that his wealth is what causes, or allows, him to be living it up.
With the accent on the first I, however, the implication is that somebody
else has no money and is living it up, and the speaker's own wealth simply
is not what the sentence is about. Hence in the former case we conclude
that the speaker is rich, and in the latter case (although we would assume
him to have at least some money) the speaker's wealth is more or less
irrelevant. Notice that the intonation contour of the consequent is the same
in either case. Obviously, the difference in meaning is to be accounted for
by pragmatics - in other words, semantically the sentence is unambiguous,
the meaning proper being no more than: 'In the world of the imagination
in which I have no money, I am not living it up'. Not only does this allow
both pragmatic constructions to be put on it, it also constitutes one more
reason for rejecting the view that SCs mean the negation of the
propositions contained in their antecedents.
To add one more example:
(26) If you were my enemy, I would not give you an answer
Notice that this sentence can be used for at least two different purposes: a)
the speaker wishes to indicate what he would do in the imaginary situation
in which the addressee is his enemy; and b) the speaker wishes to indicate
THE PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS OF CONDITION~ COMPARED 175
that the addressee is not his enemy - for then he would not have answered
him. In the latter case there must be an accent on answer; in the former,
both would and answer must receive stress.
8 A classification
If the following is not a fully fledged theory of conditional sentences, it is
at least a description which is in keeping with the conclusions reached in
the preceding chapters, and one that does justice to the facts.
I. 'now'
This is the class of conditionals whose meaning is 'now' (in the sense of
'non-past'), whose domain is the real world, and whose fulfilment is
,open', i.e. they are in principle, albeit not necessarily in practice, capable
of materializing in the non-past real world of the present or the future. The
speaker indicates what happens, what slhe does, what will happen, or what
slhe will do, given the materialization of the event or situation mentioned
in the antecedent.
The link between antecedent and consequent may be free (stochastic) or
unfree (there is thus no causality inherent in the meaning of the conditional
construction). If it is unfree, the reasoning is either causal or logical; if it
is logical, the consequent is implied by the antecedent.
Cutting across this categorization, there is the question whether the claim
or prediction made in the consequent is specific or generic. If it is specific,
the materialization of the event or situation mentioned in the antecedent
must be uncertain. If it is generic, no such limitation obtains - although
even if the proposition mentioned in the antecedent is certain (,2 + 2 make
4'), the speaker is not committed to its truth.
The tense or verb form to be used in the antecedent depends on the type
of condition to be fulftlled; if this is the occurrence of a non-past event,
the Present Tense must be used ('If you sound the alarm, the police will be
here in five minutes'); if it is the completion of a non-past event, the
Present Perfect must be used (,If you have finished your work, show it to
me'); if it is the truth of a prediction of a non-past event, any future form
must be used (,If it will / is going to take you a week to do this job, I'd
better find somebody else'); if, to give an example of maximum
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complication, it is the hypothetical truth of the prediction of a future event,
would have + Past Participle must be used (,If Peter would have done it in
a week, why did you give the job to Fred?'; that this is really an indicative
antecedent may be clear from the more laborious paraphrase 'If "Peter
would have done it in a week" is true'); for further examples, see Chapter
3. Notice that in no case is the tense dictated by the verb form of the
consequent. (Of course, if the whole conditional is about an imaginary
world. then the antecedent should also be about such a world, i.e. contain a
Past Tense, or any other verb form capable of indicating imaginary-
worldhood).
Finally, only if the link between antecedent and consequent is of the
stochastic type, and the prediction in the consequent specific, can should
be used instead of the Present Tense.
The tense to be used in the consequent depends on (non)specificity. If the
consequent makes a specific claim, will (or any of the other modal
auxiliaries) + infinitive must be used; if the claim is generic, a Present
Tense will be used (cf. note 5, Chapter 4).
While, therefore, the type of link between antecedent and consequent is
irrelevant to the tense used in the latter, it is decisive with respect to the
use of should in the former.
There is one very special type of IC whose purpose it is show that it is
logically impossible for the antecedent to contain a true proposition (' If
you're the Pope, I'm the Empress of China'). This is the only type of
conditional that may rightly be termed 'counterfactual'. If the consequent
is not patently false, and meant to be understood as such as well, the
antecedent will be intended by the speaker as true for the sake of the
argument, and also treated as true by the listener. Compare 'If 5 is smaller
than 4, then 3 is smaller than 2' with 'If 5 is smaller than 4, then they
taught me rotten arithmetic at school.'
II. 'not now'
This the class of conditionals whose meaning is 'not now', in the sense
either of 'past', or of 'imaginary', whose domain is either the real world or
a/the world of the imagination, and whose fulftlment is therefore 'open in
the past' or 'open in a/the world of the imagination'; but whose fulfilment
is 'closed' with respect to 'now'; i.e. they are in principle incapable of
being fulfilled in the real-world of the present or future. The foUowing two
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points are to be noted, however: 1) if they belong to al) below, they are,
of course, really to be classed with I above; 2) if they belong to b) below,
their indicative versions may materialize at some future moment.
a. Conditionals which are still situated in the real world, but at a 'not
now' moment in time.
They fall into two groups:
They are instances of reported speech, in which case their
antecedents contain a Past Tense that is a backshifted Present
Tense, and their consequents have either a similar Past Tense, or
will + info that bas been backshifted to would.
Their antecedents mention a past event which either i) may have
taken place on one occasion (,If he did that, he was a fool'), or
ii) took place regularly (,If I was sad, I went to the cinema').
Note that mixtures of IIa2i and I also occur: 'If he did that, I shall fire
him'. Of course, they do not constitute a problem, since their domain
remains the real world.
The speaker indicates what happened, or what slbe did (either generally
or on one occasion), given the past materialization of the event mentioned
in the antecedent.
As in the case of I above, the link between antecedent and consequent
may be either free or unfree; see above. Similarly, the claim or prediction
in the consequent may be either specific or generic; again, see above.
b. Conditionals which are situated in an imaginary world, i.e. SCs.
The speaker does either of two things: 1) slhe indicates what happens,
what slhe does. what will happen. or what slhe will do in the imaginary
world inside hislher head, given the materialization in this imaginary world
of the event or situation mentioned in the antecedent; 2) slhe invites the
listener to apply Contraposition: since the indicative version of the
(proposition in the) consequent is clearly at odds with the situation existing
in the real world, the indicative version of the (proposition in the)
antecedent must be false. Note that it would be wrong. therefore to label
the conditional 'counterfactual' - for it does not itself make any claim
about matters in the real world.
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As regards the stochastic or logical/causal link between antecedent and
consequent. SCs behave like ICs, although no SC can make a claim that is
only logical or causal (,If you were invisible, no one would be able to see
you') without doing something else at the same time. As regards the
distinction specific - generic there is also an important difference: SCs
cannot be used to make generic statements (compare *'If something were
water, it would freeze at 0° C.' with 'If that were water, it would freeze at
0° C.').
Finally, we cannot rephrase an IC as an SC if we know the proposition
contained in the antecedent to be true.
Given all this, we can list the standard uses of ICs and SCs.
Both ICs and SCs are used to make contingent predictions or claims, and
both are used for stochastic, causal and logical reasoning. In both types of
conditional, there is a contingent commitment to q, which becomes
operative as soon as p materializes. In the case of SCs the moment of
becoming operative is the moment of speaking, since in SCs the p
materializes 'now' (albeit in the speaker's head).
Whereas ICs are used to make claims, predictions etc. about the real
world, the claims, predictions etc. in SCs pertain to an imaginary world.
In addition to making contingent predictions, ICs very frequently lay
down contingent facts about the world (scientific statements).
The two most typical uses of SCs are, first. to prove that the indicative
version of the proposition expressed in the antecedent is untenable (in the
real world, of course). One might say that what we have in such
conditionals is an elegant natural-language version of the logical operation
of Modus ToUens. The purpose of a conditional like 'If I hated Mozart, I
would not be sitting here' is to force the inference: 'I am sitting here,
hence I do not hate Mozart.' Second, there is the purpose of speculation
about the present, We do not use 'If I had been on that plane, I would now
be dead', to prove that we were not. in fact. on that plane; all we do is
extrapolate from a hypothetical past situation to a bypothetical present one.
Similarly, 'If you were not my brother, I would report you to the police' is
not used to prove that the listener is the speaker's brother, but to make it
clear that the imaginary-world status of the reporting referred to in the
consequent is only due to the listener being the speaker's brother.
A sentence like 'If I knew I would tell you' seems capable of fulfilling
both purposes: a) to prove that the speaker does not know; b) to tell the
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listener what the speaker will do under certain imaginary circumstances.
The third task that we employ SCs for speculation about the future - and
this is where they become more or less interchangeable with ICs, although
they do remain radically different.
Both ICs and SCs can only be called true or false if they are instances of
causal or logical reasoning: causality and implication work the same way
in imaginary worlds as they do in the real one. The world of the imagina-
tion does not differ from the real world except for the changes specified by
the antecedent and the consequent. If the reasoning in a conditional is
stochastic, not even an IC can, in general, be called true or false. It should
always be borne in mind that what is logical reasoning in an IC may
become stochastic in its 'corresponding' Sc. Such an IC, therefore, bas no
SC counterpart.
Since a speaker employing an SC is really saying something like: 'I am
not talking about the world as it is now or will be', it does not make sense
in that case to understand his words as referring to things as they actually
are in the world.
Logically, ICs and SCs are the same, with the single proviso that the
domain of the former is the real world, and that of the latter an imaginary,
or a possible, world. Although we often use SCs to find out things about
the real world through extrapolation (' If the engine had exploded, we
would have found debris allover the place. Since we didn't find debris,
the engine didn't explode'), SCs themselves are never about this world.
We evaluate an SC by extrapolation from what we know about the real
world (for example, since we know that engines that explode leave debris
all over the place, we rightly consider 'If the engine had exploded, we
would have found debris all over the place' to be true).
Both ICs and SCs are truth-functional within their proper domains, i.e.
the real world and that of the imagination respectively. Calling an SCs true
in the real world has disastrous effects; hence, even if we respond to one
by saying 'that's true', that must never be taken to mean that it is true in
our world.
Since SCs cannot be used for generic statements, no generic IC, whether
it be an instance of stochastic, causal or logical reasoning, can have a
subjunctive counterpart. The same point can be made by saing that in SCs
if can never mean 'whenever'.
Although some Past SCs may seem to have Past IC counterparts, i.e.,
may be considered to be Past ICs to which only a single operation ('make
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subjunctive') bas been applied, it is better to look upon sucb Past SCs as
the past versions of Present SCs, whicb in their tum are the subjunctive
versions of Present ICs. This is because we can only bave access to the
world of the imagination 'now', at the moment of speaking - which, by the
way, may be looked upon as the pbilosophical analogue of the linguistic
fact that would have + Past Participle can only occur in the consequents of
a Past SCs.
For the sake of clarity, the classification outlined above will be presented
in a scbema (see figure 3) wbich takes as its starting point the tense used
in the antecedent, and wbich corresponds to a number of example
sentences given below. The PresentlPast dicbotomy thus arrived at sbould
not be taken to suggest that no other tenses can be used in conditional
antecedents.
Examples:
1) If the boteI is full we'll go to a campsite (or: Sbould the botel ...)
2) If you drop that vase it will break
3) If the botel is full we always go to a campsite
If be's disappointed he'll just shrug his shoulders
4) If you're a bacbelor you're unmarried
If 2 + 2 = 4, then 4 - 2 = 2
If you beat ice it melts
5) He said that if the boteI was full they'd go to a campsite
etc. (see 2), 3) and 4»
6) If I did that, I (will have) apologized
7) If be told you that, be was lying
If he pusbed that button, the macbine (must bave) exploded
8) If she played the Schubert as an encore she left I would leave out
the repeats
9) If it rained the streets got wet
If you were caught stealing, your hands were cut off
10) If that happened I'd go to the police
If sbe played the Scbubert as an encore, she'd leave out the
repeats
11) If you dropped that vase, it would break
If you were invisible, no one would be able to see you
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Examples of embedded conditionals:
1) + 10) If ten of these pills would kill an elephant (if it took them), I
suppose five will do for me
4) + 2) If ~t cup will break (if I drop it), it is fragile
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Notes to chapter 7
1. Although most grammars (for example Close (1975: 46» agree
on this score, and stipulate categorically that past modal
auxiliaries do not undergo any change when the clauses in
which they occur are turned from direct into indirect speech,
this is not entirely uncontroversiaL Interestingly (cf. the
Introduction to Chapter 3), we must again turn to Quirk et aL's
A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (1985) for
a view which differs from that expounded in other grammars,
inclu- ding Quirk et aI's (1973) A University Grammar of
English. In section 14.34 of Quirk et aJ. (1985) it is claimed that
'the past subjunctive (...) or hypothetical past C..) is backshifted
to hypothetical past perfective if there is a change in time
reference', so that (lb) is the indirect speech version of (1a):
(1) a. 'If he were here, he would vote for the motion,'
she said
She said that if he had been there, he would
have voted for the motion
b.
In the same section, it is claimed that backshift 'is optional if
the proposition in indirect speech is still valid', so that (2b) and
(2c) are the two possible indirect speech versions of (2a):
(2) a. 'If I were in New York, I would visit the
current exhibition at the Metropolitan
Museum,' he said
He said that if he were in New York, he would
visit the current exhibition at the Metropolitan
Museum
He said that if he had been in New York, he




It seems that Quirk at al. (1985) stand alone in this respect.
The native speakers of English that I consulted about this
unhesitatingly looked upon (Lb) and (2c) as exclusively the
indirect speech versions of (Lc) and (2d) respectively:
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(2) d.
'If he had been there, he would have voted for
the motion: she said
'If I had been in New York, I would have
visited the current exhibition at the
Metropolitan Museum: he said
(1) c.
All this, however, is less important than the crucial fact that
would have + past participle is never ambiguous between a
real-world and an imaginary world reading. The only remark in
Quirk et al. (1985) with regard to the inherent ambiguity of
would + infinitive is made in section 14.23, note e (p, 1012):
'Ambiguities are occasionally found', followed by one example.
No mention is made of the disappearance of the ambiguity
under backshift.
POSTSCRIPT Chapter 7
The views expounded in the last Chapter have interesting implications for
the situation in Dutch, where there exist two subjunctive conditional
constructions side by side. However, in Chapter 2 it is claimed that only
the conditional Past Tense has 'not now' as its basic meaning, the meaning
of lOU in a conditional construction being characterized as 'imaginary
now'. How can this be reconciled with what I have claimed is the basic
meaning of the English SC?
The answer must probably be that no such reconciliation is possible, and
that, rather, a slightly different characterization of the meanings of the two
Dutch constructions is called for.
But before such a characterization is ventured on, there are a number of
points to be made. First of all, it is to be noted that, like English would in
a conditional consequent, Dutch zou in the same position is ambiguous
between a real- and an imaginary world reading. Consider the sentences in
(1).
(1) a. Als dat gebeurde, zou ik weggaan
If that happened, would I leave
'If that happened, I would leave'
b. Als dat gebeurde, ging ik weg
If that happened, went I away
'If that happened, I would leave / I left'
c. Als dat gebeurt, ga ik weg
If that happens, go I away
'If that happens, I go / shall go away'
But there is an important difference between English and Dutch, for if
sentence (la) is about the real world, it can only be the (free) indirect-
speech version of (Ic). Unlike its English translation, it is quite incapable
of referring to a past real-world habit (let alone a past single event), for
which the Past Tense must be used instead, as in (lb). Interestingly, it is
this Past Tense which allows both a Past indicative and a Present
subjunctive interpretation to be given to it. But if (1b) is given a Past
indicative interpretation, the Single-event reading seems just as far-fetched
as it is for 'If that happened, I left.' Indeed, it may be even more far-
fetched - which is probably due to the fact that a Dutch speaker is more
likely to use a Present Perfect in both clauses if he wants to refer to a
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single event.
There is a second difference between English and Dutch which is
relevant here. Whereas in English any would have + Past Participle must
be a conditional consequent, the same does not apply to Dutch zou hebben
+ Past Participle. See, for example, (2), which was already discussed in
Chapter 2.
(2) Hij zou naar Frankrijk gevlucht zijn
He would to France fled be
'He is said to have fled to France'
Sentence (2) can not only be the consequent of an SC, but also a non-
conditional independent clause; this, however, presents no serious obstacle
to a description of Dutch SCs along the lines outlined for English ones,
since as soon as a sentence like (2) is preceded by a conditional
antecedent, it can only be a conditional consequent.
In my view the fact that English would + infmitive can have past-habit
meaning is more or less an accident - as is the fact that a Dutch sentence
like (2) can have real-world meaning. It is no accident, however, that
sentences like (la), and its English translations, can always be looked upon
as the indirect-speech versions of Present ICs.
In spite of the above-mentioned differences, I conclude, then, that
English and Dutch conditionals can be described in what are fundamentally
the same terms - not surprisingly in view of the basic two-way tense
system that the two languages share, as was also noted in the preceding
chapter.
How the Dutch zou-form came to encroach upon the territory of the
conditional Past Tense (or how the two came to cover more or less the
same ground) is a question that properly belongs to the field of historical
syntax. Suffice it to say here that the free variation of the Present and
Future Tenses as regards reference to the future, also noted in the
Postscript to Chapter 2, may be responsible for a similar free variation of
the Past and the Future Past - which is what the zou-form is.
Now the important question must be addressed whether the differences
between the two forms are pragmatic rather than semantic in nature. In my
view, they should be looked upon as belonging to the realm of pragmatics.
There is, first of all, a 'theoretical' reason for this. If they were semantic,
the whole edifice erected in the last two chapters with respect to English
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conditionals would not be applicable to Dutch, in which case the latter
language would need a a special conditional logic of its own; but if they
are pragmatic, the logic of Dutch conditionals can be said to be the same
as that of English conditionals.
There is also a practical reason. The distinctions in meaning elaborated
on in Chapter 2 range from fairly to very subtle, and although I personally
have no doubt about the oddity of the 'odd' sentences cited, it is doubtful
whether all native speakers of Dutch will condemn all of them off-hand.
More importantly, it does not seem possible to think of situations in which
the replacement of one form by the other changes the truth-value of the
sentence in which they occur - which is another way of saying that
synonymy is not affected by such a change.
So, if the speaker 'knows that not', he can use either form; but the zou-
form then indicates that the real state of affairs is irrelevant, and the Past
Tense that it is not, If the speaker 'does not know', or does not wish to
indicate that he knows, he must use the zou-form.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift bevat, afgezien van bet inleidende hoofdstuk 1, twee
soorten studies. Hoofdstuk 2 tim 4 zijn detailstudies betreffende
Nederlandse en Engelse voorwaardelijke zinnen (VZs), terwijl Hoofdstuk 5
tim 7 de betekenis van VZS in bet algemeen tot onderwerp hebben,
hetgeen neerkomt op het nauwkeurig bepalen van de scheidslijn tussen
datgene wat als de eigen, inherente of noodzakelijke betekenis van de
voorwaardelijke constructie kan worden aangemerkt, en alle verdere, min
of meer toevallige, betekenisaspecten die in de dagelijkse praktijk aan de
constructie worden toegekend. In de aan sommige hoofdstukken
toegevoegde 'postscripten' worden verbanden gelegd tussen de Engelse en
de Nederlandse situatie, en tussen in het eraan voorafgaande hoofstuk en
elders besproken zaken, en wordt levendig gespeculeerd over mogelijke
toekomstige ontwikkelingen.
Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een algemene introductie van bet onderzoeksgebied, en
verdedigt het gangbare onderscbeid tussen 'gewone' en 'hypothetische'
VZs (vergelijk bijv. 'Als je dat doet, dan kijk ik je nooit meer aan' en 'Als
je dat zou doen, dan zou ik je nooit meer aankijken'), hoewel het, om de
indruk te vermijden dat er bij gewone VZs geen sprake is van iets
'hypothetisch', beter is te spreken van respectievelijk 'indicatieve
conditionele zinnen' (ICs) en 'subjunctieve conditionele zinnen (SCs). De
laatste term is op zich weer te prefereren hoven de, dikwijls voor bepaalde
SCs gehanteerde, term 'counterfactuals'. In beide typen VZ wordt de door
als of if ingeleide bijzin het antecedent. en de hoofdzin de consequens
genoemd.
Volgens vele logici verschilt de zg. Materiele Implicatie ('als p dan q')
van de als ...dan-constructie in natuurlijke taal, omdat de eerste wei, en de
laatste, met name bij SCs, niet waarbeidsfunctioneel is, hetgeen betekent
dat bepaalde logische operaties die bij de Materiele Implicatie de waarheid
niet aantasten, dat wei doen bij sommige VZs. Een van de beweringen in
dit proefschrift is, dat zelfs een antecedent als 'Als 5 kleiner is dan 4' niet
noodzakelijkerwijs als onwaar bestempeld dient te worden (hetgeen de
meeste logici wei doen), getuige een consequens als 'dan heb ik op de
lagere school niet goed rekenen geleerd', waarbij juist uitgegaan wordt van
de waarheid van het antecedent. Men kan dus ook zeggen dat een
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antecedent in natuurlijke taal als waar dient te gelden, althans 'for the sake
of argument', totdat uit een onware consequens het tegendeel blijkt. De
toevoeging 'for the sake of the argument' is belangrijk, omdat voor de
taalgebruiker datgene wat in een antecedent staat slechts genoemd wordt,
en dus noch waar noch onwaar is. In Hoofdstuk 5 tim 7 wordt dit nader
uitgewerkt.
De opvatting dat men slechts eeo VZ kan uitspreken als noch de
waarheid van p noch die van q bekeod is, is wijdverbreid, maar oiettemin
onjuist; men kan immers heel goed zeggen 'Als 2 + 2 gelijk is aan 4, dan
is 4 - 2 gelijk aan 2'. am te kunnen verantwoorden welke typen VZ wei,
en welke niet mogelijk zijn, is het dus nodig een onderscheid te maken
tussen twee soorten verband tussen antecedent en consequens: stochastisch
(= 'vrij', 'willekeurig') en logisch/causaal. Verder blijkt ook het
onderscheid tussen 'specifiek' en 'generiek' van belang, getuige de
onacceptabele VZ 'Als ik van Mozart houd, koop ik de hele sene' en de
acceptabele 'Als ik van Mozart houd, hoef ik toch de hele sene niet te
kopen?'
Hoofdstuk 1 eindigt met een paragraaf over de precieze betekenis van de
voorwaardelijke voegwoorden if (dat ook vergeleken wordt met het
voegwoord van tijd when) en unless, en concludeert dat het feit dat if en
when soms verwisselbaar zijn, geen toeval is, maar te maken heeft met het
bovengenoemde onderscheid tussen generisch en specifiek. Het voegwoord
unless, ten slotte, betekent niet 'als niet' , maar het tegenovergestelde,
d.w.z. 'niet als'.
Omdat in Nederlandse SCs in zowel antecedent als consequens twee
vormen gebruikt kunnen worden, namelijk verleden tijd en zou( den) +
infmitief, beschikt die taal in feite over vier SC-constructies, waartussen
evenwel volgens de meeste Nederlandse grammatica's hooguit stilistische
verschillen, maar geen betekenisverschillen bestaan. Onder andere op grond
van het feit dat, bijvoorbeeld, VZSmet verleden tijd in de bijzin en zou +
info in de hoofdzin veel vaker voorkomen dan vice versa. wordt in
Hoofdstuk 2 beweerd dat zulke verschillen wei degelijk bestaan.
Wanneer een spreker de zou-vorm banteert, geeft hij aan dat de
deokbeeldige gebeurtenis zich, wat hem betreft, 'nu' voltrekt, waarbij in
bet midden wordt gelaten of de gebeurtenis zich in werkelijkheid al dan
niet afspeeh. Hanteert hij daarentegen de verleden tijd, dan zijn er twee
mogelijkbeden: a) hij geeft daarrnee aan te weten, dat de gebeurtenis in
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kwestie niet in de werkelijke wereld plaatsheett of zal plaatsbebben; b) hij
doet een categoriscbe bypotbetiscbe uitspraak. De fundamentele betekenis
van de verleden tijd is namelijk bet tegenovergestelde van die van de zou-
vorm, en bet tegenovergestelde van 'nu' is Diet aileen 'niet nu', maar ook
'op welke andere tijd dan ook'. Zo beeft dus de verleden tijd twee, nauw
verwante, betekeniselementen, die in aile VZS waarin ze voorkomen,
meespelen, boewel er steeds maar een op de voorgrond treedt.
Aan bet eind van Hoofdstuk 2 wordt een opsomming gegeven van aile
combinaties die er, gegeven de twee betekeniselementen die de verleden
tijd heeft, bestaan, en worden er voorbeelden gegeven van niet aileen de
mogelijke, maar ook van de onmogelijke combinaties.
Hoofdstuk 3 bebandelt een uitzondering op wat als een regel van de
Engelse grammatica geldt, namelijk dat in conditione Ie bijzinnen het
gebruik van will en would aileen toegestaan is wanneer aan deze
bulpwerkwoorden de betekenis 'willen, bereid zijn' toegekend kan worden,
met andere woorden, wanneer er sprake is van 'volitional' willlwould. Het
zeldzame voorkomen van nonvolitonal will/would wordt gerelateerd aan het
vrijwel volledige ontbreken van will en would in temporele bijzinnen. Er
wordt betoogd dat aan bet sporadiscbe optreden van will/would geen
grammaticale, maar een statistiscbe regel ten grondslag ligt: in de
overgrote meerderbeid van de gevallen is de voorwaarde waaraan in een
VZ voldaan moet worden een gebeurtenis, en zo'n gebeurtenis wordt in
een IC 'genoemd' door middel van de tegenwoordige tijd, en in een SC
door middel van de verleden tijd. Er zijn echter ook VZS waarin de te
vervullen voorwaarde niet (bet plaatsvinden van) een gebeurtenis is. maar
(de juistheid van) een voorspelling van een gebeurtenis. Dit kan aan de
band van Nederlandse voorbeelden worden toegelicht. De zinnen 'Als Jan
morgen komt, vraag ik bet bern' en 'Als Jan morgen komt, hoef ik hem nu
niet te bellen' bevatten ogenscbijnlijk identieke antecedenten. die ecbter bij
nadere beschouwing radicaal blijken te verscbiUen: de eerste bevat een
verwijzing naar een gebeurtenis, de tweede een verwijzing naar een
voorspelling van een gebeurtenis.
Nu is bet in het Engels in het algemeen niet mogelijk aan de toekomst te
refereren door middel van de tegenwoordige tijd; een toekomstige tijd
(will, be going to. Present Continuous, etc.) is. anders dan in het
Nederlands, verplicht. De zojuist geciteerde twee Nederlandse zinnen
worden dus, bij vertaling in het Engels, respectievelijk 'If John comes
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tomorrow, I'll ask him', en 'If John is coming / is going to come / will
come tomorrow, there's no need to call him now', waarbij de vertaling met
will zeker de ongebruikelijkste is - eenvoudig omdat will als volitional
gemterpreteerd zal worden, net als wanneer het in de zelfstandige hoofdzin
'John will come tomorrow' zou optreden. Het is dus niet
verbazingwekkend dat de meeste gevallen van will na if inderdaad
eveneens volitional zijn. Heel anders ligt het echter bij would na if, dat,
getuige een antecedent als 'If you would like to ...', vrij frequent voorkomt
en dan vrijwel altijd non volitional is. Onder deze bescbrijving vallen ook
de meeste gevallen van volitional Will/would; de uitzonderingen laten zich
gemakkelijk verldaren door het feit dat bij verzoeken regelmatig de
bereidheid van de aangesprokene om iets te doen gelijkgesteld wordt met
de handeling zelf (' Als u het raam open zoud: willen doen, zou ik dat zeer
op prijs stellen').
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt voorwaardelijk should behandelt, dat zich in grote
lijnen net zo gedraagt als mocht in Nederlandse voorwaardelijke bijzinnen.
Engelse grammatica's verschillen wat het juiste gebruik van should betreft
nogal van mening; de meest gezaghebbende grammatica bescbrijft should +
infinitief in antecedenten als een variant van de verleden tijd (zodat de
zinnen waarin het optreedt SCs zijn), terwijl de meeste andere
grammatica's het juist als een variant van de tegenwoordige tijd
beschouwen (zodat er sprake is van ICs). In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt stelling
genomen tegen het hoogste gezag, met als voornaamste argument dat de
grammatica van het Engels minder consistent lijkt te worden als men
voorwaardelijk should laat optreden in SCs.
Bovendien werpt Hoofdstuk 4 een kritische blik op de notie
'waarschijnlijkheid', voornamelijk omdat vrijwel algemeen de opvatting
heerst dat should het daadwerkelijke plaatsvinden van de gebeurtenis
waamaar verwezen wordt minder waarschijnlijk maakt dan wanneer
gebruik wordt gemaakt van de tegenwoordige tijd. De stelling die in
Hoofdstuk 4 wordt verdedigd luidt dat should uitsluitend aangeeft dat de
spreker de gebeurtenis in kwestie als een theoretische mogelijkheid
beschouwt, en dat deze 'theoreticiteit' van should er tevens voor zorgt dat
normaliter de hoofdzin een 'nu', d.w.z. op het moment van spreken te
nemen, beslissing bevat ten aanzien van de gedragslijn die gevolgd moet
worden als de in de bijzin genoemde 'theoretische' mogelijkbeid
werkelijkheid wordt.
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Oat should in het Engels ook in SCs wordt gebruikt heeft minstens drie
oorzaken: a) het Engels heeft blijkbaar behoefte aan een vorm die het
irrealis-betekenisaspect van de verleden tijd mist. en die minder formeel
klinkt dan het ook beschikbare were to; b) sprekers spriogen nu eenmaal
vaak halverwege over van de ene constructie naar de andere, en bepaalde
frequent gehoorde mengvormen kunnen al gauw 'normaal' gaan k.linken; c)
sommige VZS met should in het antecedent en would in de consequens zijn
grammaticaal onaanvechtbaar, omdat de hypotbetische consequens afbangt
van een eveneens hypotbetische, maar soms niet expliciet gemaakte,
voorwaarde: 'Should Peter drop in, I would leave immediately (if I were
you)'. De laatste twee redenen gelden ook voor het Nederlandse mocht in
voorwaardelijke bijzinnen, maar de eerste niet, omdat het Nederlands hier
beschikt over de zou-vorm. Dit zou kunnen verldaren waarom 'incorrect'
should vaker voorkomt dan 'incorrect' mocht.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift houdt zich bezig met de logica van
VZs. Hoofdstuk 5, dat zich beperkt tot de logica van ICs, neemt
dienaangaande een standpunt in dat door enkele logici wordt gedeeld: de
overeenkomst tussen de Materiele Implicatie van de klassieke logica en ICs
is geen schijn is, en de argumenten die gewoonlijk worden aangevoerd om
het tegendeel te bewijzen, falen om een van de volgende redenen: 1) De
hoofdzin van de IC wordt gelijkgesteld met de consequens, terwijl er in
feite sprake is van een elliptische zin, zodat de hoofdzin slechts een deel is
van de eigenlijke consequens; zo dient men de logische operatie van
Contrapositie (waarbij 'als p dan q' omgezet wordt in het logisch
equivalente 'als Diet q dan Diet p') niet gedachteloos toe te passen op een
zin als 'Als je dorst hebt, dan is er bier in de ijskast' (met als uitkomst het
onzinnige 'Als er geen bier in de ijskast is heb je geen dorst'). VuUen we
het weggevallen gedeelte aan, dan levert Contrapositie het gewenste
resultaat op: 'Als je dorst hebt, dan zal het je genoegen doen te horen dat
er bier in de ijskast is' wordt 'Als het je geen genoegen doet te horen dat
er bier in de ijskast is, dan heb je geen dorst'. 2) Er wordt slordig
omgesprongen met de plaatsing van hulpwerkwoorden, zodat ze, onder
Contrapositie, van het antecedent in de consequent terechtkomen en vice
versa. 3) Het negeren van het bereik van negatie, wat ook bij Contrapositie
weer ernstige gevolgen kan hebben: de zin 'Als het hier regent. regent het
niet hard' wordt dan bijvoorbeeld 'Als het hard regent. regent het hier
niet'. Vervang niet hard door zachsjes en de zaak is opgelost: 'Als bet niet
196 NEDERlANDSE SAMENVAITlNG
zacbtjes (of 'niet niet bard') regent, regent bet bier niet'. 4) Het negeren
van de 'ceteris paribus'-conditie; dit ondergraaft de transitiviteit, een
logiscbe operatie waarbij •aIs P dan q' en 'als q dan r' tesamen de
conclusie 'als p dan r' wettigen. Bijvoorbeeld: 'A1s Jansen voor de
verlciezingen sterft, wint Pietersen' en 'Als Pietersen wint, trekt Jansen
zicb terug uit bet openbare leven', leveren natuurlijk niet samen op: 'A1s
Jansen voor de verkiezingen sterft, trekt bij zicb terug nit bet openbare
leven': de Pietersen die in de tweede zin beeft gewonnen, beeft aan
verkiezingen deelgenomen waaraan ook Jansen deelnam, maar de Pietersen
in de eerste zin niet, De ene q is de andere dus niet meer. 5) Het
gelijkstellen van 'niet (als p dan q)' van de klassieke logica met 'bet is niet
zo dat als ... dan ...'. in naturlijke taal. De logiscb formule 'niet (p dan q)'
betekent eigenlijk 'bet is een contradictie dat (p en q)', terwijI de frase 'bet
is niet zo dat als '" dan' eerder gemterpreteerd moet worden a1s 'bet is niet
noodzakeJijk dat a1s .., dan ...', of ' aIs .... dan niet noodzakelijkerwijs ...'.
Hoewel bet standpunt dat in boofdstuk 6 wordt verdedigd niet door Iogici
wordt gedeeld, bezit bet weI de charme van grote eenvoud: ook SCs
gedragen zicb gebeel waarheidsfunctioneel, en dus geheel overeenkomstig
de Materiele Implicatie van de klassieke logica, met als enige verscbil ten
opzichte van ICs dat bun domein niet de echte wereld is, maar een
denkbeeldige wereld.
De argumenten die logici tegen de correspontie aanvoeren zijn eigenlijk
vrij gering in aantal - maar dat is niet zo verbazingwekkend a1smen beseft
dat velen al vinden dat ICs niet waarbeidsfunctioneel zijn.
Van cruciaal belang is de vraag of de antecedenten van SCs betekenen
dat de gebeurtenis of de stand van zaken die erin genoemd wordt, in de
echte wereld niet plaatsvindt of bet geval is. Betekent bijvoorbeeld 'If I
were invisible. no one would see me' dat de spreker niet onzicbtbaar is?
Hoewel deze vraag ook door vele logici ontkennend beantwoord wordt,
wordt tocb vaak expliciet gesteld dat het antecedent 'onwaar' is. En omdat
bet antecedent onwaar is, wordt de bele VZ net zo waar aIs 'If I were
invisible. everybody would see me'. Als dus toegegeven wordt dat het
antecedent van een SC onwaar is, dan scbeiden zich de wegen van de
Materiele ImpJicatie en de als ...dan-constructie.
Nu zaI een logicus beweren dat a1s hij een antecedent 'onwaar' noemt,
bij daarmee bedoelt 'onwaar in de echte wereld'. Maar (zie boven) 'If I
were invisible' goat niet over de echte wereld, maar over een
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denkbeeldige, en een logicus die wil weten of 'If I were invisible, no one
would see me' waar is in de echte wereld, stelt zich de verkeerde vraag.
Wanneer Contraposiue wordt toegepast op SCs, doen zich twee
problemen voor die afwezig zijn bij ICs: a) bij SCs leidt de operatie
(althans in het Engels) tot ongrammaticale zinnen; en b) bij verschillende
SCs is het resultaat van de operatie een zin die het tegnovergestelde lijkt te
betekenen (bijv. 'Als je filosoof was geweest, had je gezwegen' en z'n
contrapositief 'Als je niet gezwegen had, was je geen filosoof geweest').
Het probleem is opgelost - hoewel de intunies zullen blijven tegenspartelen
- zodra we beseffen dat bet eerste antecedent niet betekent 'Je was geen
filosoof, maar alleen: 'In de denkbeeldige wereld waarin jij filosoof was' .
Ook andere zinnen die moeten bewijzen dat Contrapositie., of
Transitiviteit, bij SCs iets oplevert dat waarheidsfunctioneel anders is dan
de oorspronkelijke SC, slagen daar niet in, of kunnen weerlegd worden met
dezelfde argumenten die in Hoofdstuk 5 al voor ICs zijo aangevoerd.
Als eveowel ICs en SCs logiscb hetzelfde zijn, hoe zit bet dan met ICs
en SCs die elkaars subjunctieve en indicatieve versie lijken te zijn? Een
(beroemd) voorbeeld wordt gevormd door bet paar 'Als Oswald Kennedy
niet vermoord heeft, dan beeft iemand anders het gedaan' en 'Als Oswald
Kennedy niet vermoord had, zou iemand anders bet gedaan bebben'. De
oplossing ligt hier in een in Hoofdstuk 1 reeds ter sprake gebracht
onderscbeid, n1. dat tussen stochastisch en logischlcausaal redeneren. In de
eerste zin volgt de conclusie in de consequens dwingend, terwijl de
conclusie in de tweede consequens gebeel voor de rekeoing van de spreker
komt, en dus bet resultaat is van stochastiscb redenereo. Met andere
woorden: de tweede zin is geen subjunctieve versie van de eerste.
Hoofdstuk 7 gaat in op de pragmatiscbe verschillen tussen ICs en SCs, en
stelt dat die verscbiUen alle te verklaren zijn uit bet feit dat ICs en SCs op
verscbillende domeinen betrekking bebben.
De vraag of ook ICs beschouwd kunnen worden als betrekking bebbend
op mogelijke werelden, wordt nu expliciet gesteld eo negatief beantwoord.
Eveneens wordt afgerekend met het fenomeen 'waarschijnlijkbeid' als
mogelijke basis van de bescbrijving van de verschillen tussen ICs en SCs,
mede met betrekking tot de 'schaal van hypotheticiteit' waarvan Comrie
(1986) beweert dat die binnen VZs loopt van laag (ICs) tot hoog (SCs). Bij
sommige, op de toekomst betrekking bebbende, vzs lijkt het niet uit te
maken of ze als IC of als SC worden geformuleerd; maar zelfs dan blijft er
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een cruciaal verschil, namelijk dat de SC zich afspeelt in het hoofd van de
spreker, en dus in feite 'nu' plaatsvindt
Bij een nauwkeurige beschouwing van ICs die zich niet als een SC laten
herschrijven en vice versa, blijkt dat elke SC een indicatieve versie heeft,
maar dat bet omgekeerde Diet waar is: er zijn ICs zonder subjunctieve
versie, te weten die ICs die een generieke bewering doen. Men kan dus
ook zeggen dat er geen generieke SCs bestaan.
Vele Engelse SCs zijn inherent ambigu, want kunnen ook gernterpreteerd
worden als een IC die betrekking heeft op een gewoonte in bet verleden
(,If be was thirsty, be would take a beer'). Dat die ambigulteit Diet langer
bestaat bij SCs die zich in bet verleden afspelen (,If he bad been thirsty,
be would have taken a beer), is verklaarbaar als men zo'n 'Past' SC niet
bescbouwt als de subjunctieve versie van een Past Ie, maar aileen als de
naar bet verleden verplaatste versie van een Sc.
Dat SCs vaak ambigu zijn betekent overigens niet dat de subjunctieve
constructie structureel ambigu is. De betekenis van de verleden tijd in het
antecedent van SCs is niet meer dan 'niet nu', wat zowel benut kan
worden om over bet verleden te spreken als over een denkbeeldige wereld.
Hoofdstuk 7 besluit met een classificatie van VZs, en legt uit waarom de
term 'counterfactual' beter niet gehanteerd kan worden met betrekking tot
SCs, en eigenlijk alleen van toepassing is op een IC als 'Als u de Paus
bent, ben ik de keizerin van China' - want aileen in zo'n zin moet men,
om tot een ware VZ te komen, uit de onwaarbeid van de consequens de
onwaarheid van bet antecedent afleiden. Bij SCs daarentegen komen
onware antecedenten niet voor.
Stellingen beborende bij bet proefschrift
On conditionals - a study of conditional sentences in English and Dutch
van PJ.G.M. Nieuwint
1 Het antecedent van voorwaardeIijke zinnen dient, met uitzondering van
een vrij zeldzaam indicatief type, altijd als waar bescbouwd te worden;
bij subjunctieve voorwaardelijke zinnen komen onware antecedenten
niet voor. Om bij deze laatste zinnen te spreken van 'waar in deze
wereld' is een emstig misverstand. (Hoofdstuk 6 en 7)
2 Als indicatieve voorwaardelijke zinnen waarbeidsfunctioneel zijn, dan
zijn subjunctieve dat ook. (Hoofdstuk 5 en 6)
3 De notie '(on)waarschijnlijkheid' is zowel bij de vergelijking tussen
indicatieve en subjunctieve voorwaardelijke zinnen als bij subjunctieve
voorwaardelijke zinnen op zich irrelevant. (Hoofdstuk 4)
4 Het is niet zinvol om een onderscheid te maken tussen subjunctieve
voorwaardelijke zinnen en zg. 'counterfactuals', een term die voor-
namelijk tot verwarring aanleiding geeft. (Hoofdstuk 6)
5 In tegenstelling tot wat in Engelse grammatica's wordt beweerd,
bestaat er in de Engelse grammatica geen regel volgens welke non-
volitional will en would niet gebruikt mogen worden in conditione Ie
bijzinnen. (Hoofdstuk 3)
6 Bij de studie van taalveranderiog wordt de rol van de beleefdheid
onderscbat. (Hoofdstuk 1 en 3)
7 Het grote gevaar van bet beoefenen van corpuslingutstiek is dat bet
leidt tot statistiscbe feiten die voor grammaticale regels worden aan-
gezien. Zie bijvoorbeeld Stelling 5.
8 Als de nieuwe druk van een grammatica 50% diller is dan de oude,
kan men er vrij zeker van zijn dat hij tevens 50% slecbter is.
9 De titel A Communicative Grammar of English (Leecb & Svartvik
(1975» bevat een contradictio in terminis.
to Hoewel 'waarbeid bestaat niet' de beknopst denkbare contradictio in
terminis lijkt te zijn, bewijzen woorden als popmuziek en sportnieuws
dat bet nog korter kan.
11 De overeenkomst tussen de taalkundige Prof. Dr. P'C, Paardekooper en
de letterkundige Dr. W.F. Hermans is dat zij beiden, door met de
regelmaat van de klok anderen te kapittelen over slecbt Nederlands,
gebeel ten onrecbte de indruk wekken zelf goede stilisten te zijn.
12 De zoveelste toepassing van de wet van Murpby: in Nederland
vertrekken de treinen altijd minstens een minuut te laat, bebalve
wanneer men zelf een minuut te laat op bet station aankomt.
13 Op de regel dat de uitzondering de regeJ bevestigt is de regeJ dat de
uitzondering de regel bevestigt de regeJ die de uitzondering bevestigt.
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